ffhimb, 38377 4469 SUPPLEMENT -TO The Of TUESDAY, the loth of AUGUST, 1948 Registered as a newspaper WEDNESDAY, n AUGUST, 1948 MEDITERRANEAN CONVOY OPERATIONS. OPERATION " EXCESS " 4. With regard to the dawn action reported in Enclosures Nos. 6 and 9,* it is thought that The following Despatch was submitted to the this must have been a chance encounter, as Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on so small an Italian force would hardly have the igth March, 1941 by Admiral Sir Andrew been sent unsupported to attack a heavily B. Cunningham, G.C.B., D.S.O., Comman- defended convoy. The heavy expenditure of der-in-Chi'ef, Mediterranean Station. ammunition by BON A VENTURE, largely in- Mediterranean, curred in an effort to sink a crippled ship, serves to emphasise the importance of using iqth March, 1941. the torpedo at close range on such occasions. 5. I fully concur with the remarks of the OPERATIONS M.C.4 AND M.C.6 Vice-Admiral, Light Forcesf concerning the towing of GALLANT by MOHAWK (Enclo- Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the sure No. i if), and consider that this was a enclosed reports on Operation M.C 4 (which in- most ably conducted operation. cluded Operation " Excess ") and Operation It cannot be satisfactorily determined M.C.6,* carried out between 6th and i8th whether GALLANT was mined or torpedoed, January, 1941. but the absence of tracks and failure by the 2. These operations marked the advent of enemy to claim her sinking lend probability the German Air Force in strength in the Medi- to the supposition that it was a mine. terranean, and included the damaging of 6. The dive bombing attacks by German air- H.M.S. ILLUSTRIOUS on loth January and craft were most efficiently performed and came the loss of H.M.S. SOUTHAMPTON on nth as an unpleasant surprise. The results of short January. range A.A. fire were disappointing, though it has been subsequently learned that this fire 3. The incident reported in paragraph 7 of was in fact more effective than dt appeared, and Enclosure No. 6f illustrates the difficulty of the Germans suffered considerable loss. passage through the Narrows during periods of bright moon when, in order to avoid the A dmivalty footnotes ' known minefields, it is necessary to pass within * These enclosures are not included The action gun and visibility range of Pantellaria. referred to was a brief ancounter at dawn on loth January by ships escorting Convoy " Excess " with Admiralty footnotes ' two unidentified enemy vessels which delivered a torpedo attack on them * Operations M C 4 and M C 6—see paragraph i of f Vice-Admiral, Light Forces—Vice-Admiral H D Commander-in-Chief's narrative Pndham-Wippell, C B , C V O f This enclosure is not included The incident J This enclosure is not included The Vice-Admiral, referred to was the apparent detection of GLOUCES- Light Forces remarked that he considered that the TER and SOUTHAMPTON by the defences of Commanding Officer of MOHAWK " showed deter- ^Pantellaria on the night of Sth/gth January mination and good judgment in continuing the tow " 60177 4470 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n AUGUST, 1948 Nevertheless, it is a potent new factor in paragraphs 29 and 30, and although the Rear- Mediterranean war and will undoubtedly deny Admiral, ist Battle Squadron remained at sea us that free access to the waters immediately with Force X intending to deliver F.A.A.* surrounding Malta and Sicily which we have attacks against the Dodecanese and the previously enjoyed, until our own air forces Cyrenaican coast traffic, the weather prevented have been built -up to a scale adequate to meet these operations. it. Tuesday, Jth January, 1941. 7. The dive bombing attacks on the 3rd Cruiser Squadron on the afternoon of nth 3. Force H, consisting of RENOWN, January—resulting in the loss of SOUTHAMP- MALAYA, ARK ROYAL, SHEFFIELD, TON—were a complete surprise, delivered at BONAVENTURE and destroyers, left Gib- a time when the ships concerned believed them- raltar, Convoy " Excess," consisting of ESSEX selves to have drawn clear of the threat of for Malta, and CLAN GUMMING, CLAN air attack, and when officers and men were • MACDONALD and EMPIRE SONG for doubtless- relaxing their vigilance to some ex- Piraeus, having sailed the previous evening. tent after a*very strenuous four days. 4. Force A, consisting of WARSPITE, This damaging attack served to emphasise VALIANT, ILLUSTRIOUS, JERVIS, the importance of including an R.D.F. ship* NUBIAN, MOHAWK, DAINTY, GREY- in detached units whenever possible. HOUND, GALLANT and GRIFFIN, sailed at 8. The remarks of the Commanding Officer, 0500. H.M.S. JAGUAR are of considerable interest, 5. The Commander-in-Chief s position at in particular his practice of firing 4.7-mch bar- 0800 was 31° 33' N.,. 