Belief, desire, and rational choice Course aims In this course, you will learn the basics of decision theory, a formal model of rational choice that is central to many discussions in philosophy of mind, epistemology, action theory, epistemology, cognitive science, philosophy of science, and political philosophy. Along the way, you will learn about the Bayesian perspective on rationality and about the prospects for a functionalist/interpretationist account of mental states. We will read and discuss a selection of papers and book chapters. Some of these will be technical and difficult, but you will learn to work your way through literature of this kind and understand the often simple ideas hidden behind the technicalities. You will also practice public speaking by giving a (very) short presentation. Seminar content Decision theory systematizes the connection between belief, desire, and rational choice -- very roughly, that rational agents act in a way that would bring them closer to satisfying their desires if the world were as they believe it to be. After introducing the basic framework of decision theory, we will mainly focus on two questions. First, does rationality impose constraints on what an agent may believe or desire, and if so, what are these constraints? Second, can we turn around the principles of decision theory and define (or explicate) an agent's beliefs and desires in terms of their choices? Readings A. Basics • Rachael Briggs, "Normative theories of rational choice: expected utility", Stanford Encyclopedia, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-normative-utility/ • Patrick Maher, pages 1-23 of Betting on Theories, Cambridge University Press 1993 (first 6 sections of chapter 1, "The logic of preference") • James Joyce, pages 48-70 of The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, Cambridge University Press 1999 (first 6 sections of chapter 2, "Decision Problems") B. Bounded Rationality • Daniel Kahnemann, pages 697-706 of "A perspective on Judgment and Choice", American Psychologist 2003, 697-720 • Joseph Halpern, Rafael Pass, and Lior Seeman, "Decision Theory with Resource Topics‐Bounded in cognitive Agents." science 2014, 245-257. C. The pragmatic interpretation of belief and desire • Robert Stalnaker, chapter 1 ("The problem of intentionality") of Inquiry, Cambridge University Press, 1984 • David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, chapter 2 ("Behaviorism and Beyond") of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, 2nd edition, Blackwell 2007 • David Lewis, "Radical Interpretation", Synthese 1974, 331-344 • Daniel Dennett, "Intentional Systems Theory". In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann and Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press, 2011, pages 339-350 • Lina Erikson and Alan Hajek, "What are degrees of belief?", Studia Logica 2007, 185-215 D. Constraints on belief • Brian Skyrms, pages 20-29 of Pragmatics and Empiricism, Yale University Press, 1984 (excerpt of chapter "Degrees of Belief") • David Christensen, "Preference-based arguments for probabilism", Philosophy of Science 2001, 356-376 • Christopher Meacham, "Impermissive Bayesianism", Erkenntnis 2014, 1185-1217 E. Constraints on desire • Simon Blackburn, chapter 6 ("Game theory and rational choice") of Ruling Passions, Oxford University Press, 1998 • Paul Weirich, "Expected utility and risk", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1986, 419-442 • Lara Buchak, chapter 4 ("Redescription") of Risk and Rationality, Oxford University Press, 2013 (pages 113-147) • Lara Buchak, "Risks and Tradeoffs", Erkenntnis 2014, 1091-1117. .