I I U. S. Strategies for Cooperation with I the Soviets on Ocean Science I Report of a Workshop held I 29-31 October 1991 I Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution I Woods Hole, MA 02543 I I Sponsored by I National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration via the Sea Grant Program, with support from the I National Science Foundation and the Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy I I A Report of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution to the I National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Pursuant to NOAA Award No. NA16RG0527 -01 I I I I I I I I I The views of the workshop participants do not necessarily reflect the I official positions of the sponsoring agencies I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I U.S. STRATEGIES FOR COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIETS ON I OCEAN SCIENCE I TABLE OF CONTENTS I INTRODUCTION 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 I WORKING GROUP REPORTS 7 Physical Oceanography 8 Geology & Geophysics 14 I Biogeochemistry 31 Acoustics 37 Space /Remote Sensing 44 I Arctic 56 I Marine Policy 66 STRATEGY APPROACHES AND CONCERNS 76 Academic Interests: Benefits and Problems 77 I U.S. Policy Perspectives 80 Cooperative Agreements and Government 82 Review Mechanisms I Science Sponsoring Agency Views 83 Strategies for Cooperation 84 I APPENDICES 87 A. Agenda 88 B. Attendees 91 I C. Institutional Agreements and Programs, D. James Baker 97 D. Cooperative Marine Science Program for the 106 I Black Sea, D. Aubrey et al. E. Intelligence Overview, R. Haver 122 F. Technology Transfer, A. Cameron 131 I G. GOSSAT and GEESAT Processes, W. Erb 138 H. COCOM Sensitive Technologies, M. Urbina 142 I. Military Sensitivities and Concerns, RADM W. Jordan 148 I J. Text of Agreement between the Government of the 152 United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation I in Ocean Studies of 1 June 1990 K. OMNET: Sciencenet Access via IASNET, the Soviet 163 Data Network I L. Examples of Joint Ventures in Ocean Sciences: 170 I AMR USSCO, ALMAZ, IRIS, Soyuz Marine Service I I I I INTRODUCTION The idea of a workshop to discuss U.S.-Soviet ocean science cooperation was first broached during the February 1991 meeting of The Oceanography Society in St. I Petersburg, FL. At that time the Bilateral Agreement on Ocean Studies had recently been signed, the Soviets were about to rejoin the Ocean Drilling Program, and individual and institutional contacts between the two nations' oceanographic communities were increasing I dramatically. The major U.S. ocean science sponsors-- NOAA, NSF, and Navy-- agreed that given the challenges inherent in close cooperation with the Soviets in an area of militarily and economically significant research, it would be a good idea for federal agency I representatives and academics to informally discuss the risks and advantages of cooperation, and to outline priorities and guidelines to improve our chances for successful I and scientifically profitable collaboration. Of course, it's tough to hit a chaotically moving target. By the time of the workshop it was clear that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was disintegrating. Although no one I had any insight into the type of governmental or scientific structure that might evolve in what participants came to call the former USSR or FUSSR, it was clear that the ground I rules for collaboration would be vastly different than in the days of a powerful Soviet Academy of Science and a highly centralized planning system. I In spite of the uncertainties, the sponsors determined that it would still be worthwhile to hold the workshop. Preparation for it offered the Navy and other involved agencies an opportunity to review their own policies and procedures. Participation would provide a I relatively unusual opportunity for open discussion on a topic of common interest among representatives of a variety of pursuits ... scientists from academia and from federal laboratories, businessmen with joint ventures in the FUSSR, military officers, civil servants I from the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense, and members of the intelligence community from Navy, OSD, and CIA. I Perhaps because of the challenge of dealing with uncertainty and the eclectic mix of individuals and viewpoints, the participants felt that the workshop was a success. In I addition to identifying topics and individuals of interest in each of the areas of ocean science discussed, some common themes emerged. Equally as important, each of the groups gained an appreciation for the concerns, knowledge, and responsibilities of the I others, so that simply through the presentations and discussion the U.S. infrastructure for interacting in ocean science with whatever system ultimately evolves in the FUSSR was I improved. The workshop format basically consisted of seven thematic panels, each dealing with an area of mutual U.S. and Soviet interest: physical oceanography, geology and geophysics, I biogeochemistry, acoustics, space/remote sensing, the