Философия религии: Philosophy of Religion: аналитические исследования Analytic Researches 2019. Т. 3. № 2. С. 87–96 2019, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 87–96 УДК 241 DOI: 10.21146/2 587-683Х-2019-3-2-87-96 Roger Pouivet The Right to Believe that only one Religion is True Roger Pouivet – prof. à l’Université de Lorraine Institut Universitaire de France, Laboratoire d’His- toire des Sciences et de Philosophie Archives Henri-Poincaré (CNRS), 91, Avenue de la Libération, 54001 Nancy Cedex (France); e-mail: [email protected] Some philosophers claim to show that religious diversitY should lead rational beings to find some conciliation between them. TheY saY that diversity should mean that no one could pre- tend to hold the truth. We must therefore renounce alethic exclusivitY, the claim that a cer- tain religion possesses by itself the truth. This encourages religious scepticism, because when well-informed and reasonable people disagree about their religious or anti-religious beliefs, their confidence in the justification of their beliefs must be reduced or diminished – even if that belief were true – to the point that these people are intellectuallY reconciled. Let us call this claim the Principle of Intellectual Conciliation. I will first claim that it is not a sound principle of intellectual ethics. For that, I will first show that if this Principle claims to sceptically conclude to the plurality of religions, it is, in realitY, a reasoning from a scepti- cal dogma, and not onlY a reasoning that leads to scepticism. I mean that it is a hidden athe- istic argument disguised as an honest neutral reasoning. As it calls for an ethical requirement of rationalitY, without being then so transparent that it seems, it is important to show that this Principle borders on deception. I am secondly going to show that, even if one accepts to allow oneself to be conciliated by reasoning, the Principle has serious flaws, especiallY with regard to the philosophical psychology of religious faith. My conclusion will be that it is wrong that we should suspend any religious belief that an alleged epistemic peer does not share as soon as we become aware that he does not share it. It is not true that it is rational in any case to respect the Principle of Intellectual Conciliation, and that another attitude would always be irrational and morally disgusting. Keywords: Religious pluralism, conciliationism, doctrinal exclusivism, religious exclusi- vism, faith, religious scepticism, intellectual arrogance, intellectual virtue. Citation: Pouivet R. “The Right to Believe that onlY one Religion is True”, Philosophy of Religion: Analytic Researches, 2019, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 87‒96. © Roger Pouivet 88 Современные дискурсы Introduction Some philosophers claim to show that religious diversitY should lead rational beings to find some conciliation between them. TheY saY that diversitY should mean that no one could pretend to hold the truth. We must therefore renounce alethic exclusivism, the claim that a certain religion possesses by itself the truth. This en- courages religious scepticism, because when well-informed and reasonable people disagree about their religious or anti-religious beliefs, their confidence in the justifi- cation of their beliefs must be reduced or diminished – even if that belief were true – to the point that these people are intellectuallY reconciled. Let us call this claim the Principle of Intellectual Conciliation. According to this Principle, conciliation between believers of the various reli- gions would thus be a requirement of intellectual ethics. To follow this principle makes us intellectually honest. We do not preserve beliefs (including religious ones) against our right to have them. The contrarY is the culpable intellectual arrogance of those who claim to be right against people who disagree with them, but are as well informed and reasonable as theY are. To follow the Principle of Intellectual Conci- liation would also be an assurance of civil peace in our multicultural societies. It helps to ensure harmonious coexistence between believers and unbelievers, and between believers of different religions. If there is conciliation, there is peace! Thus, the two ideals of an honest intellectual life and of social peace would implY a drastic reduction of confidence in the justification of our religious beliefs or of our anti-religious beliefs. Yet mY intention is to challenge the Principle of Intellectual Conciliation1. I will first claim that it is not a sound principle of intellectual ethics. For that, I will first show that if this Principle claims to scepticallY conclude to the pluralitY of reli- gions, it is, in realitY, a reasoning from a sceptical dogma, and not onlY a reasoning that leads to scepticism. I