IRAQ'S KURDS: TOWARD AN HISTORIC COMPROMISE? 8 April 2004 ICG Middle East Report N°26 Amman/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: THE FEDERALISM FRACAS .................................................... 1 II. INDEPENDENCE OR FEDERALISM?...................................................................... 5 III. THE KIRKUK CRUCIBLE .......................................................................................... 8 A. DUELLING NARRATIVES........................................................................................................9 B. DE-ARABISATION ...............................................................................................................10 C. SHARING KIRKUK ...............................................................................................................15 IV. TOWARD AN HISTORIC COMPROMISE?......................................................... 17 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 22 APPENDICES A. MAP OF IRAQ ......................................................................................................................24 B. MAP OF IRAQI KURDISTAN..................................................................................................25 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................26 D. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS .................................................................................27 E. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................33 ICG Middle East Report N°26 8 April 2004 IRAQ'S KURDS: TOWARD AN HISTORIC COMPROMISE? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The removal of the Ba'ath regime in 2003 opened a Meanwhile, away from the give and take of the Pandora's box of long-suppressed aspirations, none as negotiations in Baghdad, the Kurds are contributing potentially explosive as the Kurds' demand, expressed mightily to a volatile atmosphere by creating publicly and with growing impatience, for wide-ranging demographic and administrative facts in Kirkuk, using autonomy in a region of their own, including the oil- their numbers and superior organisation to undo rich governorate of Kirkuk. If mismanaged, the Kurdish decades of Arabisation and stake a strong claim to the question could fatally undermine the political transition area. The Turkoman, Arab and Assyro-Chaldean and lead to renewed violence. Kurdish leaders need to communities are increasingly worried about Kurdish speak more candidly with their followers about the domination evident in control of key directorates, compromises they privately acknowledge are required, strength on the provincial council and the steady return and the international community needs to work more of Kurds displaced by past Arabisation campaigns in a proactively to help seal the historic deal. process that many see as reverse ethnic cleansing. In March 2004, rising tensions led the Arab and Turkoman The Kurdish demand for a unified, ethnically-defined members to resign from the Kirkuk provincial council. region of their own with significant powers and control A pattern, new for Kirkuk, has begun to emerge of over natural resources has run up against vehement sectarian-based protests that erupt into violence. opposition from Iraqi Arabs, including parties that, while still in exile, had broadly supported it. The Kurds Significantly, however, the tough bargaining and rhetoric in turn vigorously objected to the kind of federalism during the TAL negotiations and the friction in Kirkuk envisaged in the agreement reached in November 2003 mask a profound shift in Kurdish strategy that is yet to by Paul Bremer of the Coalition Provisional Authority be broadcast and understood publicly. The top leadership (CPA) and the Interim Governing Council, which would of the two principal Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan have been based on Iraq's eighteen existing governorates, Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of including three individual, predominately Kurdish ones, Kurdistan (PUK), is offering Iraqi Arabs what amounts and have left them without control of Kirkuk. to an historic compromise: acceptance of an autonomous region as the maximum objective of the Kurdish national A series of negotiations produced a compromise in the movement they represent and, even more importantly, interim constitution (Transitional Administrative Law, a willingness, expressed in interviews with ICG, to TAL) signed on 8 March 2004 that recognised a single abandon the exclusive claim to Kirkuk in favour of a Kurdish region effectively equivalent to what the sharing arrangement under which the city and Kurds have governed in semi-independence since 1991 governorate would receive a special status. (that is, without Kirkuk), elevated Kurdish to official language status alongside Arabic and met another Regrettably, Kurdish leaders have yet to announce their Kurdish demand by providing that a census would be decision or start preparing the Kurdish people for this held in Kirkuk before its final status was determined. profound and seemingly genuine strategic shift. Indeed, In return, the Kurdish leaders accepted postponement there is a growing discrepancy between what the Kurds of the knotty Kirkuk question until the constitutional want, what they say they want and what non-Kurds process that begins only sometime in 2005 is complete suspect they want. Given strong pro-independence and a legitimate and sovereign Iraqi government has sentiments in both the Kurdish region and Kurdish been established through direct elections. diaspora, they may encounter large-scale popular opposition to their plan at precisely the time -- the run- up to the constitutional process -- when they will need Iraq's Kurds: Toward an Historic Compromise? ICG Middle East Report N°26, 8 April 2004 Page ii to persuade a sceptical Arab public, as well as 3. Halt the return of displaced Kurds to Kirkuk city neighbouring states such as Turkey, of their true and governorate until and unless the Property intentions in order to realise even their reduced Claims Commission has ruled favourably in cases aspirations. For their part, Arab leaders have yet to of individual Kurdish families. lower their rhetoric and negotiate seriously with their 4. Step up efforts to reunify the Kurdistan Regional Kurdish counterparts to preserve Iraq's unity by Government, starting with the "service" ministries hammering out constitutional guarantees assuring and the Kurdistan National Assembly, and -- Kurds that the atrocities of the past will not recur. within a year -- encompass the remainder of the If the U.S.-designed political transition comes unstuck in administration, including the peshmerga militias. the face of continuing Sunni alienation and insurgency 5. Organise free and fair elections to the Kurdistan and escalating Shiite discontent, as the events of April National Assembly, according to the national 2004's first week threaten, Kurdish leaders may alter timetable as laid out in the Transitional their stance again and be tempted to protect the gains Administrative Law (TAL) and in no case later they have made since 1991 by asserting unilateral than 31 January 2005. control over claimed territories, including Kirkuk. That would likely cross a Turkish red line and risk a grave To the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) regional confrontation. Even if matters calm down and and the Interim Governing Council: the political transition is able to proceed more or less as planned, however, the Kurdish question will require 6. Establish offices of the Property Claims sustained international engagement. Commission in Kirkuk rapidly, and make available all the necessary resources for the The occupying powers, and the international commission to start receiving, processing and community more generally, should pay heed to the adjudicating claims forthwith and at a steady Kurds' fair demands. Continuing instability, the Kurds' pace. high expectations and their ability not only to express but possibly to realise long-standing aspirations by 7. Help Iraqis redistribute administrative power institutional power or violence make it imperative for in Kirkuk as soon as possible in order to non-Iraqi actors, including the UN, to step in and balance the interests and sizes of the principal mediate a fair resolution of competing claims. Failure to communities more fairly. quench the Kurdish thirst, after 80 years of betrayals, 8. Set up a committee charged with monitoring discrimination and state-sponsored violence, for a broad margin of freedom within a unitary Iraq could well pave claims of abuse of power and discrimination the way for more radical elements to gain the upper in Kirkuk and thereby helping the local hand in the Kurdish community and press a separatist authorities to redress them. agenda -- with possibly disastrous consequences for Iraq and the region. To U.S. Forces in Kirkuk: 9. Continue to ban weapons in Kirkuk, disarm RECOMMENDATIONS any person carrying a weapon without a permit, and conduct searches of political party To the Kurdish Leadership: offices and their affiliates for the illegal possession of weapons. 1. Start preparing the Kurdish public now for the compromise solution on Kirkuk and Kurdish To the UN: national aspirations that senior Kurdish officials