J. Edgar Hoover and the Anti-interventionists J. Edgar Hoover and the Anti-interventionists FBI Political Surveillance and the Rise of the Domestic Security State, 1939–1945 Douglas M. Charles THE OHIo STATE UNIVERSITY PREss • COLUMBUS Copyrght © 2007 by The Oho State Unversty. All rghts reserved. Library of Congress Catalogng-n-Publcaton Data Charles, Douglas M. J. Edgar Hoover and the ant-nterventonsts : FBI poltcal survellance and the rse of the domestc securty state, 1939–1945 / Douglas M. Charles. p. cm. Includes bblographcal references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-8142-1061-1 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-8142-1061-9 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-0-8142-9140-5 (cd-rom) ISBN-10: 0-8142-9140-6 (cd-rom) 1. Hoover, J. Edgar (John Edgar), 1895–1972. 2. Roosevelt, Frankln D. (Frankln Delano), 1882–1945. 3. Unted States. Federal Bureau of Investgaton—History. 4. World War, 1939–1945—Unted States. 5. Intellgence servce—Unted States— History—20th century. 6. Internal securty—Unted States—History—20th cen- tury. 7. Dssenters—Government polcy—Unted States—History—20th century. 8. Neutralty—Unted States—History—20th century. 9. Unted States—History—1933– 1945. 10. Unted States—Foregn relatons—1933–1945—Publc opnon. I. Ttle. HV8144.F43C43 2007 940.53'160973—dc22 2006102680 Cover desgn by Janna Thompson-Chordas Typeset in Adobe Minon Pro Typesettng by Julet Wllams Prnted by Thomson-Shore The paper used in ths publcaton meets the mnmum requrements of the Amercan Natonal Standard for Informaton Scences—Permanence of Paper for Prnted Library Materals. ANSi Z39.48-1992. 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 For my parents, Jeannette and Danel Charles CONTENTS Acknowledgments x Introducton 1 Chapter 1 Background 17 Chapter 2 Begnnngs War, Phony War, and Election 1939–40 39 Chapter 3 Intensfcaton The Lend-Lease Debate, America First, and Its Allies December 1940 to Summer 1941 59 Chapter 4 Focus From Great Debate Stalemate to Wartime Probe Mid-1941 to Summer 1942 87 Chapter 5 Retrbuton The FBI and the Victory Program Leak 4 December 1941 to Mid-1942 114 Chapter 6 Blossomng of the Domestc Securty State November 1941 to March 1942 140 Concluson 172 Biblography 179 Index 193 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is, indeed, a joy to thank those whose advce and support made work- ng on ths book a pleasurable experence. Throughout my educaton, and as ths project developed, I’ve benefted from superb advsng begnnng wth Robert Szymcak and John Paul Ross (Pennsylvana State Unversty), Athan Theohars (Marquette Unversty), and fnally Rhodr Jeffreys-Jones and Davd Stafford (Unversty of Ednburgh). I owe them all an inest- mable debt of grattude for ther thoughtful drecton, encouragement, and assstance. My research could never have been completed wthout gener- ous fnancal assstance from the Brtsh Overseas Research Student Award Scheme, Ednburgh Unversty, Amercan Frends of Ednburgh Unversty, the Roosevelt Study Center (Holland), Prnceton Unversty Library, the Herbert Hoover Presdental Library, and the Amercan Hertage Center of the Unversty of Wyomng. I’ve also benefted from the selfless fnan- cal help and encouragement of my parents (Jeannette and Danel), my grandparents who helped to spark my interest in hstory (Paulne & Lavern Blnn, Anne & Dan Charles), and my great aunts (Jeannette and Ll). Fnally, I want to thank Sandy Crooms, Eugene O’Connor, and others on the staff of The Oho State Unversty Press who helped ths project along and made the process an enjoyable one. D.M.C. Ere, Pennsylvana February 2007 ix INTRODUCTION Between 1939 and 1945, as war ravaged Europe and Asa, J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investgaton (FBI) montored the poltcal dssent of Presdent Frankln D. Roosevelt’s celebrated ant-nterventonst foregn polcy crtcs. Ths survellance occurred as Amercans popularly perceved a threat from a Naz “Ffth Column,” whch was inflamed by sensatonal stores of German esponage, leadng many otherwse ratonal ctzens and government offcals to suspect the motves of legtmate ant-nterven- tonst foregn polcy crtcs. More mportantly, the btter foregn polcy debate over Amercan involvement in war proved to be an opportunty for the bureaucrat Hoover who, as a conservatve, dd not ft the mold of the left-of-center Roosevelt admnstraton. Hoover, therefore, skllfully used the opportunty to ingratate hmself wth the Roosevelt admnstraton by caterng to the presdent’s poltcal and polcy interests—n provdng hm detaled poltcal intellgence on foregn polcy crtcs—to demonstrate hs worth to the admnstraton, retan hs tenure as FBI drector, and secure ncreased authorty and autonomy for hs bureau. Among those crtcs he targeted were Charles Lindbergh, the Amerca Frst Commttee, notable senators and congressmen, elements of the ant-nterventonst press, and other leadng fgures in the ant-nterventonst movement. Throughout, Roosevelt valued these