I. Introduction. a. Good afternoon. Sergeant Major Jenkins. I am Master Sergeant Kirk Hess with the United States Anny Special Forces Command (Airborne) at Fort Bragg. North Carolina. b. This is an Information Briefing about the War in Somalia. This briefing is unclassified. c. My purpose is to examine the actions ofthe some ofthe non commissioned officers involved in this conflict, specifically from the date ofthe operation to abduct two lieutenants of Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the ensuing problems they encountered, to the end ofthat operation and the rescue ofthe soldiers that were part of it. d. During this briefing I will be discussing the impact ofNCOs in a combat situation. I will be referring to information from a variety of sources including, but not limited to periodicals, books and movies. e. The following are a list ofreferences used in my research: (I) Black Hawk Down: An American War Story. <hnp:llinquirer.philly.com/packagesl somalialsitemap.asp> [Accessed between 3 May 2006 and 20 July 2006] (2) Bowden, Marlc Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modem War. Sign~t Books, New York: 2001. (3) Eversmann, Matt and Dan Schilling. The Battle of Mogadishu: Firsthand Accounts from the Men oflask Force Ranger. Ballentine Books, New York: 2004 (4) Matt Eversmann, <http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilMatt_Eversmann> [Accessed 20 July 2006] f. Through my research I have developed at deeper appreciation for the NCO and the burdens he bears when leading his soldiers in combat. II. Body. 8. Specific Operation referenced. b. NCOs experience and training prior to operation. c. Weapons and equipment used prior to and during operation. How effective were they? d. NCOs performance in combat and tactics utilized. e. NCOs leadership and affect on subordinates. f. What is an affective NCO? What are the author's conclusions? III. Closing. a. Are there any questions? b. I have discussed what the NCOs' experience and training prior to combat was, the weapons and equipment used for the operation and their effectiveness, what their performance in combat was and the tactics they utilized, and the affect their leadership had on their subordinates. The soldiers oftoday are constantly looking for a hero. The NCOs that were a part ofthe operations in Mogadishu, Somalia, are those heroes. They are true warriors, professionals, NCOs. c. This concludes my briefmg. Thank you for your time. (No other briefer follows.) Works Cited Black Hawk Down: An American War Story. <http://inquirer.philly.comlpackageslsomalialsitemap.asp> [Accessed between 3 May 2006 and 20 July 2006] Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modem War. Signet Books (a division of Penguin Books), New York: 2001. Dao Schilling, <http://www.k-b-c.comlschillinglbio.jpg> [Accessed 20 July 2006] Eversmann. Matt and Dan Schilling. eds. The Battle ofMogadishu: Firsthand Accounts from the Men ofTask Force Ranger. New York: Random House 2004 Hilltop Times <http://www.hilitoptimes.comlLifetime.asp?edition~llO> [Accessed 20 July 2006] Matt Eversmann, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matt_Eversmann> [Accessed 20 July 2006] The Battle of Mogadishu: NCOs in Action MSG Richard K. Hess The soldiers oftoday are constantly looking for a mentor, a "hero", someone they can look up to, and more importantly, someone they aspire to be like. We find these "heroes" in great numbers throughout our country's history and in all branches ofour service. These people we find arc, typically, NCOs. Are we, as NCOs, really the type of individual that someone would refer to as a "hero"? History tells us that the answer is a resounding yes! Operation Gothic Serpent, or the Battle for Mogadishu, as it is also known, occurred on October 3, 1993. Task Force Ranger was slated for this, their 7th combat mission and, what would be, their final mission in Somalia. This was the operation to capture two lieutenants of Habr Gidr clan leader, Mohamed Farrah Aidid in the "Black Sea" area of Mogadishu, Somalia. The sad part about this is that the operation was less than successful. Although they were able to capture the Aidid's two lieutenants, Task Force Ranger lost 18 men that day. Many ofthe losses were attributed to the groWld convoy that was sent in to pick up Aidid's people and came to be known as the "lost convoy". Lost Convoy - The original groWld convoy ofnine humvees and three five-ton trucks commanded by Lt. Col. Darmy McKnight. The convoy's mission was to drive Somali prisoners and the assault force back to base. They were whittled down to six humvees and two trucks. Carrying 24 prisoners, they got lost trying to find their way to the two Blackhawk crash sites. Black Hawk Down: An American War StOry, <bttp:llinquirer.pbiIIy.comJpackages/somalia/sitemap.asp> The