117 Mokete Pherudi THE ASSASSINATION OF MILITARY Head of the Early Warning Unit at CISSA, Addis COMMANDERS IN LESOTHO: Ababa, Ethiopia. Email: TRIGGERS AND REACTIONS [email protected] Head, Regional Early Warning Centre, Directorate for DOI: https://dx.doi. Politics, Defence and Security Affairs, Southern African org/10.18820/24150509/ Development Community JCH43.v2.7 ISSN 0258-2422 (Print) ISSN 2415-0509 (Online) Abstract Journal for Contemporary This article investigates civil-military relations (CMR) in History Lesotho and its impact on political and security stability. 2018 43(2):117-133 The nature of CMR is unmasked by tracing the evolution of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and the history of its © Creative Commons With politicisation. The assassinations of LDF commanders, Attribution (CC-BY) Lt-Gen Maaparankoe Mahao in 2015 and Lt-Gen Khoantle Motšomotšo in 2017, respectively, by members from within their ranks, are explored to illustrate how the undue involvement of the military in politics has contributed to instability in Lesotho. Other triggers contributing to the unstable situation are highlighted. The enquiry of this article is not only about the nature of CMR but how the regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has sought to intervene in Lesotho with the aim of firstly stabilising the politics and security of the country. SADC’s other aim has been the facilitating of security sector reforms that will, amongst other things, configure CMR such that the armed forces are accountable to civilian authority and they do not meddle in political contest. Keywords: Civil-military relations (CMR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), Southern African Development Community (SADC). Sleutelwoorde: Burgerlik-militêre verhoudings (CMR); Sekuriteitsektor-vormings (SSR); Lesotho Verdedigingsmag (LDF); Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap (SADC). 118 JCH / JEG 43(2) | December / Desember 2018 1. INTRODUCTION Broadly speaking, civil-military relations (CMR) relates to the relationship between national military organisations and civil societies as a whole. A narrower definition of the concept describes the relationship between the national military organisation and the civil authority (government) within a given society.1 The use of the concept of CMR can be traced back to Tzu2 and Clausewitz3 who both express the view that military organisations should remain servants of the state. Indeed, most other studies of CMR conclude that civilian control of the military is the most desirable arrangement and the only issues of contention on the matter are about how civilian control of the military should be established and maintained. The civilian control doctrine of CMR has found greater resonance with the wave of democratisation on the African continent and is lauded as the vehicle through which military institutions can be part of the good governance agenda.4 Despite this broad agreement that the military should be subject to civilian control, the principle has eluded Lesotho for many years. Since the eve of independence from Britain in 1966, and through much of the post-colonial period, contestants for political power have perceived the army as a tool to be employed against rivals. The Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) remains politicised. The only period of relative stability in relations between the government and the army was between 1965 and 1970. Matlosa and Pule contend that it was during this period of relative calm that seeds were sown for future instability through patronage and politicisation of the armed forces.5 The undue involvement of the army in politics has resulted in security instability in the country with some notable occurrences. For as long as the armed forces have been politicised, the Lesotho government and civil society have been engaged in debate about how to reconfigure CMR and professionalise the army. Some of the efforts towards reforms of the military and the security sector as a whole have been bolstered by external assistance. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has intervened in the country with boots on the 1 I Wogu, and J Ibietan, “Civil military relations and leadership crisis in the 21st century: An Inquiry”, International Journal of Innovative Social Sciences and Humanities Research, Vol. 2 (1), 2013, p. 48. 2 S Tzu, The art of war (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 3 C Clausewitz, On war (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 4 S. Naidoo, “The role of the military in democratic governance in Africa: The need to institutionalise civil-military Relations”. In: C Henricks (ed.), From state security to human security in Southern Africa-Policy research and capacity building challenges, (Pretoria: ISS Monographs Series 122, 2006), p. 33. 