The London School of Economics and Political Science Conspiracy, coup d’état and civil war in Seville (1936-1939): History and myth in Francoist Spain Rúben Emanuel Leitão Prazeres Serém A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, November 2012 1 Declaration I, Ruben Emanuel Leitão Prazeres Serém, hereby declare that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I declare that my thesis consists of 105,340 words. 2 Abstract This thesis deconstructs the bases of enduring Francoist myth that General Queipo de Llano heroically conquered Seville with a handful of soldiers. Having established the full ramifications of that conquest, it goes on to assess the political, social, economic and cultural implications of the Spanish Civil War in Seville, the largest urban centre to fall to the military rebels at the beginning of the conflict. Chapter I examines the nature and infrastructure of the military conspiracy against the democratic Republic developed in response to the Popular Front electoral victory of February 1936. Chapter II scrutinises the career of General Queipo, in particular his metamorphosis from a marginal figure in the conspiracy into a rebel secular saint. Chapter III dismantles the legend that Queipo directed a small group of soldiers that miraculously conquered Seville and examines how the myth was exploited to legitimise political repression. Chapter IV demonstrates how the bloody pacification of Seville by nearer to 6,000 men exemplified the conspirators’ determination to eliminate the Republic by extreme violence. It shows how the use of the most brutal methods of colonial war was employed against civilians all over rebel-controlled territory. Chapter V analyses the painful transition from insurrection to civil war from a novel perspective: fundraising campaigns. It quantifies the devastating consequences of Nationalist economic repression. Finally, Chapter VI demystifies the legend of a Catholic Church persecuted by a ‘Judeo-Masonic’ conspiracy. It concludes that anticlericalism was a popular form of protest that pre-dated the establishment of the II Republic by analysing/quantifying patterns of religiosity, revealing that only 1.44% of the local population regularly attended Church in 1930s Seville; and investigating the development of the Catholic Church into the main cultural institution in Nationalist Spain that sanctified the transformation of myth into History. 3 Conspiracy, coup d’état and civil war in Seville (1936-1939): History and myth in Francoist Spain: Contents page Chapter I: From coup de main to coup d’état: the conspiracy against the II Spanish Republic (February-July 1936) 5-41 Chapter II: Constructing the myth: General Queipo de Llano and the conspiracy in Seville (February-July 1936) 42-77 Chapter III: Deconstructing the myth: the legend of General Queipo de Llano and his soldaditos 78-128 Chapter IV: Institutionalising Terror in Rebel Spain: the pacification of the working-class districts of Seville (19-23 July 1936) 129-61 Chapter V: The forging of a Kleptocratic State: economic repression in Nationalist Seville (1936- 1937) 162-206 Chapter VI: The “apostasy of the masses”: cultural repression and the Catholic Church during the II Republic and the Spanish Civil War (1931-39) 207-58 Conclusion 259-67 Tables 268-78 Bibliography 279-93 4 Chapter I From coup de main to coup d’état: the conspiracy against the II Spanish Republic (February-July 1936) Introduction: the 16 February general elections and events of 17-19 February 1936 The 17-18 July 1936 military coup d’état, which degenerated into the bloody Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, was the single most defining event in XX-Century Spanish History.1 It was the most traumatic too, so much so that the country is still trying to come to terms with its painful legacy. Ironically, the rebellion that shaped modern Spain was never supposed to have taken place. Precisely six months before the outbreak of the insurgency - 17 February 1936 - some of its key figures attempted to quietly put the II Spanish Republic to death. Following the narrow victory of the leftist Popular Front in the hotly-contested 16 February 1936 general elections, the different factions of the right might have disagreed with regard to the future political outlook of Spain, but were unanimous in their opposition to the new government.2 Indeed, had the insurrectionary wishes of General Francisco Franco Bahamonde and José María Gil Robles (the leader of the strongest party of the political right, the CEDA3) been endorsed by the interim Prime-Minister, the conservative Manuel Portela Valladares, there would have been no need for the July rebellion. So determined were Franco and Gil Robles to annul the vote that at 3:15am of the night of 16-17 February Gil Robles woke up Portela (who had concluded his workday at 1:00am) and insisted on a meeting with him. The CEDA leader was hoping to pressure the Prime-Minister into declaring martial law and postponing his planned resignation. This would in turn allow the army, under the overall command of General Franco, to seize power and annul the elections (all under a veneer of legality). Portela rejected both of Gil Robles’ demands, but agreed to decree a state of alert 1 17 July in Spanish Morocco; 18 July in mainland Spain. 