Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 9-5-2013 12:00 AM A Defence of Anti-Psychologism About Reasons Alex Beldan The University of Western Ontario Supervisor Anthony Skelton The University of Western Ontario Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy © Alex Beldan 2013 Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Beldan, Alex, "A Defence of Anti-Psychologism About Reasons" (2013). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 1645. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/1645 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A DEFENCE OF ANTI-PSYCHOLOGISM ABOUT REASONS by Alex Beldan Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario, Canada © Alex Beldan 2013 Abstract In my dissertation my concern is the ongoing debate regarding the relationship between the reasons for which an agent acted (motivating reasons) and the reasons which count in favour of that action (normative reasons). Motivating reasons are generally taken to be psychological states of the agent. Normative reasons are generally taken to be facts or truths. Agents look to be capable for acting for the reasons that favour an action, which would require that motivating reasons are capable of being the same kind of thing as normative reasons – a requirement in conflict with what is generally taken to be the case regarding normative and motivating reasons. I resolve this conflict by arguing that, when an agent is acting in the light of true beliefs, an agent's reasons (both motivating and normative) are anti- psychological facts, whereas when an agent acts in the light of false beliefs, the agent's reasons are the beliefs that the agent is acting in light of. I examine Bernard Williams’ “reasons internalism” and Michael Smith’s Humean account of motivating reasons. Both argue, although to different ends, that motivating reasons are psychological states. I disagree. Neither position provides adequate grounds for thinking motivating reasons must be psychological states. More importantly, I argue, based on Smith's position, that the right account of the psychological states that make up motivation is not identical to our theory of motivating reasons. I then discuss Dancy's argument for an anti- psychological account of reasons, according to which no reasons are necessarily psychological states of the agent. While there is much to like about Dancy's anti- psychologism, his position is unable to account for agents acting in the light of false beliefs. Drawing on McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism, I conclude that the correct account of reasons is that when an agent is acting in the light of true beliefs, an agent's reasons are anti- psychological, whereas when an agent acts in the light of false beliefs, the agent's reasons are psychological. Keywords Moral psychology, moral motivation, anti-psychologism, normative reasons, motivating reasons, Jonathan Dancy, anti-Humeanism, Michael Smith, disjunctivism, McDowell ii Acknowledgments I would like to thank my supervisor, Anthony Skelton, for his patience, guidance, and philosophical insight. His support has been essential every step of the way. I would also like to thank my committee members, Tracy Isaacs and Andrew Botterell, for their assistance, time and comments. Their efforts have improved the quality of this document immeasurably. I owe a debt of gratitude to Elisa Hurley, who got me interested in this topic. I'd also like to thank Ben Hill, for helping me stay focused in the final stretch, and James Wong and Rocky Jacobsen for getting me into this whole philosophy thing in the first place. I'd also like to thank my mother Bonnie, and my father, Chris, for encouraging and, at times, tolerating my love of philosophy. And most of all, I'd like to thank my wife, Elana Geller, for her love and support, and for all the discussions and edits. Without philosophy, we'd never have met. iii Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... iv List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... vi A Defence of Anti-Psychologism About Reasons: Introduction ........................................ 1 Chapter 1: Internal Reasons and Cognitivism .................................................................. 13 1.1 An Overview of Williams' Position in “Internal And External Reasons ............... 13 1.2 Sound Deliberation................................................................................................. 16 1.3 External Reasons: Why Williams Thinks There Are None ................................... 18 1.4 What are Internal Reasons? .................................................................................... 20 1.5 John McDowell and Williams’ Disagreement Regarding External Reasons......... 24 1.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 30 Chapter 2: Motivating States, Motivating Reasons, and Michael Smith's Humeanism ... 32 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 32 2.2 Reasons .................................................................................................................. 34 2.3 Desires and Phenomenology .................................................................................. 37 2.4 Smith's anti-Humean Theory of Normative Reasons ............................................. 43 2.5 Implications of Smith's Humean Theory of Motivation ........................................ 52 2.6 Motivating States, Motivating Reasons ................................................................. 56 2.7 Towards an Anti-Psychological Theory of Reasons .............................................. 61 2.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 68 Chapter 3: Jonathan Dancy and the Normative Constraint ............................................... 69 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 69 3.2 Objective Reasons .................................................................................................. 71 iv 3.3 Reasons and Desires ............................................................................................... 79 3.4 Psychologistic Theories of Motivating States ........................................................ 84 3.5 Psychological Reasons, Anti-Psychological Reasons ............................................ 89 3.6 The Explanatory Constraint and Reasons Internalism ........................................... 97 3.7 Concerns about the Normative Constraint ............................................................. 99 3.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 105 Chapter 4: False Beliefs and the Combined Position...................................................... 107 4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 107 4.2 Believings, and What is Believed ........................................................................ 108 4.3 Factive and Non-Factive Explanations ................................................................ 116 4.4 An Alternative Solution to False Beliefs ............................................................. 127 4.5 The Combined Psychological/Anti-Psychological Position ................................ 131 4.6 A Critical Discussion of the Combined Psychological/Anti-Psychological Position ............................................................................................................................. 132 4.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 135 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 139 Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................................ 148 v List of Tables T Table 1: The Truth of the Non-Factive Explanation "q because p", Under Varying Circumstances ............................................................................................................ 125 vi 1 A Defence of Anti-Psychologism About Reasons: Introduction This work is about moral motivation, and in particular the nature of the reasons which motivate