WHOSE REGULATORS ?COMPETING PERSPECTIVESON BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY –THE CASEOFTHE DUTCH COMPETITION AUTHORITY Papertobepresentedatthepanel“Bureaucraticautonomyandregulatory enforcement:Aremoreautonomousregulatorsalsobetterregulators?”ofthe ECPRGeneralConference,tobeheldatPisa,Italy,6-8September2007 Workinprogress KutsalYesilkagit UniversityofUtrecht UtrechtSchoolofGovernance Bijlhouwerstraat6 3511ZCUtrecht Netherlands +31302538649 [email protected] 1 1.Introduction Regulationafterdelegationcanevolveinprecipitatedways,astheformalinstitutional arrangements,whichcircumscribethestructure,jurisdictionandcompetenciesof independentregulatoryauthorities,“donotdeterminethebehaviorofIRAsandtheir relationshipswithotheractorsbecausepowersandcontrolscanbeused[byelected politiciansandregulates]inmanydiversewaysandinstitutionalframeworksare incomplete”(Thatcher2002:955).Afterdelegation,theformalinstitutionaldesignof agenciesturnsouttobeaweakpredictorofagencybehavior(Krause&xxx).The arrangementswithwhichpoliticiansintendtoexantehardwireorstack-the-deckof regulatoryagenciesprovetobeworkinginunintendedways(Balla1998).Findingsofa numberofrecentstudiesofregulationconcludethatagenciesdevelopdifferentpatterns ofbehaviorandthatotherkindsofinteractionbetweenagenciesandtheirdirect environmentdevelopthanthosethatwereexpectedonthebasisoftheirdesign. Examiningbusiness-regulatoryrelationshipsinGermanyandtheUK,Coenshowsthat aftertheyhavebeencreatedregulatorsinbothcountriesworkwithbusinesstodefine theirdomesticregulatoryrolesandcreatetheirowndistinctpoliticalspacefrom governmentpressures”suchthat“theregulatoryrelationshiphasevolvedbeyondthat envisagedintheinitialdelegationofpowerstotheregulator”(Coen2005:394-395,375). ExaminingtheinteractionsbetweenDutchcentralgovernmentalministriesandtheir independentagencies,Yesilkagitcametoasimilarconclusionashefoundthat“[R]ules, procedures,andcompetencesmayseemclearonpaperastheyinformallactorsaboutthe formalintentionsofthedesigners.However,theagencyleadershipcaninterprettherules inadifferentwaythanpoliticianshadinmindwhentheydesignedtherules”(Yesilkagit 2004:535). Oneofthefearsofrulingpoliticiansindemocraticsystemsisthatbecauseofa ‘poor’design,regulatorswilldriftawayfromthegoalssetinlegislation,eitherbecause regulatorsbecomecapturedbythesectororbecausetheydevelopandpursueinterestsof theirown.Delegationofauthoritymaybecomesynonymousforrunawaybureaucratsand thefearoflosingcontrol(Christensen&Laegreid2006).Thegoalofthispaperisto delvedeeperintothedeterminantsof‘real’bureaucraticautonomyofregulatory 2 agencies.Moststudiesonautonomyfocusonthedelegationofformalautonomyandthe formaldesignofagencies(Christensen2001;Epstein&O’Halloran1999;Gilardi2002). Giventhegap,thequestionthispaperaddressesiswhatthedeterminantsofinformal agencyautonomyare.Whenandunderwhichcircumstancescanweexpectformally independentagenciestobemoreorlessindependentthanformallyprescribed?Which factorscausethedegreeofinformalorrealautonomyofregulatoryagencies?Orplainly: Whoseinterestsdoregulatorsserveafterdelegation? Thesequestionshavebeenaddressedfromavarietyoftheoreticallensesand models(seeBaldwin&Cave1999),butthemajorityofthesemodelsfallsineitherone ofthefollowingtwolinesofperspectives.Oneperspectiveconsidersthedegreeof bureaucraticautonomyofanadministrativeagencyasafunctionoftheinfluenceexerted bypoliticalactorsintheenvironmentoftheagency.Theorieswithinthisperspective, whichIwillrefertoasthe externalcontroltheories ofbureaucraticautonomy,agencies withthehighestlevelofautonomyhavethelowestlevelofpoliticalconstraintsimposed uponthembytheirprincipals.Theotherperspectiveregardsthehighlevelofautonomy anagencyenjoysasbeingtheresultantofanagency’sorganizationalanditsleadership’s capacitiestoforgeasolidbaseofautonomyofitsown.Highlyautonomousagencies fromwithinthisperspective,i.e. administrativebehaviouraltheories ,arethosethathave managedtocreateawideconstituencybasis,havestrongsenseofidentityandmission, andaclearlydemarcatedaswellascoherentsetoftasks. Tothisend,Iwillexaminetheextenttowhichthebureaucraticautonomyofthe CompetitionAuthorityintheNetherlands( NederlandseMededingingsAutoriteit – NMA)isaffectedbythecontrolinstrumentsofitsprincipalsandtheinternalbureaucratic capacitiesoftheagencyitself.Theprimarypurposeofchoosingthiscaseisthatof replication:towhatextentdothefactorsthatarereportedinUSstudiesashavingan effect(ornot)onthebureaucraticautonomyofregulatoryagenciesperformwithina Europeanparliamentarysetting?Thevariationininstitutionalsettingallowsustoassess whethercontrolandreputationvariableswillperformthesamewithinafundamentally differentinstitutionalsetting(Weaver&Rockman1993;butseeHammond&Butler 2003).Ifthisisthecase,wewouldcomeclosertohavingmoregeneralizable mechanismsthataffecttheautonomyofbureaucraticagencieswithindemocratic 3 systems.Section2presentsthetwocompetingsetsoftheories,followedbysection3 wheretheresearchdesignofthisresearchispresentend.Section4presentstheresults andthepaperendswithaconclusion. 