Arctic, and marine policy. Panel chairmen gave a brief overview of major issues in their area at an initial plenary session, I I 1 I I and then led a day-plus discussion with a charge to report back to a concluding plenary session the following information: I o A brief reminder of major U.S. programs, priorities, and plans in each thematic area, and any deficiencies in our approach (be they scientific, technical, logistical, etc.). I o Soviet priorities and plans in the field to the degree we understand them, and their relationship to U.S. programs and interests. o Similarities and differences in their basic approaches to major science issues; I particularly, Soviet theories or programs (e.g., SECTIONS vs. WOCE; TRANSECfS vs. RIDGE) that are substantively at variance with ours (and, if I understood, the reason for their approach). o Soviet unique strengths and weaknesses in the area (scientific, technical, infrastructure, etc.), particularly as they complement ours. I o Things we would like the Soviets to do to support U.S. global scientific objectives, and the benefits to us. o Programs, projects, etc. in which we should urge Soviet participation, types of I activity or support desired, and inducements for their participation. o Areas of cooperation we do not desire or should discourage. o Key Soviet individuals and institutions. I The reports of these thematic panels form the body of this workshop report. Because of significant differences in subject matter and consequently approach, panel chairmen I chose to address their themes and the charge in various ways, and this is reflected in the format and content of their reports. I I have attempted to summarize the general conclusions of the panels, and the comments of plenary session speakers on U.S. policy perspectives and review mechanisms, I in a section entitled Strategy Approaches and Concerns. Several of the introductory talks contained extremely useful information, and these are included as appendices. I As this report is being prepared, the economic situation in what is currently the Confederation of Independent States continues to worsen, and articles in scientific magazines discuss what can be done to "rescue" Soviet science. In spite of the turmoil, I however, at least at WHOI our interaction with Russian, Ukranian, and other FUSSR colleagues continues apace. In the week before Christmas we hosted simultaneous visits by oceanographers from Vladivostok, Sevastopol, and three separate institutes in Moscow. I All of our visitors came, did their research, presented papers, made plans for future cooperative efforts, and went home. There is, I believe, reason to think that cooperation with the Soviets in ocean science will be of continuing importance for both sides. I December 1991~ \~•--- I Craig E. Dorman Workshop Coordinator I 2 I --------------------- --- ----- ---- I I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I As the former Soviet Union started to open up in 1989, the initial impetus for U.S. cooperation with their ocean scientists was access. Access to minds, techniques, ideas, assets and areas which had effectively been closed to us for decades. U.S. academic I oceanography is a very competitive process, however, and scientists faced very real disincentives to collaboration: the extraordinary time and effort required to make contact and identify good counterparts, the opaqueness of Soviet literature, suspicions about data I quality, previous experiences (such as POLYMODE) where the benefits to the two sides were unequal, the unwillingness of sponsors to support the risk and uncertainties entailed in working from Soviet ships or with their scientists, both sides' red tape, and the potential I hostility of a U.S. Navy which still faced a formidable Soviet military. A few venturesome U.S. scientists however were willing to afford the opportunity costs. When they derived I considerable benefit others were encouraged, and as time went on a combination of agency and Institutional contacts, plus more activism on the part of the Soviets, reduced some of I the logistics and communications burden. As the political make-up of the former Soviet Union has shifted and the economic situation become even more desperate during the last few months, however, the conditions I for cooperation have necessarily changed. For example even a year ago, Soviet Institutions would commit to programs, cruises, and 'free' ship time with reasonable certainty. Then, as the concepts of political reform and market economies started to catch hold, there was a I scramble to form joint ventures and 'sell' services, and they began to request financial support even to conclude past commitments. Now we hear of first class research vessels like the R/V IOFFE (designed for acoustic experimentation) being converted to car I ferries; reliable schedules are unheard of, and national ownership of some ships is even in doubt. I In spite of their increasing problems, however, Soviet researchers remain dedicated to their science and their Institutions, and they continue to actively seek cooperation for I mutual benefit.