BIN LADEN AND THE BALKANS: THE POLITICS OF ANTI-TERRORISM 9 November 2001 ICG Balkans Report N° 119 Belgrade/Podgorica/Pristina/Sarajevo/Skopje/Tirana/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................3 II. ALBANIA ...........................................................................................................................................3 A. POLICY RESPONSES..................................................................................................................................4 B. ISLAMIC INVOLVEMENT IN POST-COMMUNIST ALBANIA........................................................................4 C. BIN LADEN IN ALBANIA?.........................................................................................................................5 D. SKOPJE STIRS THE POT ............................................................................................................................6 E. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................7 III. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA .....................................................................................................9 A. THE VIEW FROM THE FEDERATION .........................................................................................................9 B. IZETBEGOVIC, THE WAR AND ISLAM ....................................................................................................11 C. THE VIEW FROM THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA............................................................................................13 D. ASSESSING AND MEETING THE THREAT ...............................................................................................13 E. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................................16 IV. CROATIA.........................................................................................................................................16 A. FEAR OF EXCLUSION..............................................................................................................................16 B. INTO THE COALITION.............................................................................................................................17 C. AN UNLIKELY TARGET ..........................................................................................................................17 V. KOSOVO ..........................................................................................................................................18 A. KOSOVO ALBANIAN RESPONSE .............................................................................................................18 B. MEDIA ....................................................................................................................................................18 C. THE CONFUSING SEMANTICS OF ‘TERRORISM’.....................................................................................19 D. ‘RECONSTRUCTION’ AS ISLAMISATION .................................................................................................19 E. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................................20 VI. MACEDONIA ..................................................................................................................................21 A. GOVERNMENT AGAINST TERRORISM.....................................................................................................21 B. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................22 C. MEDIA ....................................................................................................................................................23 D. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................................23 VII. MONTENEGRO ..............................................................................................................................24 A. PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSES ............................................................................................................24 B. MEDIA COVERAGE .................................................................................................................................25 VIII. SERBIA.............................................................................................................................................26 A. MEDIA ....................................................................................................................................................26 B. POLITICIANS ...........................................................................................................................................27 C. BACK TO THE PRESENT .........................................................................................................................28 D. THE SANDZAK ........................................................................................................................................29 E. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................................29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THE BALKANS...........................................................................................................................30 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .........................................................................................31 C. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS....................................................................................................32 D. ICG BOARD MEMBERS ..........................................................................................................................36 ICG Balkans Report N° 119 9 November 2001 BIN LADEN AND THE BALKANS: THE POLITICS OF ANTI-TERRORISM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The global focus on Islamist extremist-inspired From this perspective, and in the absence of further terrorism resulting from the 11 September evidence demanding a more robust response, the atrocities has raised the question of the potential best way to prevent deadly violence in or for such terrorist activity in, or emanating from, the emanating from the Balkans may simply be Balkans. continued engagement by the international community across the spectrum of peace keeping Given the presence of ex-mujahidin in Bosnia, the and peace building tasks. tens of thousands of former military and paramilitary fighters in Bosnia, Kosovo and There is no doubt that, in the Balkans as elsewhere, Macedonia who are Muslims by tradition, if not the new and overwhelming Western foreign policy for the most part by observance, and the large priority has triggered some energetic attempts to deployments of U.S. and other troops in the region, borrow or co-opt the anti-terrorist agenda. Many some (though by no means all) senior Western politicians and propagandists in Serbia, Bosnia and sources describe the potential terrorist threat as Macedonia have been given the opportunity to puff significant. In this context, international officials fresh air into stereotypes of fanatical bearded and organisations in parts of the region, as well as mujahidin, myths of Muslim ‘backwardness’, and certain governments, have taken extra security theories about the ‘civilisational’ abyss separating precautions, and clamped down on individuals and Islam from the West that served sinister purposes groups suspected of possible links to terrorist in the 1990s. networks. In this context, it is important that the international Although heightened security precautions are community should not be distracted by the wave of obviously appropriate at this time, it is important anti-Muslim opinion and propaganda that has that the issue of Islamist extremism in the Balkans, washed through Serbia, Macedonia, and the Serb- and the risk of terrorism associated with it, not be controlled parts of Bosnia. In these countries, and painted as a larger problem than it is. While also in Albania, Western capitals must reward Osama bin Laden himself may have visited governments’ overall democratic performance, not Albania several years ago, and individuals with the volume of their denunciations of terrorism. links to his organisation have passed through the Balkans, it appears that only Bosnia has significant numbers of potential Islamist extremists. Elsewhere the potential for Islamist-inspired violence seems slight, and to hinge on the weakness of institutions rather than ideological sympathies with the enemies of the West. Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism ICG Balkans Report N° 119, 9 November 2001 Page ii RECOMMENDATIONS of credible supporting evidence be prepared to publicly discount them. TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 4. Do not be distracted by, or accept, the wave of 1. Closely monitor in Bosnia and Kosovo the anti-Muslim opinion and propaganda that has activities of Islamist organisations which may washed through Serbia, Macedonia, and the have links