RESEARCH PAPER 08/56 British foreign policy 23 JUNE 2008 since 1997 Three key motifs of British foreign policy during the premiership of former Prime Minister Tony Blair were the pursuit of an activist philosophy of ‘interventionism’, maintaining a strong alliance with the US and a commitment to placing Britain at the heart of Europe. Between 1997 and 2007 there were also important reforms to the strategic and institutional frameworks for the formulation and delivery of foreign policy. Focusing on these areas, this Research Paper reviews the development of British foreign policy since 1997. In doing so, it also looks at how much has changed since Gordon Brown replaced Tony Blair as Prime Minister in June 2007. The Paper is not an exhaustive consideration of all aspects of British foreign policy or of every aspect of the operations of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office since 1997. For issues not covered by this Paper, Members and their staff should contact the appropriate Research Sections of the Library. They may also want to consult the Library’s Research Papers on British defence policy since 1997 and British defence policy since 1997: Background issues. Also relevant are Standard Notes SN/IA/4742, The foreign policies of the main opposition parties and SN/IA/4743, British foreign policy since 1997: A select bibliography. 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Authors are available to discuss the contents of these papers with Members and their staff but cannot advise members of the general public. We welcome comments on our papers; these should be sent to the Research Publications Officer, Room 407, 1 Derby Gate, London, SW1A 2DG or e-mailed to [email protected] ISSN 1368-8456 Summary Three key motifs of Tony Blair’s 10-year premiership were an activist philosophy of ‘interventionism’, maintaining a strong alliance with the US and a commitment to placing Britain at the heart of Europe. While the ‘special relationship’ and the question of Britain’s role in Europe have been central to British foreign policy since the Second World War, many have argued that interventionism was a genuinely new element. There were also other, less immediately visible, changes to British foreign policy during his premiership as a consequence of reforms to the strategic and institutional frameworks for the formulation and delivery of that policy. Although there has been some recalibration in terms of these three key motifs since Gordon Brown became Prime Minister in June 2007, so far there has been more continuity than change in British foreign policy since Blair left office. This is also true in terms of the strategic and institutional frameworks. Tony Blair’s adoption of an interventionist foreign policy was set in motion by the 1999 Kosovo crisis, during which he made his now famous ‘Chicago speech’, unveiling a ‘doctrine of the international community’. However, the events of 11 September 2001 created a context in which the emerging concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ was affected by the perceived imperatives of the ‘war on terror’. Blair’s interventionism was criticised on three main grounds: that while it was sincerely intended, it was fundamentally misguided; that while the broad intentions were good and the overall objectives desirable, implementation was sometimes misguided or inconsistent; and, finally, that it was largely a cynical smokescreen for ‘business as usual’. Blair and his supporters mounted vigorous defences, reasserting the unavoidability of needing on occasions to deploy ‘hard power’, but the war in Iraq left them struggling to regain the initiative. The Brown Government has sought to re-legitimise interventionism by (re)linking it more closely to conflict prevention and humanitarian agendas, including through the emerging legal norm known as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. However, it has not entirely repudiated the exercise of military power. It could hardly do so while British troops remain in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has emphasised that military action in future genuinely will be a ‘last resort’. In this regard, Iran could be the biggest test on the horizon. But observers question whether either the political appetite or operational capability exists for significant new military operations in the foreseeable future. Tony Blair began his premiership by seeking to reformulate the ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the US in the aftermath of the Cold War. While President Bill Clinton was in office, he strongly promoted the idea of Britain as a ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe. Despite their ideological proximity, Blair and Clinton did not always see eye to eye, for example over Kosovo. Blair and Clinton’s successor, President George W Bush, were brought together on a ‘war footing’ following the events of 11 September 2001. Blair decided that the ‘war on terror’ provided an opportunity to demonstrate British commitment to its relationship with the US and to act as a go-between with the rest of the world, including Europe. However, the attempt to make Britain the ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe ultimately foundered over Iraq. The ‘bridge’ metaphor subsequently disappeared from British official discourse. Critics also argued that Blair had been unable to negotiate any meaningful ‘paybacks’ from the Bush administration on other issues in return for his loyalty, for example on Israel and the Palestinians. For a while, the very term ‘special relationship’ reportedly fell out of favour in British official circles. After Gordon Brown came to power, his new government, while continuing to describe the US as its most important bilateral partner, appeared initially somewhat to distance itself from the Bush administration. There were indications of discontent on the part of the administration about British plans to further reduce troop numbers in Iraq, although these plans were formed during the last year of the Blair premiership. However, since spring 2008 the Brown Government has initiated a rapprochement. The process of troop reduction in Iraq has been put on hold for the moment. It seems likely that the main goal is to create more permissive conditions for a revival of the ‘special relationship’ around a shared and more multilateral global agenda when the next President takes over in the White House in January 2009. However, some analysts argue that there are longer-term structural forces at work, leading to increasingly divergent strategic interests, which could hinder any such future revival. Tony Blair came to power in 1997 echoing pledges of predecessors to put Britain ‘at the heart of Europe’. He did so with the advantages of a party that was not particularly divided over Europe and a massive parliamentary majority. However, while strongly committed to EU enlargement, it was – again like its predecessors – ambivalent about closer integration, tending to prefer voluntary and intergovernmental co-operation, for example, on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and determined to secure Treaty ‘opt-outs’ and national vetoes for Britain when deemed necessary. In addition, it held back from joining the single European currency, the euro, on the grounds that the economic conditions were not right. While it supported the idea of an EU Constitution in principle, it felt compelled to agree to hold a referendum on it, although this subsequently became unnecessary. Two waves of enlargement during the Blair premiership created a wider choice of allies for Britain within the EU. However, by the time he left office, many of the more pro-integration countries within the EU felt that he had broken his pledge of ten years earlier. The Brown Government has so far acted much as a Blair Government would probably have done had its term of office continued. Its main preoccupation has been to navigate the treacherous political waters of the Treaty of Lisbon, taking care to counter portrayals of it as a revival of the Constitution or as primarily an instrument for further integration. If this can be achieved, the Government hopes that the EU will subsequently focus on more ‘outward- looking’ agendas, including further enlargement and strengthening the Union’s capability to project power and influence around the world. Brown has spoken approvingly of a “Global Europe.” For as long as Gordon Brown is Prime Minister, it is difficult to envisage dramatic changes in Britain’s generally cautious posture towards the euro.