View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives Rethinking Coercive Diplomacy A Dynamic Approach to NATO Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia and Kosovo Henning Køhler Knutsen Master Thesis, Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Sciences UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Spring 2012 II Rethinking Coercive Diplomacy A Dynamic Approach to NATO Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia and Kosovo Henning Køhler Knutsen III © Henning Køhler Knutsen 2012 Rethinking Coercive Diplomacy: A Dynamic Approach to NATO Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia and Kosovo Henning Køhler Knutsen http://www.duo.uio.no/ Print: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo IV Abstract After the Cold War, with the advent of low-interest, “optional”, post-modern warfare, regional conflicts and failed states have illuminated the radars in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states. For these countries, as the expected need for military force relinquished, its actual use increased. Left with a need for improved tools for handling the increasing number of international security issues, the strategy of coercive diplomacy has never been of more current interest. This thesis seeks to address a lacuna in contemporary theorizing about coercive diplomacy, namely the under-theorization of the adversary. Through within-case and cross-case analysis of the NATO interventions in Bosnia- Herzegovina and Kosovo, I attempt to show how both scientists and political decision-makers can benefit from a more in-depth analysis of the coerced. The thesis takes the theoretical framework developed by Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock as a starting point. As a significant step in the right direction, their model of coercive diplomacy better accounts for the motivations, interests, and expected reactions of the target state. Furthermore, I seek to congruence test the theory’s predictions against the historical outcomes of NATO’s coercive diplomatic attempts. The results indicate that the framework delivers generally correct predictions, and that further theoretical development in this direction is warranted. Word Count: 40,788 V VI Acknowledgments The final product which has become my master thesis could not have been realized without the valuable help of a number of people. Each contributing to my project in their own way, I am very grateful for their assistance. Any remaining mistakes are mine alone. Firstly, I would like to thank my thesis advisor at the University of Oslo, Professor Janne Haaland Matlary. Her experience, professional insight, and constructive feedback have helped shape and review my thesis. Furthermore, I am grateful to the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), who awarded me a generous scholarship and a part in the research programme “NATO in a Changing World”. Finally, I am in debt to my family in general, and to my wife in particular. Ewelina, your ability to get me through good and frustrating times alike continues to astound me each and every day. Henning K. Knutsen Oslo, May 2012 VII VIII For my wonderful wife; who provides encouragement like no one else IX X Contents 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Research Theme .......................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Research Question ....................................................................................................... 4 2 Theory ................................................................................................................................ 7 2.1 Main Concepts ............................................................................................................. 7 2.2 A Model of Threats .................................................................................................... 10 2.3 Research Status .......................................................................................................... 12 2.3.1 The Pioneers: Schelling, and George and Simons ............................................. 12 2.3.2 The Ideal Policy: Jakobsen................................................................................. 13 2.3.3 Jentleson and Whytock: Knowing your Enemy ................................................. 15 3 Method ............................................................................................................................. 21 3.1 Case Selection ............................................................................................................ 21 3.2 Method of Comparison .............................................................................................. 22 3.3 Operationalization and Classification ........................................................................ 23 3.3.1 The Dependent Variable ..................................................................................... 24 3.3.2 The Coercer’s Strategy ....................................................................................... 24 3.3.3 Target’s Domestic Politics and Economy .......................................................... 25 3.4 Data Collection .......................................................................................................... 26 3.5 Replicability, Validity, and Reliability ...................................................................... 26 3.6 Generalization ............................................................................................................ 27 4 Bosnia-Herzegovina ......................................................................................................... 29 4.1 Sources of Conflict .................................................................................................... 29 4.2 Elites and Key Actors ................................................................................................ 30 4.3 NATO Coercive Diplomacy ...................................................................................... 36 4.3.1 The NATO-WEU Naval Blockade .................................................................... 37 4.3.2 Operation Deny Flight ........................................................................................ 41 4.3.3 The Siege of Sarajevo ........................................................................................ 45 4.3.4 The Markale Marketplace Massacre .................................................................. 47 4.3.5 Assault at Goražde ............................................................................................. 49 4.3.6 The Tuzla Shelling ............................................................................................. 52 4.3.7 Operation Deliberate Force ................................................................................ 54 XI 5 Kosovo ............................................................................................................................. 61 5.1 Sources of Conflict .................................................................................................... 61 5.2 Elites and Key Actors ................................................................................................ 62 5.3 NATO Coercive Diplomacy ...................................................................................... 64 5.3.1 Operation Determined Falcon ............................................................................ 65 5.3.2 The October Agreements ................................................................................... 68 5.3.3 The Rambouillet Conference ............................................................................. 71 5.3.4 Operation Allied Force ....................................................................................... 75 6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 85 6.1 Results ....................................................................................................................... 85 6.1.1 The Diverging Sub-Cases ................................................................................... 88 6.2 Causality .................................................................................................................... 89 6.3 Key Variables ............................................................................................................ 91 6.3.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions ................................................................. 91 6.3.2 External Pressure versus Domestic Politics ....................................................... 92 6.4 Mismatching Objectives and Strategies .................................................................... 96 6.5 Explaining Coercive Diplomacy ............................................................................... 98 6.6 Final Remarks .......................................................................................................... 101 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 105 List of Tables Table 4.1: Serbian economy’s performance in the early nineties (UN.org)............................. 38 Table 5.1: Serbian economy’s performance in the late nineties (UN.org) ............................... 68 Table 6.1: Main findings of chapters four and five, with expected and