#271 "Russian Regions in Expanding Europe: The Pskov Connection" by Mikhail Alexseev and Vladimir Vaguine This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 31 August 1997. The authors are grateful to Douglas Blum, Stephen Hanson, Stephen Crowley, and Stefanie Harter for their extensive and thoughtful comments and suggestions. Research for this paper was funded in part by grants from the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies is a division of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Through its programs of residential scholarships, meetings, and publications, the Institute encourages scholarship on Russia and the former Soviet Union, embracing a broad range of fields in the social sciences and humanities. 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The views expressed in Kennan Institute Occasional Papers are those of the authors. © August 1998 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars edited by Kate Moore RUSSIAN REGIONS IN EXPANDING EUROPE: THE PSKOV CONNECTION In the six years since the collapse scientists call a "unitary actor." The of the Soviet Union, policy makers in more pertinent, and interesting, the eighty-nine constituent regions of question is what kind of Russia­ the Russian Federation have been capable of implementing what kind increasingly self-assertive, of policies in its relations with the splintering the whole concept of outside world-is going to evolve "Russia's foreign policy." out of the present conditions. Diamond-rich Sakha-Yakutia- an Meanwhile, in dealing with Russia, autonomous republic in the Far East the world will increasingly have to the size of India-negotiated trade deal with the diversity of Russia's deals with De Beers and even regions and also take into account attempted to coin its own currency the complexity of center-periphery featuring the governor's profile relations. instead of Russia's official In this paper, we first examine two-headed eagle. St. Petersburg's political and legal foundations for government issued its own foreign center-periphery relations in Russia, policy declaration. Tatarstan opened and post-Soviet economic realities a foreign ministry and placed its own that define the scope of the regions' representatives in key Russian independent role in Russia's foreign embassies abroad. Oil-rich Tyumen relations. We then focus on a exchanged "embassies" with paradoxical case of Moscow-regions Ukraine. Moscow joined the U.S. by divergence in Russia, namely, Pskov opening a foreign ministry office-a oblast', where independent regional de facto consulate-in Sverdlovsk policies favoring Russia's economic region. A coalition of Russia's integration with Europe have Siberian regions this spring took over emerged despite the fact that local policing of the Mongolian border, by political elites have been dominated agreeing to maintain thirty-six guard by the nationalists (the Liberal posts along the 2,175 mile long Democratic Party or LDPR) and the border with Mongolia, as well as to communists (KPRF) advocating build twenty-four new guard posts tighter political and economic and three command centers at their centralization under Moscow. In this own expense.1 sense, Pskov oblast' is a fairer test of These striking examples hardly Russia's prospects for integration suggest that Russia will splinter just with the European and global like the Soviet Union. After all, the economies than more advanced Russian Federation has survived regions such as Novgorod or military defeat in Chechnya-thus Samara. If the current nationalist and contradicting those Kremlin communist elites in Pskov give doomsayers who unleashed the war priority to integration with Western under the slogan of preserving economies, most of Russia's other Russia's integrity. Acute regions will follow. constitutional crises in Tatarstan and Moscow and the Regions: Bashkortostan have also abated. At The Political Balancmg Act the same time, all these recent developments show that Russia is Nearly half of Russia's regions hardly a monolith, or what political now base their relations with 1 Moscow on power-sharing regions' activities in building agreements unthinkable in the Soviet economic ties outside of Russia.4 era-all consistent with Russia's The diverse body of regional Constitution. Many ethnically political leaders also has a collective non-Russian regions, such as the powe:::' base in Moscow. They are republics of Bashkortostan and members of the Federation Tatarstan, require their leaders (both Council-the upper chamber of the elected and titled "president") to Russian parliament. When regional speak the local language and have administrators owed their extended the local residency record. appointments to Yeltsin, the Kremlin Of the fifty incumbents-appointed could count on the Federation earlier by Yeltsin-who ran for Council's compliance. The governor between September 1996 gubernatorial elections have broken and January 1997, half were voted this circular flow of power. Now the out of office. Yeltsin' s allies expected democratically elected governors to lose no more than ten incumbents. wield many significant powers. Sixteen of the twenty-five newly Without the Council's approval elected governors ran on the ticket of Yeltsin cannot declare war, deploy the communist alliance, the National Russian troops outside Russia, Patriotic Union of Russia. Most introduce martial law, set the federal winners of gubernatorial races-be it budget and taxes, change borders communists or "strong managers"­ between Russia's regions, or openly aspired to become "local nominate Constitutional Court and Luzhkovs"-in reference to the Supreme Court justices. The Council highly successful mayor of Moscow may ratify or denounce Russia's who has frequently challenged the international treaties and is granted a Kremlin on nationwide policy issues, key role in the president's notably on privatization and impeachment procedure.5 In handing the Crimean port of November 1997---consistent with its Sevastopol over to Ukraine.2 regionalist orientation-the Deposing elected governors is Federation Council rejected also a hazard-as in the case of legislation that would have required Yevgeny Nazdratenko in the Far center-region power-sharing East's Primorsky krai, where Moscow agreements, including existing ones, backed off, fearing the follow-up to be ratified by the upper house. In elections would return a communist this case, the Council's position was to the local gubernatorial office. closer to that of Russia's two Besides, Moscow must now be strongest regional rights champions, mindful of opinion polls saying that Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The Russians trust governors and mayors Council also turned down a bill to about three times more than they limit the regions' power to conduct trust the federal govemment.3 Even their own foreign policy.6 the Russian State Duma-where the The erosion of Moscow's political Great Russia nationalists have a influence is combined with the working majority-has passed a law, erosion of economic leverage. on the first reading-and with the Moscow has been unable to deliver unusual majority of timely payments to federal workers 318-10-legalizing many of Russian in the region8--€ven to those 2 manning intercontinental missile property committees, and regional sites and nuclear power tax inspectorates. Federal agencies plants-putting regional officials on that have continued since the Soviet the spot in dealing with various era-such as the ministry for internal protesters and lobbies. In remote affairs, the federal security service regions of the Far East, Moscow's (domestic branch of the former economic clout has also been KGB), and state procuracy-have weakened. For example, it was maintained the initiative in cadre reported in October 1997 that 70 nominations for regional positions, percent of Kamchatka's revenues but have largely deferred the choices came from trade and joint economic to regional chief executives. The activities with the countries of the regional hold on key personnel Asian Pacific and the United States appointments is also strengthened by West Coast, rather than with the rest the collapse of the Soviet system of of Russia? In addition, with "horizontal shifting of cadre," in widespread corruption and local which a successful executive from sensitivities about joblessness, the Kazan could get a promotion to regional elites have also been Sverdlovsk and then to Leningrad or skeptical about having Russia's new Moscow. The