3 The Problem of Evil For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good?1 espite being conceived in secular terms in much contemporary Dthought, the “problem of evil” has traditionally been a theological one concerned with the question of how to reconcile the existence of suf- fering, and hence evil, in the world, with the characterization of the Judeo-Christian God as benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent. Formally articulated by Epicurus (341–270 BCE) and originally quoted in the work of Lactantius (c. 260–340 CE), the “problem of evil” is tradi- tionally presented as follows: God either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and willing, He is envious, which is equally at variance with God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble and, therefore not God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what source then are evils? Or why does He not remove them?2 Presented syllogistically, the problem is this: God is benevolent. God is omnipotent (which should be taken to include omniscience). There is evil in the world. If the first two propositions are true, the third cannot be. R. Jeffery, Evil and International Relations © Renée Jeffery 2008 34 EVIL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Now the third is true as a matter of observable fact. From this it follows that one (or both) of the first two premises must be false. But if either is false, there is no God as Judeo-Christianity portrays Him.3 Of course, “evidence” of the existence of evil is the “observable fact” that there is suffering in the world. However, what makes the existence of suf- fering the “problem of evil” in this context is the juxtaposition of “partic- ular narratives of events of pain, dereliction, anguish, oppression, torture, humiliation, degradation, injustice, hunger, godforsakeness, and so on” with the “Christian community’s narratives” about the character of God.4 That is, the problem of evil arises from the juxtaposition of the existence of suffering in the world with specific assumptions about God’s benevolent, omnipotent and omniscient character. As Marilyn McCord Adams explains, however, even this is not a straightforward equation for there is no “explicit logical contradiction between” the seemingly incom- patible claims that, on the one hand “God is benevolent” and “God is omnipotent,” and on the other that “There is evil in the world.”5 Rather, the contradiction arises because of the way in which the first two prem- ises are commonly construed. That is, a contradiction emerges because benevolence and omnipotence are commonly interpreted to incorporate the following additional claims: A perfectly good being would always eliminate evil so far as it could; An omniscient being would know all about evils; and, There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do.6 Thus, the primordial experience of suffering is only conceived as a “prob- lem,” the “problem of evil,” when its meaning is sought in relation to an all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God who is both capable of pre- venting it and ought to do so. What also becomes clear at this juncture is the fact that there is not one “problem of evil” at play here but rather two problems; the logical and the evidential problems of evil. The logical problem of evil is funda- mentally concerned with the internal logic or consistency of theistic explanations of evil. That is, it is “the problem of clarifying and reconcil- ing a number of beliefs” that constitute the “essential parts of most theo- logical positions.”7 It is, in short, the most common version of the “traditional” problem associated with reconciling the character of God THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 35 with the existence of evil discussed above. On the other hand, the evidential problem of evil poses a different problem to theists with its claim that “the facts of evil constitute evidence against the hypothesis that the world was created, and is governed, by an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God.”8 Among the most prominent proponents of this view in late twentieth century aetheology is William Rowe, who expressed the problem as follows: 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omnis- cient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.9 As such, Rowe’s argument from evil “asserts that the evidence of God is incompatible” with the type of evil described in the first premise.10 Thus the existence of evil, understood in terms of suffering, brings the very existence of God into serious question. However, leaving the finer points of these arguments aside for now it suffices to say that these two problems have, in various ways, exercised the minds of theologians and philosophers alike for many centuries. In order to get a better sense of this, this chapter therefore traces the devel- opment of the “problem of evil” from the Babylonian theodicy to the works of Thomas Aquinas. In doing so it illustrates the manner in which various thinkers, throughout an extensive period of history, sought to provide meaning for what could otherwise be conceived as instances of meaningless suffering by reference to the character of God and the nature of the created order. However, foreshadowing a distinction that took hold in modern thought about evil, to be discussed in Chapter 4, it also high- lights the emergence of an important division in the conceptualization of the problem of evil in the work of Augustine of Hippo: that which dis- tinguished between the theological problem of why a good God allows suffering, and the moral problem of why human beings choose to com- mit evil acts. 36 EVIL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Theodicy Traditionally, theological problems of evil, in their logical and evidential forms, have been the focus of that area of scholarship known as theodicy (combining the Greek theos, God, with dike, righteousness),11 a term coined by Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz at the beginning of the eigh- teenth century to describe attempts to reconcile the goodness, and indeed existence of God, with the existence of evil.12 Before discussing its finer points in more detail however, it is worth noting that what is often termed “theoretical theodicy” is not without its detractors. For some, the “putative solution” to the problem of evil proposed by theoretical theod- icy “does not solve the problem at all, but instead avoids confronting the real difficulties” posed by the existence of evil in the world.13 Others, echoing the criticisms leveled at the theoretical treatment of evil more generally, “condemn it as an inappropriate response to human suffer- ing.”14 Indeed, claims that theodicy overlooks or even “sanatizes”the real- ity of human suffering abound.15 Even the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, has suggested that “perhaps it is time for philosophers of religion to look away from theodicy—not to appeal blandly to the mysterious purposes of God, not to appeal to any putative justification at all, but to put the question of how we remain faithful to human ways of seeing suffering, even and especially when we are thinking from a reli- gious perspective.”16 However, what is really at stake here is the very point of theodicy itself. Is the point of engaging in theoretical theodicy to understand the phenomenon of evil, or is it to remove the problem of evil altogether? If it is the former, then the criticisms leveled above are somewhat overstated for what is actually at stake is the way in which suf- fering is understood. This, as we will see, is not necessarily incompatible with Williams’s call to “remain faithful to human ways of seeing suffer- ing.” On the other hand, “solving” the problem of evil, in the sense of eradicating evil from its worldly existence would seem to be a futile exer- cise. If we accept the existence of evil and that it is fundamentally eradi- cable, our problem is how to understand its place in our world view. That is, the problem is, in traditional theological terms, one of how to reconcile the existence of evil with our understanding of the divine order, an exer- cise that does not entail overcoming evil in the world but ultimately seeks to provide otherwise meaningless suffering with some sort of meaning. Perhaps the oldest known theodicy is the Babylonian Theodicy.17 A short and fragmentary poem possibly composed as early as 1400 BCE, THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 37 the work is posed as a dialogue between two friends, one who has suf- fered the evil of a social injustice, and the other “who tries to reconcile” the facts of the case “with established views on the justice of the divine ordering of the universe.”18 The particular suffering the anonymous author laments is what he has endured at the hands of a rich man who has ruined him. He writes: People extol the word of a strong man who is trained in murder, But bring down the powerless who has done no wrong.