5 K Matlosa and N Pule, “Civil-military relations in Lesotho 1966-1998. Problems and Prospects”. In: R. Williams and G Cawthra (eds.), Ourselves to know: Civil military relations and defence transformation in Southern Africa, (Pretoria: ISS, 2003), p. 39. Pherudi / The assassination of military commanders in Lesotho 119 ground to ensure stability in times of security crises through various strategies such as “Operation Boleas”, as well as with training and capacity building programmes such as “Operation Maluti” aimed at professionalising the LDF. In 2000, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) organised and hosted a three-day dialogue workshop on CMR in Lesotho, aimed at professionalising the LDF. From 2001, under an agreement with the government of India, an Indian Army Training Team (IATT) spent two years training the LDF. Other countries including Botswana, Britain, China, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, helped in contributing to professionalise the LDF. International organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Red Cross offered to provide technical assistance aimed at promoting the respect for constitutionalism, human rights and submission to civilian authority. Despite these interventions, Lesotho continues to experience periodic political and security crises, largely because of the LDF’s involvement in politics and its non-subscription to the doctrine of civilian control of the armed forces. The assassinations of LDF Commanders, Maaparankoe Mahao and Khoantle Motšomotšo in 2015 and 2017, respectively, significantly highlighted the CMR crisis in Lesotho. SADC intervention, in response to both these assassinations has provided detail of the crisis in a manner helpful to creating possible solutions. This article therefore, after capturing a brief history of CMR in Lesotho, explores the reasons behind the killing of the Commanders in an effort to unmask the CMR challenges and propose policy prospects. 2. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN LESOTHO From inception as a paramilitary force in the 1960s, Lesotho’s armed forces have always played a significant role in politics. Leeman argues that the first post- independence ruling party, the Basotho National Party (BNP), to maintain power when its legitimacy waned, relied upon the army.6 Sixishe concurs and adds that the armed forces were used to intimidate opposition parties that were dissenting THE BNP’s hold on power.7 The force was initially a paramilitary police outfit called the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), transforming into the Lesotho Paramilitary Force in the 1980s, before it was elevated to a defence force called the LDF. From the time the PMU propped up Dr Leabua Jonathan’s position as Prime Minister until the establishment of the LDF, the armed forces had become highly politicised, particularly due to the role they had played in securing political power. 6 B. Leeman, Lesotho and the struggle for Azania, Vol. 1, (London, 1985), p. 128. 7 D.T. Sixishe, But give him an army too: Leabua Jonathan – A Biography, (Maseru, Mokorotlo Publications, 1984), p. 42. 120 JCH / JEG 43(2) | December / Desember 2018 The involvement of the PMU in Lesotho politics became evident from the 1970s when the BNP lost the elections and Leabua Jonathan declared a ‘Qomatsi (state of emergency) and what he called a five-year holiday from politics.8 He achieved the unconstitutional stay in office through the help of the PMU. After the 1970 coup, the BNP government exercised stringent control over the armed forces and shaped the military to serve its own political ends. Recruitment into the army was done along political party lines; therefore, the institution owed its allegiance to the BNP and not to the constitution of the country.9 One of Leabua Jonathan’s legacies was introducing the military to politics. To some extent, he made the military aware of its power as king maker and this strength was later perfected by future military leaders and politicians. The 1986 coup provides another example of how the army’s involvement in politics has contributed to political instability in Lesotho. On 20 January 1986 the Lesotho paramilitary force, led by Maj. Gen. Metsing Lekhanya, deposed Leabua Jonathan’s government. Not long thereafter, the ruling Military Council entrenched its authority and banned all political activities. The military was enjoying power and was reluctant to lead the country to a democratic dispensation in the shortest possible time. In mobilising credibility for the Military Council, Lekhanya established amicable relations with King Moshoeshoe II and this arrangement became known as “military-monarchy alliance”. In 1987, Moshoeshoe II gave the army the Knight Commander of the Most Dignified Order of Moshoeshoe and the armed