CAUSE LAWYERS INSIDE THE STATE Douglas NeJaime* Scholarship on the legal profession tends to situate cause lawyers in a state of adversarial tension with government lawyers. In this traditional paradigm, cause lawyers challenge the agenda of government attorneys, who represent institutional interests and the status quo. From this oppositional perspective, socio-legal scholars explore the activity of lawyers working at public interest law firms, for general social movement organizations, and in private practice. For some time, however, cause lawyers have moved in and out of government, thus complicating the conventional picture of lawyer-state opposition. This Article aims to identify and understand the significant role that cause lawyers play inside the state. It does so by drawing on recent social movement scholarship exploring the overlapping and interdependent relationship between movements and the state. Ultimately, this Article identifies four key impacts that cause lawyers within the state may produce: (1) reforming the state itself; (2) shaping state personnel and priorities; (3) harnessing state power to advance shared movement-state goals; and (4) facilitating and mediating relationships between the movement and the state. These productive functions, however, also come with significant limitations. By appealing to governmental authority and involving the state as a pro-movement force, cause lawyers in government positions may channel movement activity toward moderate goals and into institutional, state-centered tactics. Accordingly, this Article explores not only the benefits but also the costs of cause lawyer movement in and out of the state. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 650 I. LAWYER-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN CAUSE LAWYERING SCHOLARSHIP ................................................................................. 656 * Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles (Loyola Marymount University). I benefited tremendously from David Luban’s extensive comments and thoughtful essay responding to this Article. I thank KT Albiston, Sam Bagenstos, Steve Boutcher, Jennifer Earl, Bill Eskridge, Chai Feldblum, Suzanne Goldberg, Dawn Johnsen, Lynn Jones, Joe Landau, Anna-Maria Marshall, Sharon McGowan, Maggie McKinley, Dan Meltzer, Margo Schlanger, Reva Siegel, Ed Stein, Michael Waterstone, and Tobias Barrington Wolff, as well as attendees at the DOMA Symposium at Fordham Law School and the 2012 Law & Society Conference, for helpful comments and encouragement on this project. Tom Boone, Laura Cadra, and Joshua Phillips at Loyola’s William M. Rains Law Library provided excellent research support. 649 650 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 A. Cause Lawyers Against the State .............................................. 656 B. Cause Lawyers with the State ................................................... 659 C. (Cause?) Lawyers Inside the State ........................................... 660 1. Lawyers Abroad ................................................................. 661 2. Lawyers in the United States ............................................. 662 II. MOVEMENT-STATE OVERLAP IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH ...... 666 III. CAUSE LAWYERS AND STATE POWER ................................................ 671 A. Reforming the State ................................................................... 671 B. Shaping State Personnel and Priorities .................................... 675 C. Harnessing State Power to Advance Shared Movement-State Goals ....................................................................................... 677 1. Regulation .......................................................................... 680 2. Litigation ............................................................................ 682 3. Adjudication ....................................................................... 683 D. Facilitating and Mediating Movement-State Relationships ..... 687 1. Turning Outward ................................................................ 688 2. Turning Inward .................................................................. 691 IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF CAUSE LAWYER MOVEMENT INTO THE STATE ............................................................................................. 698 A. Goals and Tactics ..................................................................... 700 B. Effects on the Movement ........................................................... 702 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 704 INTRODUCTION In 2011, the National Law Journal found that 60 out of 118 lawyers hired to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division over the previous two years had worked for a civil rights organization1—including twenty- four for the ACLU, fifteen for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and ten for the NAACP or the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund (LDF).2 Also in 2011, The New York Times reported that approximately 90 percent of lawyers recently hired across three sections of the Civil Rights Division had civil rights backgrounds.3 In other words, 1. See David Ingram, Civil Rights Staffs Up, NAT’L L.J., May 30, 2011, at 11. 2. See id. 3. See Charlie Savage, In Shift, Justice Dept. Hiring Lawyers with Civil Rights Backgrounds, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2011, at A19. While federal law prohibits the use of political or ideological considerations in hiring career attorneys to the DOJ, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2305 (2006), the 2008 Inspector General’s report found that during the Bush Administration the DOJ’s Bradley Schlozman used conservative political affiliations to screen candidates for positions in the Civil Rights Division. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 4–6 (July 2, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT]. Of course, there is a correlation between political affiliation and service at a traditional civil rights organization. As The New York Times reported on its specific sample, 2012] CAUSE LAWYERS INSIDE THE STATE 651 those with significant cause lawyering experience were entering (or reentering) government service during the Obama Administration.4 While the lawyers’ civil rights credentials qualified them for their government positions, they also signaled the likelihood of increased action on issues important to the organizations from which these lawyers came. Indeed, a former DOJ Bush appointee, who himself had joined a conservative movement organization after his government service, worried that attorneys in the Obama Administration would coordinate efforts with their former employers.5 Therefore, even as cause lawyering experience furnished relevant expertise, it suggested relationships between activist networks and the government that fueled partisan criticism.6 Cause lawyering credentials appear especially important for political appointees to top-level enforcement positions. For instance, Professor Samuel Bagenstos, a leading disability rights advocate and scholar, served as the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the DOJ from 2009 to 2011.7 Bagenstos had worked on significant disability rights cases, including United States v. Georgia.8 Another accomplished disability while nearly 25 percent of the Bush hires had listed conservative affiliations, such as Federalist Society membership, on their resumes, none of the Obama hires did. See Savage, supra note 3. And more than 60 percent of the Obama hires listed liberal credentials. See id. 4. See Savage, supra note 3 (several of the DOJ hires during the Obama Administration had left the DOJ during the Bush Administration). In the seminal first volume of their cause lawyering series, Professors Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold explained that cause lawyering “is frequently directed at altering some aspect of the social, economic, and political status quo.” Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3, 4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering]; see also Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold, State Transformation, Globalization, and the Possibilities of Cause Lawyering: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA 3, 13 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, State Transformation] (“The objective of the attorneys that we characterize as cause lawyers is to deploy their legal skills to challenge prevailing distributions of political, social, economic, and/or legal values and resources.” (citing Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, supra note 4)). 5. See Ingram, supra note 1 (reporting remarks by Hans von Spakovsky, who worked at the Heritage Foundation after his time at the DOJ). 6. For instance, Ed Whelan attacked two openly gay DOJ attorneys with cause lawyering experience by suggesting they were part of “a broader ideological agenda that would have gay causes trump religious liberty.” Ed Whelan, Re: Obama DOJ Picks a Fight Against Religious Freedom, NAT’L REV. ONLINE: BENCH MEMOS (Aug. 29, 2011, 1:01 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/275777.