The Politics of Fraud: A Seruilius Casca in Livy Paul Jarvis In the late second century BCE two wealthy members of the publicani committed an audacious fraud against the state. They had received the contracts for army supplies in 215 BCE, during a crucial period of the Second Punic War.1 The paper examines Livy’s account of this incident and its aftermath, in which he records the methods employed to condemn the malefactors, and the efforts of the one man prosecuted to save himself. The objective is twofold: i) to analyse Livy’s account of the political influence that the publicani displayed throughout this incident, and ii) to examine the misleading account of the tribune C. Seruilius, to whom Livy attributes the cognomen Casca. The identity and actions of this C. Seruilius ‘Casca’, a tribune of 212, have no small bearing on the incident. Ernst Badian’s brief analysis relies too heavily on a chronological argument; on this basis he unjustly dismisses the caution displayed by the senate in dealing with the unfolding events. Before proceeding it is worthwhile to discuss the approach and relevant terminology. First, the approach taken. The investigation of the evolving political power of the publicani as a class is feasible due to this instance of conflict. The publicani rarely constituted anything like a modern political party or even a Roman factio.2 It is only when a threat was perceived to their pursuit of profit that sufficient numbers of the publicani would unite to exert political influence.3 The same is true of the senate in this conflict: to use the term collectively and imply a unified front is almost always hazardous; the senate was the public expression of an oligarchy dedicated to fierce personal and factional competition.4 Nevertheless, the instance investigated comprises a serious enough conflict to crystallise for a time the fundamental differences and objectives of the two groups. This crystallisation drew clear lines based on self-interest: for the publicani, that they might pursue their profits with minimal state interference; for the senate, that they might exercise sufficient power over the state to maintain the status quo essential for the successful functioning of the oligarchic system. These differences were eventually exploited by an ambitious nobilis for his own ends; time and circumstance had by then made the differences more obvious.5 It is further pertinent to define the term publicani. Publicanus in this paper is used to mean any individual engaged in the bidding for and fulfilling of public contracts. This usage thus excludes the employees of a publicanus.6 The term encompasses members of the equites and other lesser 1 All dates are BCE unless otherwise noted. 2 T. R. S. Broughton, “Comment” in ed. R. Seager, The Crisis of the Roman Republic (Cambridge, 1969), pp 118- 9. Originally printed in Second International Conference of Economic History vol. 1 (1962), pp. 150-62. All references are to the pagination in Seager. 3 The prosecution of Quintus Mucius Scaevola’s legate Publius Rutilius Rufus in 92 is a good example of another such occasion, as are the efforts in the senate of Crassus in 61 on behalf of the publicani operating in Asia. For Scaevola and Rutilius cf. E. Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts (Harvard, 1968), pp. 204-6. For Crassus’ actions in 61, cf. B. A. Marshall, Crassus: a Political Biography (Amsterdam, 1976), pp. 97-9. 4 E. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 121-2. His remarks are equally applicable to the period examined by this paper. 5 Gaius Gracchus in 123-2 BCE. Cf. P.A. Brunt, “The Equites in the Late Republic” in ed. R. Seager, The Crisis of the Roman Republic (Cambridge, 1969), p. 85. Originally printed in Second International Conference of Economic History vol. 1 (1962), pp. 117-49. All references are to the pagination in Seager. 6 This conforms to Livy’s use of the term at 25.3.17-18; 25.4.2; 25.5.1; 43.16.3; 45.18.4. At 34.9.12 he uses the word redemptor (contractor) to refer to what are presumably the agents of one or more publicani in Spain: redemptoribus vetitis frumentum parare ac Romam dimissis (with the contractors forbidden to buy grain and dismissed to Rome). ASCS 31 [2010] Proceedings: classics.uwa.edu.au/ascs31 1 members of the first class.7 It is important to note that the publicani were spread among the whole first class: even those publicani who qualified for the equestrian census were mixed among such equites as the landed gentry of Italian towns, rural landowners such as (most prominently) the fathers of Marius and Cicero and the forebears of Pompeius.8 In a political sense, the significance of the publicani lies in the fact that they were, more than the rural men of means, present in Rome itself.9 I. The incident has its