reports and made no complants about the impro- prety or cvl lbertes volatons of J. Edgar Hoover’s actons. It was durng ths perod, moreover, when Hoover’s FBI frst used ts resources n an expansve way to montor, provde ntellgence, and dscredt an admnstraton’s poltcal opposton. But whle the FBI exten- svely montored admnstraton opposton as t never had prevously, compared to the Cold War era—where Hoover operated autonomously— the extent of the FBI’s actvty was more defned. Whereas, by 1957, the 1 Introduction Cold War FBI had abandoned prosecutons in favor of secret and illegal programs (the COINTELPROS) to dsrupt and contan ts targets, the FBI durng the 1939–45 perod consgned itself to the collecton and ds- semnaton of poltcal intellgence and worked to slence admnstraton crtcs by developng legal cases—utlzng the Smth Act, Foregn Agents Regstraton Act, conspracy statutes, and (durng wartme) the Esponage Act1—or by intatng grand jury proceedngs that, whle nomnally secret, mght have dscredted opposton efforts by castng doubt on ther legt- macy. Ths actvty suggests that the FBI’s role in the later natonal securty state, executed whle Amerca advocated an actvst foregn polcy and deferred to executve authorty, les n the prewar foregn polcy debate (the so-called Great Debate) where a hdden agenda lay behnd interven- tonst polcy and where patterns of FBI behavor mrror those of the Cold War and natonal securty state perod. Further hghlghtng the development of the FBI as a natonal secu- rty apparatus, datng from 1940 it establshed a formal relatonshp wth Brtsh intellgence. Like Hoover and Roosevelt, the Brtsh had a vested nterest n the poltcal actvtes of the ant-nterventonsts. Whereas Hoover sought to develop legal cases aganst them, collect derogatory ntellgence, and provde the Whte House wth poltcal intellgence that alluded to its crtcs’ subversveness, Brtsh intellgence sought to hasten Amercan entry into the war by dsruptng and dscredtng these foregn polcy crtcs. The relatonshp between the FBI and Brtsh intellgence, whch had exsted on an ad hoc bass datng from the Frst World War, was made permanent from 1940 and contnued to grow, extendng into the Cold War years. Whle the exact scope and nature of the two organzatons’ relatonshp cannot be ascertaned fully owng to classfcaton restrctons on relevant documents, nevertheless t s clear that the two mantaned close tes. The closeness, orgns, and development of the relatonshp, moreover, demonstrates that the FBI’s nternatonal role n the later natonal securty state—where the FBI cooperated intmately wth Alled foregn intellgence agences—had its orgns durng the Great Debate of 1940–41. That Hoover was lmted to the above tactcs durng the Great Debate can be understood if we recognze that he dd not yet have the level of 1. The Smth Act of 28 June 1940 prohbted any ndvdual or organzaton from advocatng the volent overthrow of the Unted States government or membershp wth a group advocatng such an acton. The 1940 Foregn Agents Regstraton Act (amended from the 1938 verson) requred all foregn-controlled groups to regster wth the Justce Depart- ment. Introduction 3 autonomy that he would durng the Cold War, though he dd have a greater level of autonomy than at any prevous tme. Wthout complete assurance that intrusve programs would never be dscovered, and untl hs poston as FBI drector was frmly rooted wth ideologcal alles in the Whte House or Congress—somethng Hoover dd not develop untl the Cold War—Hoover refused to employ such methods, rememberng the effects wrought on the Bureau of Investgaton from dscovery of other llegal tactcs employed durng the 1919–20 Red Scare. These concerns were reflected in Hoover’s repeated efforts to counter any crtcsm that FBI agents were involved in illegal actvty and hs publc denals that the FBI collected noncrmnal informaton durng the Great Debate. The fact of the matter, however, s that FBI agents had ndeed employed llegal survellance tactcs and actvely sought noncrmnal ntellgence on the ant-nterventonsts for bureaucratc and poltcal purposes. —■■■■■■■— Further characterzng ths perod, the FBI drector demonstrated that he was, above all, a pragmatc bureaucrat. Begnnng wth the Cooldge admnstraton in 1924, Hoover made hmself valuable to each succeedng admnstraton by provdng informaton he thought each would fnd use- ful. Hoover was successful inasmuch as he held onto hs hgh poston in government longer than any comparable fgure in Amercan hstory—he was FBI drector from 1924 untl hs death in 1972, nearly ffty years. Ths pragmatsm is sgnfcant when one examnes the bureau in the context of the New Deal era. Generally regarded as a watershed in the development of the welfare state, the New Deal reflected the precept of “bg govern- ment” staffed by left-of-center poltcans seekng proactve leadershp n Washngton. Whle on the surface it seems the poltcal vews of New Dealers and J. Edgar Hoover would be at odds, the FBI drector thrved durng the Roosevelt admnstraton.