. Taiwan’s Place in the Evolving Security Environment of East Asia . - 616 Serra Mall, Room E301 A Workshop Report by the ..- Stanford, CA 94305-6055 Phone: 650.724.5647 Taiwan Democracy and Security Project aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/research/us-asia-security-initiative July 2018 U.S.-Asia Security Initiative Taiwan’s Place in the Evolving Security Environment of East Asia Workshop Report July 2018 Prepared by Kharis Templeman The 2017–18 Taiwan Democracy and Security Project workshop was made possible in part by generous and continuing support from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in San Francisco. Taiwan Democracy and Security Project U.S.-Asia Security Initiative Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Stanford University U.S.-Asia Security Initiative Executive Summary he greatest threat to Taiwan’s contin- at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia- ued place among the world’s liberal Pacific Research Center, convened a work- Tdemocracies is today external, not in- shop that examined Taiwan’s place in the ternal. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) evolving security environment of East Asia. has always posed an existential threat to the Participants from the United States, Taiwan, regime on Taiwan, but its growing econom- and elsewhere in Asia were experts on a wide ic influence, rapid military modernization, array of economic, diplomatic, and security increasingly assertive maritime claims, and topics. The discussions at the workshop were newly aggressive diplomatic efforts to isolate intended to place Taiwan’s security challeng- Taiwan from international bodies have accel- es in a broader regional context, to consider erated in recent years. Put simply, Taiwan’s possible obstacles to and opportunities for long-term future as a democracy and de facto greater multilateral cooperation on security independent state is jeopardized by China’s issues, and to devise a set of recommenda- rise. tions for steps that Taiwan and its friends and partners could take to enhance regional secu- The PRC’s growing power presents diffi- rity relationships. cult security challenges for most of the coun- tries in the Indo-Pacific region, not just for REPORT HIGHLIGHTS Taiwan. But these challenges are rarely con- sidered from a multilateral perspective. Most Negative attitudes toward the PRC regime U.S. analyses of security issues in the Western are hardening in the United States. The Pacific tend instead to focus on bilateral or past two years have coincided with a sea trilateral (U.S.-China-Country X) relation- change in U.S. elite attitudes toward China ships. This pattern is especially common in across many domains. Within diplomatic, mil- discussions of Taiwan’s security, where the itary, business, and academic circles, a large emphasis is on cross-Strait and U.S.-Taiwan majority now view China’s economic, politi- relations to the neglect of Taiwan’s other re- cal, and military trajectories and behavior in gional and global partnerships. much less positive terms than even five years With this context in mind, in March 2018 ago. This shift in attitudes extends across the the Taiwan Democracy and Security Project, partisan divide. This pattern is increasingly a part of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative evident in Congress, where concern about 4 China’s rise is now one of the few issue areas still remaining under a threshold that would on which Republicans and Democrats share trigger a response from the United States and similar views. other nations. Taiwan has little leverage to re- spond to PRC actions on its own. The Trump administration’s response to the challenges posed by the PRC has focused too Taiwan remains an important partner for the heavily on military posture, and not enough United States in the Western Pacific, and the on other elements of American power and U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security has influence. The National Security Strategy implications for its other partners and al- and National Defense Strategy both desig- lies in the region. Particularly in the face of nate China as a strategic competitor, and Chinese efforts to undermine U.S. influence U.S. Pacific Command has been renamed in Asia, Taiwan has an important symbolic “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command” to make more role to play. A strong U.S. relationship with explicit that America’s competition with the Taiwan sends a powerful signal to other allies PRC now spans both the Indian and Pacific and partners, including Japan, South Korea, Oceans. But while the current administration and the nations of Southeast Asia, that the has adopted a more forceful military posture United States remains willing to bear costs in in the region to reassure allies and partners, order to counter growing Chinese power. Any it has also pursued strategies in other do- weakening of America’s long-standing policy mains that have weakened the U.S. position, embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 including withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific (which stipulates any effort to determine Partnership (TPP), imposing tariffs against the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful allies as well as against the PRC, and taking a means is to be regarded as threat to the peace skeptical view even of bilateral trade agree- and security of the Western Pacific area and ments. The latest federal budget has also put of grave concern to the United States) would the United States on a path of ever-greater have negative consequences for Taiwan, the fiscal risk and reinforced concerns among United States, and the stability of the entire many countries in the region that U.S. nation- Indo-Pacific Region. al power is in long-term decline. Taiwan is currently vulnerable to PRC pres- The PRC will continue to increase pressure sure and needs to strengthen its resolve to on Taiwan absent a stronger U.S. and inter- take appropriate actions as well as its resil- national response. China’s stance toward ience in the face of an increasingly aggressive Taiwan changed as soon as President Tsai China. Taiwan’s economy is more depen- Ing-wen took office in 2016 and refused to dent on the PRC than that of any other coun- endorse the “1992 Consensus.” Especially try in the world. Its military no longer holds since the Communist Party’s 19th Congress a qualitative advantage over the People’s in November 2017, Beijing has pursued poli- Liberation Army (PLA), and its open and cies that shrink Taiwan’s domestic and inter- democratic political system appears vulner- national space. They have more aggressively able to Chinese influence operations and to employed United Front tactics to win allies in both subtle and direct efforts to weaken trust Taiwan and isolate Tsai and the Democratic in government institutions. Nevertheless, Progressive Party (DPP); used both policy car- Taiwan could realistically pursue policies and rots and sticks in an attempt to shape Taiwan’s make investments over the next few years economy in ways that work to Beijing’s ben- that significantly strengthen its military, eco- efit; and ratcheted up military exercises near nomic, and political resilience, and these nec- the island. Each of these steps mimics the essary measures should be encouraged and “salami-slicing” tactics that Beijing has em- supported by the United States. ployed elsewhere to increase pressure while 5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR with Taiwan in forums such as Asia-Pacific THE UNITED STATES: Economic Cooperation (APEC, in which Taiwan is already a member) and to include Enhance U.S.-Taiwan cooperation across Taiwan in other multilateral conversations multiple arenas. Taiwan’s security envi- and negotiations, including, potentially, the ronment continues to grow more precarious Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement in the face of a rapidly modernizing PLA. The for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or “TPP- United States should continue to enhance 11”). and deepen high-payoff exchanges between Consider a “tit-for-tat” approach to respond the U.S. and Taiwan armed forces. In addition, to Beijing’s “salami-slicing” tactics against restarting a process of regular arms sales Taiwan. Beijing will continue to take steps will allow Taiwan military planners to better that further isolate Taiwan in internation- match resources with strategic goals. al arenas, threaten its security, damage its Consider negotiating bilateral trade and in- economy, and undercut its democratically vestment treaties with Taiwan. Under the elected leadership. All of these actions are Trump administration, trade deficits have changes to the relationship that existed be- become a political lightning rod in America’s fore President Tsai Ing-wen took office, and, relations with most of its allies and partners taken together, challenge the credibility of around the world. Both Taiwan and the United U.S. statements about opposing “unilater- States could, however, benefit from entering al changes to the status quo.” Furthermore, into reciprocal tax and investment treaties because Taiwan has limited means to oppose that are politically less sensitive. Progress on Beijing’s actions, these steps will continue issues like these would signal to the region the absent a firm U.S. response. The Trump ad- deepening of U.S. cooperation with Taiwan, ministration should therefore consider taking including the use of non-military elements steps that impose costs on the PRC and ex- of U.S. power to improve Taiwan’s economic plicitly link these to actions that Beijing takes position and to bolster it against the ongoing in its ongoing efforts to undermine Taiwan’s threats posed by the PRC’s coercive actions. interests. Look for ways for the United States to support RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TAIWAN: Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy. The New Southbound Policy (NSP) offers considerable Taiwan needs to take advantage of opportu- promise over the long term to lessen Taiwan’s nities to be a responsible partner and good reliance on mainland China’s economy and citizen in the region.