Agric Hum Values DOI 10.1007/s10460-017-9772-1 Contradictions, consequences and the human toll of food safety culture Patrick Baur1 · Christy Getz1 · Jennifer Sowerwine1 Accepted: 10 January 2017 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 Abstract In an intensifying climate of scrutiny over long-standing food-ways. The long-term danger, we con- food safety, the food industry is turning to “food safety clude, is that this uniform and myopic response to real risks culture” as a one-size-fits-all solution to protect both con- of foodborne illness will not lead to a holistically healthy or sumers and companies. This strategy focuses on chang- sustainable agrifood system, but rather perpetuate a spiral- ing employee behavior from farm to fork to fit a universal ing cycle of crisis and reform that carries a very real human model of bureaucratic control; the goal is system-wide toll. cultural transformation in the name of combatting food- borne illness. Through grounded fieldwork centered on Keywords Food safety · California · Culture · Moral the case of a regional wholesale produce market in Cali- economy · Labor fornia, we examine the consequences of this bureaucrati- zation of food safety power on the everyday routines and Abbreviations lived experiences of people working to grow, pack, and CDC US Centers for Disease Control deliver fresh produce. We find that despite rhetoric prom- FDA US Food and Drug Administration ising a rational and universal answer to food safety, fear FR Federal Register and frustration over pervasive uncertainty and legal threats FSMA Food Safety Modernization Act can produce cynicism, distrust, and fragmentation among GAPs Good Agricultural Practices agrifood actors. Furthermore, under the cover of its pub- GMPs Good manufacturing practices lic health mission to prevent foodborne illness, food safety HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points culture exerts a new moral economy that sorts companies HARPC Hazard Analysis and Risk-based Preventive and employees into categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ accord- Controls ing to an abstracted calculation of ‘riskiness’ along a scale LGMA The California Leafy Greens Marketing from safe to dangerous. We raise the concern that ‘safety’ Agreement is usurping other deeply held values and excluding cul- USDA US Department of Agriculture tural forms and experiential knowledges associated with Introduction * Patrick Baur [email protected] In September of 2013, US Marshals arrested Eric and Ryan Christy Getz Jensen in connection with a 2011 outbreak of Listeria [email protected] monocytogenes linked to cantaloupes aggregated and dis- Jennifer Sowerwine tributed by Jensen Farms, which they owned and operated. [email protected] Over 2 months, the outbreak spread across 28 states, sick- ening 147 people and killing 33, making it one of the dead- 1 Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management, University of California, Berkeley, 130 liest outbreaks of foodborne illness in US history (CDC Mulford Hall #3114, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA 2012). Federal prosecutors charged the brothers with six Vol.:(0123456789)1 3 P. Baur et al. counts of “introducing an adulterated food into interstate growing professionalized class of food safety experts who commerce”, threatening each with 5 years of probation, are pioneering their own industry independent of state 6 months of home detention, and $150,000 in fines (Jensen authority. Coupled with the rise of this professional food et al. 2013). The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) safety industry is a call to embrace formal “food safety cul- stated that pressing the charges “sends the message that ture” (Powell et al. 2011; Yiannas 2009), envisioned as sys- absolute care must be taken to ensure that deadly pathogens tem-wide behavioral alignment to a ‘safety first’ mentality do not enter our food supply chain” (Elliot 2013). In addi- at all organizational levels from farm to fork. tion to serving that sentence, which was issued by the court Taken together, industry and government initiatives on in January 2014 (Ortiz 2014), the brothers also faced law- food safety complement one another in a perpetual motion suits from 66 of the 147 victims (Food Safety News 2015). cycle of crisis and reform. If outbreaks of foodborne illness Jensen Farms filed for bankruptcy. are symptoms of a “food-system-borne illness” (McMahon The Jensen brothers’ case ushered in a new phase of fed- 2013) produced by a “boomerang effect” from attempts to eral food safety oversight that is raising anxiety among food control nature by industrializing and homogenizing the industry operators. At the British Retail Consortium’s 2016 global food system (Stuart and Worosz 2012), then top- annual