origin in 215. At 23.48.6ff., Livy records the situation. The senate was short of money and Hannibal was still at large in Italy.10 The senate requested that those (23.48.10) qui redempturis auxissent patrimonia (who had increased their property by contracts) extend credit to the government in the contracts for supplies for the army and navy.11 Nineteen men came forward, comprising three companies.12 These companies were composed of powerful publicani.13 The wealth required for gaining these large and important contracts was in the hands of relatively few individuals, who organised themselves into partnerships for the fulfilling of particular contracts.14 We may presume they performed many other services through the system of letting contracts.15 The usual number of bidders for a large contract is unknown; presumably in this case the number was 7 The publicani, particularly toward the last fifty years of the middle Republic and thereafter, were spread throughout the first class. Cf. Livy 43.16.2 and M. I. Henderson, “The Establishment of the Equester Ordo” The Journal of Roman Studies 53 (1963) p. 62f; Brunt, pp. 89-92. 8 Marius and Cicero were from wealthy families near Arpinum, Pompeius came from a similar background in Picenum. On Marius and Cicero see M. Gelzer, The Roman Nobility (Oxford, 1969), trans. R. Seager, pp. 17, 131; T. F. Carney, A Biography of C. Marius (Chicago, 1970), pp. 8-9. On Pompeius see Gelzer, p. 93. 9 Hence by default more involved in politics. Cf. E. Badian, Publicans and Sinners (Oxford, 1972), pp. 50-3; Brunt, pp. 88-9. 10 Livy 23.48.6ff. 11 Livy 23.48.10-12. 12 Livy 23.49.1. 13 Cf. Livy 25.1.2, where Pomponius Veientanus is described as a praefectus socium and gathers an army to fight Hanno. He is referred to at 25.1.4 as ante publicanus omnibus malis artibus et rei publicae et societatibus infidus damnosusque ([he had been] previously a publicanus with all the false tricks; faithless and harmful to the state and to companies). Faithless or not, he can certainly be classified as a publicanus of note. As for Postumius, Livy at 25.3.15 describes him as a relative of the tribune Seruilius Casca. This is not firm proof given the issue of the identity of this Seruilius, but it is also not impossible. It seems therefore probable that both men moved in high enough circles to be considered prominent publicani, placing them firmly among the first class. See also Badian (1972), p. 18; H. Hill, The Roman Middle Class in the Republican Period (Oxford, 1952), pp. 51f. 14 Livy at 23.49.1 states that the nineteen men who came forward to complete the contract comprised tres societates. It is difficult to see how such large contracts could have been undertaken without the formation of such companies, which required large securities of land on the part of the members to obtain contracts. ILLRP 518 is an example of a company being formed for a relatively small contract in 105 at Puteoli. The sum is 1500 sesterces, and one of the five men named is listed as praes (57-9): C. Blossius Q. f. | (sestertiis) MD, idem praes, Q. Fuficius Q. f. |Cn. Tetteius Q. f. C. Granius C. f. Ti. Crassicius. Although this inscription is dated securely to 105, it is logical to infer that this system, if in place for such a small contract, was also in place for large ones and that in large contracts several of the socii could be joint praedes. The praedium itself was land (55-6): praedia satis | subsignata erunt (they will have guaranteed sufficient farms), cf. also Cic. Flac. 80; Polyb. 6.17. 15 See Livy 4.22.7; 5.23.7; 6.32.1; 9.43.25 for contracts for public buildings, the dates of which stretch back to 435. Cf. Brunt, pp 104-5. Brunt notes correctly that Livy at 23.48.6f is emphasising the novelty of the contracts being fulfilled on credit, not the novelty of the system itself, which implies that Livy at least believed that the system was in place long before. 2 lower than the norm due to the war. The few individuals who had come forward to accept the contract in this case were aware of the powerful position they were in. It is possibly due to this low number of bidders that Livy does not mention competition for the contracts let in 215. This lack of competition is understandable given the situation in Italy at the time – one year after Cannae, Hannibal was a very real threat to the Roman state.16 This state of affairs enabled the publicani to make certain demands and to undertake what was effectively a risk-free venture: their supplies at sea were fully insured by the state,17 and they themselves were excused from military service.18 The publicani represented the only way the state could, at this time, obtain army and navy supplies, and they took advantage of their situation.19 A mixture of both patriotism and opportunism is conceivable.