2 Electoral results in Seville (capital): Popular Front: 61,5%; Right: 35,8%; Falange 0,7% (total: 97,4%). Electoral results in the province of Seville: Popular Front: 32,7%; Centre-right: 26,5% (total: 59,2%). Gómez Salvago, José, La Segunda República, pages 222-23. Electoral results in Spain: Electores: 13,553,710; Votantes: 9,864,783 (72%). Popular Front (Popular Front + Centre in Lugo): 4,555,401 + 98,715 (34,3%). Centre-Right: 2,636,524 (33,2%). Tusell, Javier, Las elecciones del Frente Popular en España, vol. 2, pages 13 and 24-28. For electoral fraud in Granada see pages 123-91. 3 Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas. See: Montero, José Ramón, La CEDA, 2 vols.; Robinson, Richard, The origins of Franco’s Spain. For the memoirs of its leader see: Gil Robles, José María, No fué posible la paz. 5 (estado de alarma). Another even more dramatic meeting was imposed on the Prime-Minister by Gil Robles at 8:30am on 19 February under a pine tree on the outskirts of Madrid, just before Portela tendered his resignation. Moreover, General Franco twice met Portela and twice was shunned by the Prime-Minister. Franco had already failed to convince the Director-General of the Civil Guard, General Sebastián Pozas Perea, to join forces with himself and Gil Robles. On the night of 17 February, the Chief of the General Staff of the Spanish Army met with Portela to offer his services to restore public order in Spain. The offer was rejected and, during the cabinet meeting of that same day (just a few hours after the first Gil Robles-Portela Valladares meeting), the Prime- Minister persuaded President Niceto Alcalá-Zamora into signing an order proclaiming martial law, which was to be put in use only in case of emergency. Not one to take rejection lightly, General Franco took matters into his own hands and persuaded several military garrisons into declaring martial law, which amounted to a coup de main. To complete the circle of right-wing forces attempting to suffocate the yet-to-be inaugurated Popular Front government, on the night of 18 February José Calvo Sotelo, representing the monarchist party Bloque Nacional, also paid a visit to the Prime-Minister. The following morning, a fatigued Portela Valladares tendered his resignation and handed power to Manuel Azaña Díaz, leader of the moderate left-wing Izquierda Republicana (IR) party.4 Not everyone was willing to concede defeat just yet. When General Manuel Goded Llopis heard of Azaña’s ascension to power, he headed straight to the Montaña Barracks in Madrid and attempted to organise an impromptu rebellion against the Republic. The impulsive general 4 For the events that followed the 16 February elections, including photographic evidence of the declaration of martial law in Zaragoza see: ABC (Madrid), 19 February 1936 (as far as ABC was concerned, the new government would seek to “legitimar la revolución”). Its edition of 20 February edition fronted a photograph of Portela Valladares with the comment “crisis total” (in reference to the Prime-Minister’s resignation). However, Portela Valladares clarified the situation regarding a possible declaration of martial law: “queda autorizado el presidente para declarar el estado de guerra donde sea necesario”, ABC (Madrid) 17 February 1936. For the failed coup de main see: Gil Robles, José María, No fué posible la paz, pages 492-98; Alcalá-Zamora y Torres, Niceto, Memorias, page 347; Maíz, B. Félix, Alzamiento en España, page 37; Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, General Queipo de Llano, page 82; Portela Valladares, Manuel, Memorias, pages 175-85; Preston, Paul, The coming of Spanish Civil War, pages 242-44; Preston, Paul, Franco, pages 115-119. 6 failed to persuade the local officers into accepting his bizarre proposal and eventually abandoned the garrison, in his own words, “asqueado y rabioso”.5 The political right learned several invaluable lessons from the 16-19 February events: a) that the Republic would not surrender without a fight; b) that the army was divided in its sympathies, which compromised the possibility of a swift coup d’état; and c) that the battle- hardened Civil Guard would play a key role in any subversive enterprise.