Food Safety Americas Conference—a forum for down government intervention represents the reform swing some of the biggest multinational agribusinesses to com- to re-embed the dangerous excesses of industrial agribusi- pare notes on food safety—the first plenary speaker warned ness within a socially acceptable range of ‘safety’.1 the audience that “complacency kills.” Citing the Jensen However, these interventions reveal a critical contra- Farms case and the deadly 2008–2009 outbreak of Salmo- diction of regulation. As Elizabeth Dunn has evocatively nella linked to the Peanut Corporation of America, which argued, modern states derive power and authority to rule also culminated in criminal indictments for the owners and from their capacity to purify society (emulating a “sewer”) executives of the company (Goetz 2013), the speaker went by removing “contaminants”, whether microbiological, on to describe the “new human illness standard” that FDA chemical, or social. However, “the state as sewer is con- has adopted in waging its “war on pathogens.” The newly stantly overflowing” because this mode of power needs to coined standard “suggests that whenever a food product constantly seek out new dangers and new risks to justify becomes associated with an outbreak of foodborne ill- its continued existence (Dunn 2007). Federal officials and nesses, it will trigger a federal criminal investigation of the industry reformers, in this context, may well be attempting company” (Flynn 2016). Even operators with no foreknowl- to address the symptoms felt by wealthy American con- edge that their products are contaminated with pathogens sumers without regard to the underlying causes of food- and no evidence of intentional negligence, as demonstrated system-borne illness. Such a “sewer state”, especially when by the Jensen brothers’ case, can be found criminally neg- operating under the blank check of a moral imperative to ligent if a consumer falls ill due to a product sold by that protect public health, may systemically ignore and obscure operation. The question facing each and every person in the the burdens that a continuously escalating cycle of crisis- industry, the speaker told those assembled, is “What’s the and-reform places on small-scale producers and agrifood risk that I could find myself going to jail because of a food workers. The pressing question must be, as Martha McMa- safety decision that I made?” hon poignantly asked, “What food is to be kept safe, and for This unprecedented willingness to launch criminal whom?” (2013). investigations and prosecute company officials following In this paper, we first characterize the technocratic outbreaks of foodborne illness is the latest development in bureaucracy—embodied in the US “sewer state” agencies an intensifying climate of scrutiny over food safety. It can and their civil society counterparts among the emerging be interpreted as a lengthening of the State’s “shadow of professionalized food safety industry—that has arisen to hierarchy” (Héritiera and Lehmkuhl 2008) over the decen- govern this perpetual cycle of food scare and reform. We tralized, generally voluntary food safety initiatives that have been spear-headed by private industry, especially multi-national retailers (Havinga 2006; Bain et al. 2013; 1 The underlying irony is that reform efforts refuse to acknowledge Ransom et al. 2013), largely in response to acute “food the possibility that treating the agrifood system as a massive factory scares” that have kindled consumer anxiety from the US to line has produced the perfect environment for breeding deadly and virulent pathogens in the first place, hence the appropriateness of Europe to Japan (Caswell 2006; DeLind and Howard 2008; the “boomerang” metaphor invoked by Stuart and Worosz. However, Loeber et al. 2011; Yamaguchi 2014). The voluntary sys- this irony is well hidden, for as Terry Marsden observes, “What is so tem of non-state-based preventive governance comprises a striking about the contemporary governance of agri-food are the ways nested system of standards, accreditation, certification and in which it has built up resilience in dealing with its own unsustain- able and metabolic vulnerabilities at the same time as protecting it audits that Loconto and Busch (2010) have termed the “tri- [sic] abilities to create surplus values and profit” which distract atten- partite standards regime”. This regime empowers a rapidly tion from the externalized costs and harms (Marsden 2010, 7). 1 3 Contradictions, consequences and the human toll of food safety culture argue that the ascendance of neoliberal managerial reform government stakeholders including food safety experts, frames the “old” ways as inferior, emblematic of unscien- trade association leaders, farm consultants, research scien- tific, disorganized,