2.TheoriesofBureaucraticAutonomy:TheoriesofExternalControlversus AdministrativeBehavioralTheories ExternalControlTheoriesofBureaucraticAutonomy Theredoesnotexistasingleexternalcontroltheoryofbureaucraticautonomy.Wecan distinguishbetweentheoriesofexternalcontrolthathavetakenanarrowconceptionof whatconstitutes‘external’andtheoriesthathavecasttheirnetsomewhatwider. 1 Theorieswithanarrowconceptiononlytakeintoaccounttheinfluenceofformal politicalinstitutionsonbureaucraticautonomy,notablythePresidentandCongress; studieswithabroaderconceptionalsotakeintoaccounttheinfluenceofothernon- politicalactors,suchasthecourts,interestgroups,andcitizens.Thereadershouldbe awarethatthisclassificationoftheoriesiscontingentonthepoliticalsystemwithin whichtheseweredeveloped.Asthesetheorieshavebeenmainlydevelopedwithinthe US,theclaimsdevelopedbythesetheoriesarehighlyrestrictedtotheUSsystemof separation-of-powersandtheexistentsystemofchecks-and-balancestherein.Therefore,I willdescribethisstrandofautonomyresearchasitasbeendevelopedinUSpolitical science.AfterthisdiscussionIwillbrieflyassesstheirapplicabilitytoparliamentary systems. Externalcontroltheoriesofbureaucraticautonomywithanarrowfocusonhow andtowhatextentformalpoliticalinstitutions,i.e.CongressandthePresidency,have influenceonagencydiscretion.WithintheUS,thesetheoriescorrectedthelong-time dominantviewwithinUSscholarshipthatbureaucracywasoutofcontrolbecauseonlya “smallfractionofresources[were]goingintocongressionaloversight,thehaphazard natureoftheoversightactivitiesthatdidtakeplace,thelackofexpertisebymembersof Congressandtheirstaffs,andthedisregardsofbureaucratsfortheirmembers”(Miller 1ButseeKrause(1996)whohasmadethesamedistinctionadecadeago. 4 2005:209).Duringthe1980sthe‘congressionaldominance’theoriesofbureaucratic politicsemerged(McCubbins1985;Calvert,McCubbins&Weingast1989),showing thatCongressexertedbothexpostcontrolsthroughtheappropriationprocess,legislation andlegislativechanges,andoversighthearings(Weingast&Moran1983;Bendor&Moe 1985;Kiewiet&McCubbins1991;Epstein&O’Halloran1999)andexantecontrols throughagencydesign,administrativeprocedures,auditsandcompulsoryreporting (McCubbins1985;McCubbins,Noll&Weingast1987;Macey1992;Potoski&Woods 2001;Whitford2002).Presidentialinfluencetheoriesofpoliticalcontrolwereareaction tothisschool,pointingouttothecongressionaldominancescholarsthatPresidential powersstretchoverthebureaucracythankstotheauthoritytoappointagencydirectors, reorganization,andbudgetarypowers(Beck1982;Moe1982,1985;Wood1988;Bendor &Moe1985;Howell&Lewis2002;Lewis2003). Feelingthatbothcongressionaldominanceandpresidentialinfluencestudies focusedonjustonesideoftheprocessofpolitical,multipleprincipalstudiesof bureaucraticcontrolhavebroadenedthisviewsintwoways.First,thesestudieshave shownthattherearenojustifyinggrounds,boththeoreticallyaswellasempirically,for treatingtheinfluenceofthesepoliticalactorinisolationofeachother.Secondtheyhave shownempiricallythatbureaucraticagenciesperceiveotherthanthesecoregovernmental actorsasexertinginfluenceontheirdecision-making(Wood&Waterman1991; Ringquist1995;Hammond&Knott1996;Waterman,Rouse&Wright1998;Furlong 1998).FocusingonthePresidentandCongress,HammondandKnott(1996:163) concludethatbureaucraticautonomyisa“contingentmatter”dependingonthestrategies pursuedbythePresident,theHouseandtheSenateinagivencircumstance.Insome circumstances(e.g.events)someagenciesmayenjoymoreautonomythaninother circumstances,butthesystemicfindingisthatpoliticalcontrolisamatterof“joint custody”ofpresident,congressandthecourts.Furtherevidencefortheconcomitant powersofthetwocorepoliticalinstitutionsisbroughttobearbyWoodandWaterman (1991)whofoundthatpoliticalappointments,aninstrumentsharedbybothinstitutions, hassubstantiallymoreimpactonbureaucraticresponsivenessthanchangingbudgets, legislationandadministrativereorganizations(seealsoRingquist1995). Furlongfoundthatpoliticalcontrolisnotan“issue…ofcongressionaldominance 5 orpresidentialcontrol,butratherofsharedauthorityandtheabilitytoinfluencepolicyin onedirectionoranother”.However,andherehegoesastepfurtherthanhispredecessors, healsofindsstrongsupportfortheinfluenceofinterestgroups.Heconcludes:“interest groups’abilitytoaccessandshapepolicybothdirectlyandindirectlyisevidentandmust notbeoverlooked”(Furlong1998:61).Interestgroups,asMoeassertedonce,arekey playersinthepoliticsofdelegationandadministrativedesign,asthey,perhapsmorethan electedpoliticians,careaboutthecontrolregimeofadministrativeagenciesasthese agenciesareessentialtothepolicyprocessandthedistributionofpublicservicestotheir members(Moe1995). 2Finally,thebroadestfocusistobefoundintheworkof