Power Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement Skopje, 2008 Publisher: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office Macedonia, ul. Risto Ravanovski 3, 1000 Skopje, Macedonia http://www.fes.org.mk Cover design and pre-press: PROMO DSGN, Skopje Proofreading provided by BesTel Copies: 300 Copyright by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung CIP – Каталогизација во публикација Национална и универзитетска библиотека “Св.Климент Охридски”, Скопје 321.7(497.7)”2001” POWER Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. – Skopje : Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008. – 212 стр. : табели; 24 см Фусноти кон текстот ISBN 978-9989-109-45-4 а) “Охридски рамковен договор 2001” – Имплементација COBISS.MK-ID 73541642 Content: 5 Introduction 7 Florian Bieber Power-Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement 41 Etem Aziri The Spirit of the Consensus and the Integration in a Multi- ethnic Society 67 Ermira Mehmeti Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement 89 Izet Zeqiri The Economic Causes and Consequences of the 2001 War and the Consolidation of the Economy after the Crisis 109 Sali Ramadani Power-Sharing and Internal Security 131 Rizvan Sulejmani Consensus Democracy and Power-Sharing in Macedonia 165 Xheladin Murati Education and Use of Language 179 Emil Atanasovski Educational Segregation of Communities in Macedonia; an Unsustainable Policy Severely Hampering Integration Efforts 195 Ixhet Memeti Power-Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement 207 Florian Bieber Conclusions: The Ohrid Framework Agreement after 7 years Authors take full responsibility for their expressed opinions and positions. The opinions and positions in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Introduction In recent years there has been a dispute in Macedonia about the „spirit of the Ohrid Framework Agreement“ (OFA). This was first and foremost related to the question of the use of the so called “Badinter rule” in forming a governing coalition (inclusion of the biggest ethnic Albanian party) and turned on to be discussed in other matters. While one side was referring to such “spirit” in claims of a breach of the OFA by the ruling government, the other neglected either completely something like a “spirit” which could serve as a source for interpretation of the OFA or referred to the fact that no legally binding regulations would explicitly force the ruling party to act in one or another way. In a juridical terminology it would have been more appropriate to use the term “sense and purpose” of the regulations of the OFA and to give answers to current questions and challenges in light of those terms. But this is only a question of terminology. “Spirit” in fact means exactly that – sense and purpose. What has been the “sense and purpose” of the Ohrid Framework Agreement when it was negotiated and signed in 2001? Certainly, the immediate establishment of peace - but also a lot more. It has not been a cease-fire agreement, but an agreement which put the Macedonian Constitution on new grounds. From a political model oriented along the classical idea of Westminster democracy, the modified Constitution turned the structural setting into a consociational democracy with particular rules for keeping smaller ethnic communities protected from majorization in specific political fields. Whether this Macedonian model of a Power-Sharing agreement is an example of strong or weak institutionalization of consociational democracy - will be discussed in more detail in this publication. The idea of this Power-Sharing agreement was to guarantee to all ethnic communities in Macedonia the political, societal and cultural participation and self-expression within the Macedonian state. Guaranteed rights should not just be nominal, but citizens belonging to smaller ethnic communities should have a realistic opportunity to exercise them. Thus the Ohrid Framework Agreement aimed at full integration of those ethnic groups whose level of participation until then was somehow depending on the will of the biggest ethnic community. This publication will try to answer the question to what extent the purpose of the OFA has been achieved with its implementation and in which aspects it might have failed or unintended side effects might have emerged. Therefore, the single contributions to this publication do not just try to answer the question whether the respective regulations prescribed by the OFA have been adopted and implemented. Going beyond this technical understanding of the implementation we would also like to answer the question whether the “sense and purpose” of the OFA as an instrument of integration of minorities in Macedonia has been materialized or whether it has at least had a visible impact on the development of an integrated (multicultural) society. Furthermore, the authors give recommendations for the creation of an even more integrated society. Finally, it has to be mentioned that the integration of all ethnic groups of the society is an ongoing challenge not only for Macedonia, but everywhere else. A challenge that can and should be responded to on various levels – the central state, the municipalities, the civil society and, last but not least, by the behavior and attitude of individuals. The editors of this publication hope to give impetus to an ongoing debate within and outside Macedonia about the success, but also about possible pitfalls of this specific Power-Sharing agreement that was created in 2001. The editors are especially grateful to Florian Bieber (Ph.D.) from the University of Kent who was willing to accept the role of a scientific coordinator for the publication. Stefan Dehnert Rizvan Sulejmani (Ph.D.) Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Institute for Political and Intercultural Studies Power-Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement Florian Bieber POWER-SHARING AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OHRID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT Ever since becoming an independent country in 1991/2, commentators domestically and internationally have often warned of an imminent crisis or conflict in Macedonia. Nevertheless, Macedonia has managed to not only achieve independence peacefully, but has also avoided much of the blood-shed of the major part of former Yugoslavia. While the conflict in 2001 arguably undermined the myth of Macedonia as an “island of stability”, the quick resolution of the conflict without a large number of victims stands in sharp contrast to the wars elsewhere in the region. The Ohrid Framework Agreement, the subject of this book, provided for a guide out of the conflict, which has proved relatively successful. Many of the other peace plans for other parts of former Yugoslavia had a considerably more difficult starting position. It is considerably easier to make peace after 8 months of skirmishes with around 200 victims1 than after 3 ½ years of war and over 100,000 dead. A second key difference which has made peace more enduring in Macedonia has been the fact that the conflict, at the core, was not about competing state projects, but rather about competing ideas on the nature of the state. While the National Liberation Army (NLA) issued some statements in the early phases of the conflict suggesting a secessionist agenda, the goals were quickly toned down and genuinely appeared to focus on the rights of Albanians in Macedonia rather than redrawing borders.2 In Croatia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the state as such was under dispute, making a settlement without re-drawing borders considerably more difficult. A third particular feature of Macedonia has been the tradition of inter- ethnic accommodation since the early 1990s. Macedonian political 1 Iso Rusi, “What Do the Casualties of War Amount to?” AIM, 25.12.2001. 2 Alex Belamy, “The New Wolves at the Door: Conflict in Macedonia,” Civil Wars, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 132-133. 7 Florian Bieber framework during the 1990s was contradictory. The Constitution and understanding of many majority parties assert the ‘ownership’ of the majority over the state. Based on the logic of nations and republics during Communist Yugoslavia and the perceived threat by neighbors over identity and name, reinforced a proprietary approach towards the state.3 At the same time, a tradition of broad coalitions emerged since 1992 which consistently included Albanian parties in the Government. This contradiction was unable to accommodate the inter-ethnic tensions during the conflict in 2001 and highlighted that stability required more significant inclusion of Albanians than just at the level of government, whereas Albanians had remained under-represented in the public administration and lacked adequate protection of group rights. This chapter4 argues that there are three key controversies over the Ohrid Framework Agreement: First, what kind of power-sharing system the OFA establishes remains controversial. As will be subsequently argued, the Agreement does not fall squarely within one category of institutional design for multi-ethnic states, allowing for different and contradictory interpretation of its institutional set-up and its ‘spirit’. I will argue in this chapter that the current Macedonian system is a weak form of consociational power-sharing. Second, some scholars have argued that the Ohrid Framework Agreement is not an adequate response to the conflict in 2001 and that it increases tensions, rather than lessening them. Closely related, some have argued that less the OFA itself, but its implementation has worsened inter-ethnic relations. Such