A Foregone Conclusion? The United States, Britain and the Trident missile agreements, 1977 – 1982 Suzanne Doyle A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the University of East Anglia, School of Politics, Language and Communication Studies. July 2015 This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution. Abstract Only recently have declassified government documents on the United States sale of Trident nuclear missiles to the United Kingdom become available. As such, the Trident agreements of 1980 and 1982 have received little scholarly attention. This thesis provides the first focused study of the negotiations on the supply of Trident C4 and D5 missiles. It does this by drawing upon material from the British National Archives, the Jimmy Carter Library and the Ronald Reagan Library. Specifically, the research focuses on the ways in which the interests of the United States influenced the Trident negotiations and British decision- making on the successor to Polaris. This approach eschews the Anglo-centric framework that dominates research on the US-UK nuclear relationship. This US-centred approach demonstrates the contingency of the Trident negotiations. Both the Reagan and Carter administrations were hard-headed in their discussions with the British over the supply of Trident, and only consented to do so when it suited Washington. Furthermore, both administrations drove a hard bargain over the terms of sale, and sought to derive the greatest possible benefit from the deal. US geostrategic interests, economic realities and domestic politics influenced the actions of White House officials throughout. The sale of Trident only brought modest benefits. As such, both US administrations viewed it as helpful to assist the British when it coalesced with their overall interests. However, if a Polaris replacement clashed with the priorities of the administration, they disregarded British interests. As such, the Trident agreements were not a ‘foregone conclusion’ due to the logic of Cold War ‘deterrence’, or long-standing US-UK nuclear co- operation, but negotiations heavily influenced by the context of the time. As such, the study reveals the ways in which the broader political concerns of the United States interacted with the US-UK nuclear relationship and nuclear decision-making. 2 Acknowledgements Many people have helped me in many ways in the course of writing this thesis. I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Faculty of Humanities and School of Politics at the University of East Anglia that made this thesis largely possible. Through attendance at various conferences, I have been extremely fortunate to receive advice and support from many in my field – too many to name here. But particular thanks goes to the organisers of the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP), as well as Matthew Jones, Kaeten Mistry, Kristan Stoddart, Leopoldo Nuti, and David Holloway. Thanks also goes to my ‘nuclear friends’ from the NPIHP who have been a source of inspiration. I am grateful to the School of Politics for providing a supportive and friendly environment within which to conduct research. Special mention goes to Lee Marsden, Hussein Kassim, John Turnpenny, Alan Finlayson, Alex Brown and David Gill. My fellow residents of 3.82 over the years deserve considerable thanks for their encouragement and making what could be a lonely experience a lot of fun: Kate Maguire, Ana Fitzsimons, Emily Crocker, Juliette Harkin, Nick Wright, Tori Cann, Vanessa Buth, Viv Fluck, Susan Wang, Nasta Yakubu and Maja Šimunjak. My supervisor David Milne deserves special thanks. The completion of this thesis owes a huge amount to his support, encouragement and testing comments. Most importantly, I must give thanks to my family for their unconditional support. My Nana, as well as my various aunts, uncles and cousins for their encouragement. Chris’s family for welcoming me into theirs. Louise, who is the kindest sister-in-law one could ever ask for. My ever thoughtful brother David, who managed to provide the answer at the very beginning of writing… And my always smiling niece and nephew, Chloe and Joshua, who have provided perspective. Audrey, my cat, also deserves special mention, for keeping me entertained and ensuring that I rise early. I give my deepest thanks to my Mum, Dad and Chris. My parents have always been unfailing in their love, support, belief and encouragement – despite wondering if I will ever stop being a student. None of this would have been possible without them. Chris has given me the unwavering love and support that I needed to finish this thesis, despite having his own to write. I cannot tell Chris how much our time together, nor his ability to stay out of the PhD bubble, means to me. I dedicate this thesis to my Mum, Dad and Chris, with love and gratitude. 3 Contents Abstract 2 Acknowledgements 3 Abbreviations and Acronyms 5 Introduction 7 Part One – Historical Overview Chapter 1 - Frequently Renegotiated: The US-UK nuclear 24 relationship, 1940 – 1976 Part Two – The Carter administration and the Trident C4 agreement Chapter 2 - Securing the Options: The Carter administration 55 and the US-UK nuclear relationship, January 1977 – December 1978 Chapter 3 - SALT in the Wounds: The Preliminary 93 Negotiations, 1979 Chapter 4 - A Transactional Relationship: The Trident C4 157 agreement, December 1979 – July 1980 Part Three - The Reagan administration and the Trident D5 agreement. Chapter 5 - The Wait for a D5 Decision: The Reagan 204 administration and the US-UK nuclear relationship, January 1981 – September 1981 Chapter 6 - Red Threat: The Reagan administration and the 246 United Kingdom’s D5 upgrade, October 1981 – March 1982 Conclusion 292 Bibliography 306 4 Abbreviations and Acronyms ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missiles ANF Atlantic Nuclear Force CM Cruise Missile CND Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe DOD Department of Defense EEC European Economic Community ERW Enhanced Radiation Warhead FRG Federal Republic of Germany FY Fiscal Year GLCM Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles HLG High-Level Group HMG Her Majesty’s Government ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile JCL Jimmy Carter Library LRTNF Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions MDA Mutual Defence Agreement MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle MLF Multilateral Force MOD Ministry of Defence MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles MRV Multiple Re-entry Vehicle N.D. No Date NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NPG Nuclear Planning Group 5 NSC National Security Council NSDD National Security Decision Directive PRC People’s Republic of China PSA Polaris Sales Agreement R&D Research and Development RRL Ronald Reagan Library SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SAM Surface-to-Air Missile SCC Special Coordination Committee SDI Strategic Defence Initiative SDP Social Democratic Party SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile SLCM Submarine Launched Cruise Missile SNP Scottish Nationalist Party START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks TNA The National Archives TNF Theatre Nuclear Forces USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WWII World War II 6 Introduction “Unless you were quite senior in the government, you knew nothing about these things at all. You talk about Parliament being ignorant… We were all ignorant about it.” - Lord Peter Carrington.1 Over the course of a rather timid United Kingdom general election campaign, the events of 9 April 2015 stood out. On that day, Michael Fallon, the Conservative Defence Secretary, claimed that, in order to do a deal with the anti-Trident Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) and secure power in Westminster, Ed Miliband would “stab the United Kingdom in the back” over renewing the UK’s Trident nuclear weapons system just as he had “stabbed his own brother in the back” to lead the Labour party.2 Notwithstanding the absurdity of comparing relations with a brother to one’s policy on nuclear weapons, the ensuing media circus highlighted the peculiarities of British elite thinking on the country’s nuclear force. David Cameron, leader of the Conservative party, pressed for an absolute Labour commitment to Trident, stating: We need an answer from Labour. Are you really committed to the Trident deterrent? Are you really going to have four submarines and can you rule out any arrangement where the SNP put you into power knowing they want… less secure defences without a Trident replacement.3 Vernon Coaker, Labour’s Shadow Defence Secretary, replied to the Conservative accusations: “Labour is committed to maintain a minimum, 1 Lord Carrington quoted in Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), viii. 2 Michael Fallon, “This unholy alliance would put Britain’s security in jeopardy,” The Times, 9 April 2015, accessed 29 May 2015, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/thunderer/article4405666.ece. 3 David Cameron quoted in Patrick Wintour “Trident row: Cameron defends Fallon’s attack on Miliband,” The Guardian, 9 April 2015, accessed 29 May 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/apr/09/trident-row-cameron-defends-