29° 16' E., on a mean rage over the stern of a ship attacked by line of advance of 345° at 17 knots. There dive bombers. The idea is now under develop- were no incidents until 1640 when an enemy ment in the Mediterranean Fleet with a view aircraft was located by R.D.F. f bearing 037°, to the destroyer screen putting an " umbrella 32 miles. The aircraft itself was sighted, and barrage " over the fleet. ILLUSTRIOUS's fighters which were standing 9 Force X|' had originally put to sea to by on deck were flown off but were too late, take part in the offensive operations intended and Force A was reported. The aircraft then in Operation M.C.6, which had to be aban- sighted BRAMBLELEAF and the corvettes. doned It was most unfortunate that per- In -view of this sighting the Commander-in-Chief sistent bad weather prevented the Rear- sent an aircraft to PEONY to order her to make Admiral, ist Battle SquadronJ from deliver- a drastic alteration of course so as to throw ing any of the attacks which he intended, and off torpedo bombers. Two groups of aircraft which would have been a most useful counter approached the fleet during the afternoon but to the undoubted set back which the fleet retired on sighting the Fulmars. The second as a whole had received. group sighted and reported the fleet at 1720. 10. It is satisfactory to record that Convoy 6. The Commander-in-Chief s position at " Excess " whose safe passage had been the 1800 was 33° 33' N., 27° 25' E., steering 290° main object-'of the operation, reached its at 19 knots. destination safely. Shortly after dark, at 1828, enemy aircraft were reported bearing 130° by R.D.F. This (Signed) A. B. CUNNINGHAM, aircraft, however, crossed astern and never got nearer than 15 miles to the fleet. There were Admiral, no further incidents and the Commander-m- Commander-in-Chief. Chiefs position at midnight was 34° 13' N., 25° 26' E. OPERATIONS M.C-4 AND M.C.6. 7., Force B, consisting of GLOUCESTER, NARRATIVE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, SOUTHAMPTON, ILEX and JANUS, left the • MEDITERRANEAN. Aegean for Malta. Operation M.C.4 was devised, in co-operation 8. Force C. BRAMBLELEAF and corvettes with the Flag Officer Commanding, Force H,§ passed the Kaso Strait without incident. to cover the passage of the much delayed Several floating mines were sighted south of the Convoy " Excess." It was intended to con- Kaso Strait, two being sunk by PEONY. tinue at sea in the Central Mediterranean after the passage of the convoy and to conduct a 9. Convoy M.W.5^, consisting of BRECON- further operation (M.C.6), which was to have SHIRE, CLAN MACAULAY escorted by consisted of offensive operations against CALCUTTA, DIAMOND and DEFENDER, shipping on the Italian coasts. sailed from Alexandria for Malta at 1400. 2. Operation M.C.6 was brought into force 10. Force D. ORION and YORK left by the Commander-m-Chief's message 1039/gth Alexandria at 0300 to cover the passage of January, buij the offensive operations in the BRAMBLELEAF through the Kaso Strait Central Mediterranean had to be cancelled after AJAX and PERTH left Piraeus to rendezvous- the damage to ILLUSTRIOUS described in with Vice-Admiral, Light Forces at Suda Bay at 0800/8th. A dmiralty footnotes . * R D.F. ship—ship fitted with radar equipment n. Five floating mines were sighted during t Force X at Alexandria—BARHAM and EAGLE, the day. There were no further incidents and screened by 5 destroyers course was set to pass south of the Medina.Bank f Rear-Admiral, ist Battle Squadron—Rear-Admiral Admiralty footnotes "• P" H B Rawhngs, C B , O B E Fla^ Officer Commanding, Force H— Vice- * F A A —Fleet Air Arm Admiral Sir James F Somerville, K C B , D S O. t R D F —radar SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n AUGUST, 1948 4471 at 2200 in position 34° 30' N., 14° 50' E., and Friday, loth January, 1941. the mean line of advance was altered to 320°. 21. At 0430, when in position 35° 56' N., 13° 20' E., course was altered to 290° to ren- Wednesday, 8th January, 1941. dezvous with Convoy " Excess " At 0741 a 12. The Commander-in-Chief s position at report was received "from BON A VENTURE, 0800 was 35° 30' N., 23° 12' E., and the Anti- who was in position 36° 29' N., 12° 10' E., Kith era Channel was entered at 0900. Force D that she had sighted two enemy destroyers and the corvettes were met leaving Suda Bay, bearing 010°, 3 miles, and at 0756 the Rear- •which was entered at 1230.