mean that it is a hidden atheistic argument disguised as an honest neutral reasoning. As it calls for an ethical requirement of rationalitY, without being then so transparent that it seems, it is important to show that this Principle borders on deception. I am secondlY going to show that, even if one ac- cepts the argument as it is, the Principle has serious flaws, especiallY with regard to the philosophical psychology of religious faith. The principle of conciliation as a reformulation of Agrippa’s first mode To explain what is (perhaps secretly) the Principle of Intellectual Conciliation, consider the following reasoning: 1. X believes that p. 2. Y believes that q. 1 I already defended religious exclusivism in [Pouivet, 2013]. I am here seeking to complete my ar- gument and to defend it against the conciliationist strategy. Roger Pouivet. The Right to Believe that only one Religion is True 89 3. p and q are apparently incompatible2. 4. If X was in Y's situation, it is verY likelY that X would believe q, and that he would think p is wrong3. 5. If Y was in X's situation, it is verY likelY that Y would believe that p, and that he would think q is false. 6. It is intellectually compulsory to doubt p and q. Such an argument asserts that if p and q are incompatible religious beliefs (or that p is a religious belief and q an anti-religious belief), then one is necessarilY led to doubt about p and q. In this argument, (4) and (5) correspond to the Principle of Intellectual Conciliation. It is an argument from religious disagreement to reli- gious scepticism for equallY intelligent people, of good faith and intellectuallY hon- est. (Exactly the kind of people we are, of course). ConsequentlY, it is hardlY surprising that the previous argument has a sceptical conclusion, since it is an application to religious belief of one of the five modes of Agrippa, as described by Sextus Empiricus in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism [Sextus Empiricus, 2000, p. 40‒41]. Yet, these modes of Agrippa are indeed much formula- tions of scepticism than arguments in favour of scepticism. The first mode of Agrippa, and the main one, is preciselY the disagreement of opinions. It has this structure: (A) S1 believes that p. (B) S2 believes that not p. (C) At most, one of them is right. (D) The disagreement between S1 and S2 cannot be resolved. (E) We must suspend judgment on p. It is the disagreement itself that is supposed to induce the suspension of judg- ment. Assume that (D) is disputed, that is, that the disagreement cannot be resolved. Then, to justifY p or not p, it would be necessarY to give in favour of one or the other a reason r1. But it can in turn be challenged, according to the same argument as the previous one. Then another reason r2 is needed. But the argument applied to r1 applies also to r2, and another reason r3 is needed. Hence, there is an infinite regres- sion (second mode of Agrippa). The reason proposed will ultimatelY remain relative to the one who gives it (third mode); or it is hardlY a hYpothesis (fourth mode); or else it supposes other reasons which are, taken together, circular (fifth mode), because one of them, the first, serves to found others of which one is used to found the first – which takes us around and around in circles. Therefore, the disagreement, that is to saY (D), subsists. FinallY we should then suspend the judgment (E). 2 Let us say that p and q could be one of these propositions: God exists/God does not exist; there is only one God/There are multiple gods; God is one and triune/God is absolutely one; Jesus is the Son of God/Jesus is an admirable man; Jesus died on the Cross and rose/If even Jesus died on the Cross, he never rose; The Virgin Mary has an immaculate conception/The Virgin Mary is tainted by Original sin; The Bible says the truth/Vedic texts tell the truth; the Bible does not say the truth. 3 It would be possible to contest that one could know what someone would think in a situation where he would be (in a counterfactual situation therefore). But this is to explain the reasoning of those who defend the Principle of Intellectual Conciliation, and not to accept the premises of this reasoning. 90 Современные дискурсы Whoever uses the logical form of Agrippa’s first mode to reason about the di- versitY of religions knows verY well what will happen: he will conclude scepticallY. It is with any disagreement we come to this conclusion: it is not at all peculiar to re- ligious disagreements, but to disagreements in general. And it makes no doubt that the initial argument about religious disagreements at the beginning of this paper is simplY a reformulation of Agrippa’s first mode with religious premises simplY added. (4) specifies (D): it gives a reason why some disagreement about religious beliefs cannot be resolved.