View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Texas A&M Repository JOHN STUART MILL’S SANCTION UTILITARIANISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION A Dissertation by DAVID EUGENE WRIGHT Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chair of Committee, Linda Radzik Committee Members, Clare Palmer Scott Austin R.J.Q. Adams Head of Department, Gary Varner May 2014 Major Subject: Philosophy Copyright 2014 David Eugene Wright ABSTRACT This dissertation argues for a particular interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism, namely that Mill is best read as a sanction utilitarian. In general, scholars commonly interpret Mill as some type of act or rule utilitarian. In making their case for these interpretations, it is also common for scholars to use large portions of Mill’s Utilitarianism as the chief source of insight into his moral theory. By contrast, I argue that Utilitarianism is best read as an ecumenical text where Mill explains and defends the general tenets of utilitarianism rather than setting out his own preferred theory. The exception to this ecumenical approach to the text comes in the fifth chapter on justice which, I argue on textual and historical grounds, outlines the central features of Mill’s utilitarianism. With this understanding of Utilitarianism in place, many of the passages commonly cited in favor of the previous interpretations are rendered less plausible, and interpretations emphasizing Mill’s other writings are strengthened. Using this methodology, I critique four of the most prominent act or rule utilitarian interpretations of Mill’s moral theory. I then provide an interpretation of Mill’s theory of moral obligation and utilitarianism. On Mill’s account of moral obligation (which purportedly holds for moral theories generally, not just utilitarianism) there is a tight relation between an action being wrong and it being subject to punishment by an agent’s conscience. The utilitarian aspect of Mill’s theory concerns the role of rules in an agent’s conscience. According to Mill’s sanction utilitarian view, the actions that are punished ii are those actions that violate the moral rules which, if widely internalized across society, would promote general utility. On this account, an action is wrong when an agent violates a justified moral rule and is properly punished, at least by one’s conscience. An action is right when conditions are such that if the action were not performed, then the action would be properly punished by at least the agent’s conscience. I apply this interpretation to other notable components of Mill’s approach such as his account of practical action (the Art of Life) and his theory of liberty. iii DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated, without hesitation, to Katie Wright. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I have long looked forward to thanking the many individuals who helped me complete this dissertation. At each stage—theorizing, planning, researching, composing, editing, revising, and defending—there were many who added something and a few who helped with everything. First, I want to thank my dissertation committee members. I want to thank R.J.Q. Adams for taking me on as a History student. I could not have written this dissertation without the central ideas that I developed while under his guidance. I want to thank Clare Palmer, especially for her thorough and incisive feedback throughout the many stages of this project. In several cases I saw her privilege helping me improve my work ahead of other pressing commitments, and for her continual willingness to push me to be clear and careful in my work I am sincerely grateful. I want to thank Scott Austin for his always sagacious and timely advice, and for his endless string of wry comments that brightened my mornings as I returned to the mines of Mill’s Collected Works. I want to thank Michael LeBuffe for spurring me to do better work in the history of philosophy than I thought I could. Both his confidence in my work and his high standards have shaped my aims and hopes for this dissertation. I want to thank the Texas A&M Department of Philosophy staff for their patience and for helping me complete this project. Jamie Bosley, Tom Ellis, Osmara Garcia, and Katy Massey all came to my aid at key moments. I also want to give special thanks to Gary Varner for his role in making it possible for me to spend a semester working on my v dissertation with my wife at the University of Delaware. I also want to thank the audiences at Texas A&M University and Lehigh University where I presented portions of my work. I want to thank friends like John Forcey for our many nights of staying up and arguing philosophy for far longer than we had planned on and for pushing me to be a more creative philosopher. In addition, I want to thank Cody Jackson for helping me revise parts of the dissertation and for never turning away an opportunity to discuss moral and political philosophy. I want to thank my six-year officemate and friend TJ Kasperbauer. No single professor or fellow student has shaped my philosophical thinking as much as he has, and his own drive to do philosophy well has certainly inspired whatever scholarly zealousness one finds in this dissertation. In addition, I want to thank my parents Gary and Carol Wright. So many days I called them feeling tired and discouraged about my progress only to have them raise my spirits by reminding me that I was not alone. I also want to thank my brothers, Micah and Jon, and Jon’s wife Keely, as well my sister Christine and her husband Adam for their support and concern throughout the dissertation. Each of them reached out to me at different points and their encouraging words have not been forgotten. I also want to thank Hope Olson and Wayne Gerber for their support and counsel throughout the process of completing the dissertation. I cannot possibly give sufficient thanks to my dissertation director Linda Radzik. I am grateful for so many things that she did, but for two things in particular. First, she vi took time away from her own projects to meet with me almost every single week from the time I began working seriously on this dissertation. Second, she did not allow me, for one moment, to entertain the idea that I could not or would not do the work that was necessary to complete the dissertation. For me, this was crucial beyond measure and for all of her work I am incredibly thankful. Finally, I want to thank my wife Katie. She was there for long nights, early mornings, and the days with too much or too little coffee and certainly too many pages to write. Both for what she does, and who she is—for these and many things besides, I owe. Thank you all. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. ii DEDICATION .......................................................................................................... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................... v TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 1 Basic terminology and the varieties of utilitarianism .......................................... 1 Interpretive methodology... ................................................................................. 12 Outline for the dissertation .................................................................................. 14 CHAPTER II RULE UTILITARIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF MILL ................. 19 Urmson’s rule utilitarian interpretation ............................................................... 21 Fuchs’ rule utilitarian reading ............................................................................. 29 Mill’s Art of Life ................................................................................................. 40 Fuchs’ reply to Sumner and West ....................................................................... 43 Conclusion... ........................................................................................................ 56 CHAPTER III ACT UTILITARIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF MILL .................. 57 Crisp’s interpretive methodology ........................................................................ 59 The greatest happiness principle and the levels of morality ............................... 62 The demandingness of morality .......................................................................... 75 The Art of Life and supererogation ..................................................................... 80 Sanctions and utility maximization ..................................................................... 86 Introduction to Berger ......................................................................................... 93 Berger’s interpretative methodology ................................................................. 94 Analysis of the strategy conception of rules ....................................................... 97 Textual justifications for the strategy conception of rules .................................. 104 Objection to Berger ............................................................................................. 115 viii CHAPTER IV MILL’S ECUMENICAL
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