significant point is that the operation consisted, largely, ofNCOs. Two of the NCOs on that mission were former Staff Sergeant Matt Eversmann, a U.S. Army Ranger and leader of Chalk Four and former Staff Sergeant Dan Schilling, a U.S. Air Force Combat Control Technician. Matt Eversmann grew up in Natural Bridge, Virginia, the son ofa U.S. Army veteran. His sister was a U.S. Anny nurse and one of his older brothers was a U.S. Marine Corps Captain. Eversmann enlisted in the Army as an infantryman in December 1987 and was stationed at Fort Drum, New York with the 10th Mountain Division. In 1992 he reenlisted and arrived at Fort Benning, Georgia for his assignment in the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. Eversmann attended Airborne School, Ranger School, SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape) School, Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC). He also graduated from the Master Fitness School, Jumpmaster School, Special Operations Tactics course, and the Equal Opportunity Course. He also won the Leadership Award at Ranger School, the Primary and the Basic Course. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wikil Matt_Eversmann> The mission came five years into his Army career and was his only combat mission, as well as his fust time leading a group in combat. Prior to Operation Gothic Serpent, SSG Eversmann and his soldiers had practiced their part in the operation at least a dozen times with half of those practices coming on actual missions occurring before this one. That training included practicing fast roping from the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter and setting up their perimeter as they would during the actual operation. Task Force Ranger would use four blocking positions to surround the target building. SSG Eversmann and his men would set up a blocking position on the northwest comer ofthe target building. o The Rangers AboU: 75 Rangel'S roped OCwfl lrom feu Blacll.mw+; hd~ in The other three chalks would do the b . ~oups - called d l3k> - at the (XlI Ilt)1S (J/ 11'110 i:j,Xk to plO'IIde I"M"I' ~!or the Delta Foroe. Chalk' is ltQppOO a bk:x":I< too far nom. same on the northeast, southeast, and Lea Oy t4// . I~IS I "I Sgt.. 11(r,t Led tJv Mfst u.. I t versmafWl ~""lQmas:so southwest comers ofthe building to form an "L" shape. This would allow orop""""'" P'"'' fotCIlioII<• ~ the personnel at the ends ofthe "L" to have visual contact with the others on D Delta Force F,,""1l /leI >OOpt.efS set me Delta assaut bOIl Of abOut .aJ sok1ielS on thP. street the ends ofthe "L" positions. (Map DlnSide the lafget They theo stoiIF"l!:.'d 1110 lJuilding. courtesy of: Black Hawk Down: An American War Storr. The missioft - whICh <http://inquirer.pbilly.com/packages/s DConvo)' ...... began at 3:42 p.m. ::::n A COO\'Oy 0112 Oct. 3, 199J - was trudl.$ artd hUll1\.'t!eS - deSIgned to ::aptule omalia/sitemap.asp» "MJt~ 1(1 I"I3It bfjtind Scma~an dan teaders \he ~ Hot!!! uottI .... "' ... : meeting," a house after me msaul . It dllln .....as 10 tr.wQl I.:P .' near the OlympiC . Hotel . There was one M-60 machinegun and H~ad;g Road to pick .' .'. up the ~ . MO retIJTl !hem to thll U.S. basa. .'.' one M-203 grenade launcher at each end position. The rest ofTask Force Ranger carried either the M-16 or the CAR- IS. The CAR- IS was a Colt Automatic Rifle IS, an automatic weapon more compact and lightweight than an M-16. It fires a high velocity 5.56mm round. Other weapons used during the operation by different members ofTask Force Ranger were flash bang grenades, Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW), MK-19 or Mark- I 9 that fires 40mm rounds, the Browning SO caliber machine gun, MP-SK, a German submachine gun that fires 9mm rounds, the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), and the Springfield .45 caliber pistol. The ammunition used for the M-16 and CAR- IS proved difficult to stop the enemy with. The "new" green tipped 5.56mm round was so powerful that it would travel right through the enemy and had the effect of using an ice pick. It would leave a small entry wound but had difficulty stopping them. Outside of the M-16 and CAR-IS, the other weapons used during the operation proved very effective. Equipment used during the operation ranged from Night Vision Goggles or NVGs, also sometimes called NODs, to the high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) or better known as the "Humvee". That day, SSG Eversmann lost some of his men during the operation. However, his leadership encouraged his remaining soldiers to continue on and accomplish the mission, despite the danger they were in. The following is a quote from SSG Eversmann: "I think everybody probably went through the whole spectrum ofemotions that day.