Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of ) ) Space Exploration Holdings, LLC ) RM-11855 ) Petition for Revision of ) Section 25.261 of the Commission’s Rules ) REPLY COMMENTS OF O3B LIMITED Of Counsel: Suzanne Malloy Karis Hastings Vice President of Regulatory Affairs SatCom Law LLC O3b Limited 1317 F Street, NW, Suite 400 1129 20th Street, NW, Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20004 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 599-0975 (202) 813-4026 June 30, 2020 SUMMARY O3b’s pioneering position in building a network that provides capable, reliable connectivity to customers around the globe showcases the success of Commission policies for non-geostationary orbit (“NGSO”) systems and underscores the importance of continuing to adapt the NGSO regulatory framework to support the industry’s evolution and growth. In 2014, O3b began offering service to customers in the United States and worldwide with its Ka-band NGSO system. O3b is continuing to connect historically under- and unconnected populations with the next-generation mPOWER system of high-throughput, low-latency satellites, and is seeking authority to further expand its system to add satellites and capabilities. Given the exponential growth in NGSO system interest in the years since O3b’s operations commenced, O3b agrees that the time is ripe for the Commission to begin a rulemaking to define spectrum sharing rights between NGSO systems authorized in different processing rounds, according superior rights to earlier round systems while providing opportunities for new entrants and system expansion. O3b has developed a comprehensive framework that builds on the existing Commission rules to achieve these goals. In contrast, the sharing proposal put forward by SpaceX is incomplete and would discourage coordination between parties. Suggestions by other parties for merging processing rounds or relying on ITU priority to determine relative spectrum rights fundamentally conflict with established Commission policies and must also be rejected. The plain language of Section 25.261(c)(1) allowing choice of “home spectrum” based on network deployment order should remain unchanged. The rule accomplishes its intended purpose, encouraging prompt deployment and protecting service continuity, and changing the standard now would undermine the certainty on which operators and investors have relied. The i record conclusively shows that the purported “spectrum efficiency” metric SpaceX advocates is blatantly self-serving, would impede sharing, and would require the Commission to commit resources to refereeing disputes. Finally, the Commission should refrain from dictating that NGSO systems share beam pointing information. Such a mandate would raise significant confidentiality concerns and is simply infeasible given the dynamic NGSO operating environment. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................... i I. O3B’S SHARING APPROACH FOR SYSTEMS FROM DIFFERENT PROCESSING ROUNDS BEST PROMOTES THE PUBLIC INTEREST ........................ 2 A. The O3b Default Spectrum Sharing Proposal Provides Regulatory Certainty and Supports New Entry ............................................................... 2 B. The SpaceX Sharing Proposal and Alternatives Suggested by Other Parties Are Fundamentally Flawed ................................................. 5 II. THE COMMISSION SHOULD RETAIN ITS HOME SPECTRUM PROVISION, WHICH ENCOURAGES PROMPT SERVICE TO CUSTOMERS ..................................... 8 III. THE RECORD CONFIRMS THAT REQUIRING SYSTEMS TO SHARE BEAM POINTING INFORMATION IS INFEASIBLE AND UNNECESSARY............ 11 IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 13 iii Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of ) ) Space Exploration Holdings, LLC ) RM-11855 ) Petition for Revision of ) Section 25.261 of the Commission’s Rules ) REPLY OF O3B LIMITED O3b Limited (“O3b”) submits this reply to the comments of other parties regarding the above-captioned petition for rulemaking filed by Space Exploration Holdings, LLC (“SpaceX”) proposing new and revised regulatory provisions to address spectrum sharing among non- geostationary orbit (“NGSO”) fixed-satellite service (“FSS”) systems.1 O3b agrees that the Commission should commence a rulemaking exploring NGSO sharing issues, but neither the SpaceX proposals nor alternatives offered by commenters would achieve Commission objectives. In order to incentivize coordination, provide certainty to support investment, promote competition, and reward the delivery of service to customers, the Commission should use the approach outlined by O3b as the basis for a sharing structure that would foster the Commission’s public interest goals. The Commission should also reject changes to its home spectrum selection policy and decline to mandate that NGSO systems share beam location information. 