THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN NKARA GUA: DOMESTIC AND INTERllrI TIONAL INFL UENCES THE REPORT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION DELEGATION TO OBSERVE THE NICARAGUAN GENERAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 4,1984 BOLETA ELECTORAL PARA REPRESENTANTES A LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL REPUBUCA DE NICARAGUA CONSEJO SUPREMO ELECTORAL REGION lV i L PPSC )f MAP-ML PsAo:Al /I YOViYIEYFDt3E WPULAR ACCKm POWWl WAXlSTA CRlSTlANO LENINISTA mu--MIPIQ- I An official publication of the LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION November 19, 1984 Reprinted here with the permission of the Latin American Studies Association - Bill Becker - REPORT OF THE The range of options available to the Nicaraguan voter LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION on most issues was broad, but it would have been even DELEGATION TO OBSERVE THE NICARAGUAN broader if the U.S. Government had not succeeded in per- GENERAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 4,1984 suading or pressuring key opposition leaders to boycott or withdraw from the election. We found that the behavior of U.S. officials during the six months preceding the elections SUMMARY OF FINDINGS was clearly interventionist, apparently designed to delegitim- ize the Nicaraguan electoral process by making sure that the FSLN had no externally credible opposition to run against. In August, 1980, the Sandinista (FSLN) government in External critics of the Nicaraguan process have argued Nicaragua pledged that elections would take .place within five that, because legitimate opposition groups (especially Arturo years (i.e., sometime in 1985). That timetable was accelerated, primarily due to external pressures. The date of Cruz and his Coordinadora coalition) were "excluded" from the process, the elections were illegitimate and uncompeti- November 4, 1984, was selected so that Nicaragua would tive. The facts do not support this notion of exclusion. No have a legitimate, elected government in place before the major political tendency in Nicaragua was denied access to anticipated re-election of Ronald Reagan in the United States on November 6. The Sandinistas hoped that a competitive the electoral process in 1984. The only parties that did not appear on the ballot were absent by their own choice, not election with heavy turnout would help to deter a U.S. mili- because of government exclusion. The weight of the avail- tary intervention in Nicaragua. able evidence suggests that the Coordinadora group made a The electoral process was marked by a high degree of policy decision to pursue its political goals in 1984 outside of "open-endedness," taking the form of continuous bargaining the electoral process. between the FSLN and opposition groups over electoral rules While all the opposition parties which chose to run can- and structures, as well as more general aspects of the political didates had some valid complaints about the government's system and public policies. The record shows that both management of the electoral campaign, no party was before and during the campaign, the Sandinistas made major prevented from carrying out an active campaign. Opposition concessions to opposition forces on nearly all points of con- parties received their legal allotments of campaign funds and tention. had regular and substantial access to radio and television. The national voter registration effort was remarkably The legally registered opposition parties were able to hold the successful, especially considering that it was conducted under vast majority of their rallies unimpeded by pro-FSLN wartime conditions. In just four days, 93.7 percent of the demonstrators or by other kinds of government interference. estimated voting-age population was registered. Most of the restrictions on political activity imposed in The Nicaraguan electoral law of 1984 provided a broad March, 1982, in response to an upsurge in counterrevolution- array of protections to assure fair access, procedural honesty, ary activities were lifted at the beginning of the electoral cam- and an accurate vote count. The actual voting process was paign, and government censorship of the press was notably meticulously designed to minimize the potential for abuses. relaxed (though not eliminated). The vote was truly a secret ballot, and was generally per- The FSLN took substantial advantage of its incumbent ceived as such by voters. We observed no evidence of irre- position and, in some ways, abused it. However, the abuses -, gularities in the voting or vote-counting process. of incumbency do not appear to have been systematic; and Despite efforts by U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary neither the nature of the abuses (e.g., use of neighborhood- groups and several non-participating political groups to level Sandinista Defense Committees to distribute FSLN encourage voter abstention, 75 percent of the registered campaign propaganda and to mobilize people to attend FSLN voters cast ballots. Most voters interviewed by our delega- rallies) nor their frequency was such as to cripple the opposi- tion and by foreign journalists did not feel coerced into going tion parties' campaigns or to cast doubt on the fundamental to the polls. validity of the electoral process. Generally speaking, in this The FSLN won 63 percent of the total votes cast and campaign the FSLN did little more to take advantage of its 67 percent of the valid votes. Invalid ballots comprised only incumbency than incumbent parties everywhere (including the United States) routinely do, and considerably less than 6.1 percent of the total votes cast. Twenty-nine percent of ruling parties in other Latin American countries traditionally the valid votes went to three parties ideologically and pro- grammatically to the right of the FSLN; and another 3.8 per- have done. cent was divided among three parties distinctly to the left of Neither did the FSLN use its control of mass organiza- the FSLN. The opposition parties together took 36.5 percent tions, the food rationing system, or police to create a general- of the seats in the 96-member National Assembly elected on ized climate of fear and intimidation. Our delegation inter- November 4, including six seats that will be held by their viewed some individuals who clearly felt intimidated by the defeated presidential candidates. The Sandinista government Sandinista government, but we also observed that many peo- deliberately chose a West European-style proportional ple in Nicaragua are not reluctant to criticize the government, representation system that would maximize representation of in public, and often in the harshest possible terms. In this opposition parties in the national legislature, rather than a election year the government made little effort to stifle the U.S.-style single-member district system. vigorous criticism of its policies and performance that the electoral campaign generated. The 1984 elections brought about significant changes in beginning in January. The Sandinista government has com- the Nicaraguan political process. In addition to an unpre- mitted itself to holding regular elections in the future. cedented relaxation of political controls, a "National Dialo- These developments augur well for the future of politi- gue" involving all of the country's political and econon~ic cal pluralism in Nicaragua. However, the political opening power groups (including those that chose to boycott the process could be truncated, or even reversed, by an November 4 elections) was launched. This ongoing process intensification of U.S.-financed counterrevolutionary activities of negotiations between the FSLN and opposition forces will or by continuation of the three-year-old undeclared economic determine many of the rules of the political game to be fol- blockade of Nicaragua by the United Slates. If the pressures lowed in the post-election period. Newly-elected opposition of a war economy and war psychology are relieved, there is a party members of the National Assembly have vowed to use good chance that political liberalization will proceed. Despite their enhanced role in the political system to challenge FSLN U.S. interference, the elections of November 4, 1984, were positions on major issues like the military draft and to shape an impressive beginning. the constitution that will be drafted by the National Assembly Members of the LASA delegation discuss opposition party complaints submitted to the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), with CSE official Rosa Marina Zelaya. REPORT OF THE Wayne A. Cornelius (Political Science, University of LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION California-San Diego), President-elect of LASA. (Head of DELEGATION TO OBSERVE THE NICARAGUAN the delegation) GENERAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 4,1984 Michael E. Conroy (Economics, University of Texas-Austin; Co-Director, Central America Resource Center), member of LASA Task Force on Nicaragua. (Co-Coordinator of the PREFACE delegation) 7'homas Walker (Political Science, Ohio University, Athens), On August 15, 1984, an invitation was extended to the Co-Chair, LASA Task Force on Nicaragua. (Co-Coordinator Latin American Studies Association by the Supreme Electoral of the delegation) Council of Nicaragua, the fourth branch of the Government Laura Enriquez (Sociology, University of California-Santa of National Reconstruction, to observe the electoral campaign Cruz, in residence in Nicaragua), member of LASA. (Local and the general election to be held in Nicaragua on Arrangements Coordinator of the delegation) 1 November 4, 1984. In mid-September the LASA Executive Max Azicri (Political Science, Edinboro University of Council considered and accepted this