1 Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, Petition for Revision of Section 25.261 of the Commission’s Rules to Increase Certainty in Spectrum Sharing Obligations Among Non-Geostationary Orbit Fixed-Satellite Service Systems, RM-11855, filed Apr. 30, 2020 (the “SpaceX Petition”). I. O3B’S SHARING APPROACH FOR SYSTEMS FROM DIFFERENT PROCESSING ROUNDS BEST PROMOTES THE PUBLIC INTEREST The record reflects broad agreement regarding the pro-consumer principles that should drive development of a default spectrum sharing regime, and the regulatory adjustments proposed by O3b are tailored to advance those principles. Accordingly, the Commission should use the O3b approach as the basis for its rulemaking proposals and dismiss requests by SpaceX and others for rule changes that would disincentivize coordination and hamper competition. A. The O3b Default Spectrum Sharing Proposal Provides Regulatory Certainty and Supports New Entry O3b’s sharing proposal, which builds on existing standards, encourages all parties to work together to reach coordination agreements, and provides stability for early round systems, is uniquely suited to further the Commission’s policy objectives.2 The Commission’s 2017 decision adopting the current regulatory framework emphasized that “coordination among NGSO FSS operators in the first instance offers the best opportunity for efficient spectrum sharing.” 3 In the event no coordination between two systems is in place, the Commission specified that the operators must split the spectrum when the increase in the relevant system’s noise temperature, ΔT/T, exceeds six percent.4 The Commission determined that this six percent ΔT/T metric, which is used internationally to determine when coordination is required among geostationary orbit satellites, “is the best method for characterizing the situations in which there 2 See Comments of O3b Limited, RM-11855, filed June 15, 2020 (“O3b Comments”) at 2 n.4. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations herein are to comments filed in RM-11855 on June 15, 2020. 3 Update to Parts 2 and 25 Concerning Non-Geostationary, Fixed-Satellite Service Systems and Related Matters, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd 7809 (2017) (“NGSO Order”) at 7825, ¶ 48. 4 Id., ¶ 49. 2 is potential for interference between NGSO FSS systems.”5 The Commission made clear that this sharing methodology was limited to systems authorized in the same round and expressly rejected proposals to use ITU date priority to determine spectrum access rights.6 The O3b sharing approach is a natural evolution of this current structure, using the same six percent ΔT/T band-splitting trigger but adding a provision for situations involving systems authorized in different processing rounds.7 Specifically, O3b proposes using a multiplier of three to assign a greater share of the spectrum to earlier round systems than to later round systems in a band-splitting scenario. This multiplier achieves the balance the Commission described in the NGSO Order, by recognizing “both the need to protect existing expectations and investments and provide for additional entry.”8 By awarding a larger share of spectrum to earlier applicants, O3b’s proposed rule promotes the goal of the processing round regime: providing “a measure of certainty” for early round systems “in lieu of adopting an open-ended requirement to accommodate all future applicants.”9 As commenters emphasize, this guarantee of defined protection against later filings is an essential element of the processing round framework.10 5 Id. 6 Id., ¶ 50. 7 O3b Comments at 8-9. 8 NGSO Order, 32 FCC Rcd at 7825, ¶ 50. 9 Id. at 7829, ¶ 61. 10 See Comments of Telesat Canada (“Telesat Comments”) at 5 (“Processing rounds would be meaningless if they did not afford protection against harmful interference from those participating in later rounds.”); Comments of Kepler Communications, Inc. (“Kepler Comments”) at 7 (“Of course, the very nature of the processing round framework implies a guarantee of some level of protection for members of an earlier processing round from those of a later.”). 3 Critically, however, the approach also continues to incentivize good-faith coordination, which parties recognize represents the best means of sharing spectrum.11 As Karousel explains: Because the stakes of spectrum-splitting are so high, section 25.261 establishes strong incentives for operators whose systems may experience in-line events to reach privately negotiated