SIOC – Afghanistan: UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENTIAL UN Department of Safety and Security, Afghanistan Security Situation Report, Week 41 8 – 14 October 2010 JOINT WEEKLY SECURITY ANALYSIS The number of security incidents decreased slightly compared with the previous weeks, with only the NR and SER recording increases. The increase in activity in the NR, particularly the continued deterioration of the situation along the main highways in Balkh, Jawzjan and Saripul, is severely hampering program delivery in the area. The types of incidents recorded during the week shifted slightly, with decreased armed clashes, particularly noted in the SR, ER and CR, while IED incidents remained consistent with the previous reporting period. Incidents initiated by security forces, particularly air strikes, arrests and cache finds, increased. These operations resulted in the death of several mid level insurgent leaders in Kunduz and Badghis as well as the arrest of two potential suicide attackers in Paktya. Suicide attacks also increased, including the first such attack ever recorded in Ghor Province. Insurgents increased targeting of the civilian population, specifically increased intimidation incidents and assassinations. The renewal of ISAF’s mandate by the UN Security Council prompted a response by Taliban on their website condemning the decision. While no incidents directly affected UN staff members, seven incidents affected the aid community. In Gulran District of Hirat Province, four separate robberies of UN food occurred, two convoys were robbed and food items were stolen from a school and a clinic. Two national staff of an INGO were shot and wounded by unknown gunmen in Faryab, and one NGO guard was abducted in the WR. Additionally, one INGO national staff member was killed in the assassination of the Kunduz Governor in Taluqan. The continued incidents affecting the aid community continues to negatively impact programme delivery in many areas of the country and particularly in the northern areas. Asymmetric actions by insurgents against the population remained significantly high. While abductions by insurgents remained consistent, intimidation and assassinations increased. Twenty individuals were abducted by AGE during the week, including six ANA travelling in a civilian taxi in Ghor. They were later released unharmed following the intervention of local elders. Additionally, in Kunar an operation to free an international woman previously abducted by AGE resulted in her death and the death of nine of her captors. Intimidation incidents continue to be recorded country wide, the majority being illegal check points screening vehicles for ANSF and GoA officials. Intimidation against mobile phone companies to shut down service in the evenings continues. At least 22 individuals were assassinated during the week in the NER, WR, SR, SER and CR. This includes the assassination of the Kunduz Governor in a mosque in Taluqan, two education officials, a Kandahar Shura member killed during prayers in a mosque and the head of the District Development Shura in Dehrawud, Uruzgan. Insurgents continue to effectively target key local figures. Additionally, killings of alleged “spies” continued, including three civilians publicly executed by AGE in Badghis in the days following an air strike that killed several provincial level insurgent leaders. Similar retaliatory attacks are to be expected in areas where air strikes kill AGE leadership. Overall these incidents have a sustained impact on support for the GoA throughout the country. Suicide attacks increased to four during the week, and two potential suicide attackers were arrested in Paktya Province. This includes the BBIED attack targeting the Kunduz Governor in the Taluqan Mosque, a SVBIED attack targeting the IM in Khost, and two separate BBIED attacks, one in Ghor and one in Helmand, where the perpetrator was identified by security forces and was the only casualty. The attack targeting the PRT in Chagcharan is the first suicide attack ever recorded in Ghor where overall AGE activity has to date been relatively limited. Overall these incidents were consistent with 2010 trends in number, type and targeting while the geographic spread was slightly unusual. This document is provided exclusively for the use of the United Nations (UN). It may not be copied, forwarded or reproduced by any means, manual, electronic, photographic or photostatic to any other person or organization outside of the UN without prior approval from the Chief Security Advisor UNDSS-Afghanistan. The UN makes no claim as to the accuracy of the information or to the validity of deductions and conclusions contained in this document. Copyright with respect to all parts of this document and attachments, including the name and logo of the United Nations, remain the property of the United Nations. ©2010 SIOC – Afghanistan: UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENTIAL RISK ANALYSIS The highest risk to the United Nations in Afghanistan taking into account mitigating measures is exposure to direct suicide and complex suicide attacks in work, residence or travel situations. The second highest risk is targeting by IED of UN compounds or of UN staff working in government premises. Collateral damage as a result of such attacks against other entities remains a significant concern. Abduction of UN staff for political or criminal motives remains a significant risk, in particular in areas where the use of armoured vehicles is not yet widespread and new insurgent groups start operating. Abuse by local power holders is also rated as a high risk. Perceptions of the UN’s role in Afghanistan’s electoral process can result in a higher threat profile against the organization. Significant Events Since the End of the Reporting Period On 15 October, Sari-Pul Province, Sari-Pul City at about 0120 hrs, AGE simultaneously attacked provincial jail and ANA HQ from 3 different directions with RPG and SAF as a result 1 ANP was killed and 3 others were injured, ANSF repelled the attack, the fire fight lasted an hour before AGE withdrew towards the direction of Sayaad District. The UNAMA provincial office is located 300 mtrs from the location. Two UN staff were relocated to Mazar-i-sharif. On 16 October. Kandahar City, due to multiple attacks/explosions in different districts started before 2000 hrs, number of IEDs found in several places in town and heavy IM/ANSF bombardments, "WHITE CITY" has been declared in Kandahar City from 23:00 hrs 16 Oct till 10:30 hrs 17 Oct. All international staff was accounted for. NORTH EASTERN REGION The security situation is mostly unstable. Kunduz Province and some districts of Takhar and Baghlan Provinces remain unstable while Badakhshan Province is relatively calm and stable. Analysis of the Week’s Events Incident levels which had remained consistent at 32 after the election spike saw a 28% reduction with 23 incidents recorded. Of this total, 10 were recorded in Kunduz, seven in Baghlan and three each in Takhar and Badakhshan. Armed clashes which had remained high at an average weekly rate of 15 reduced to five over the last week with two each in Kunduz and Baghlan and one in Takhar. While in the preceding week the high number of armed clashes was attributed to a series of Special Forces operations in Takhar and a resurging Taliban in Kunduz, over the last period the Special Forces operations were refocused on Kunduz. However, the most significant incident over the past week was the assassination of the Governor of Kunduz, Eng Mohammad Omar in Taloqan City, Takhar. In Kunduz, following the resurgence of the AGE over the previous week, IM/ANSF conducted a series of successful operations. These operations were also anticipated as a response to the assassination in Takhar which has been attributed to elements in Kunduz. IM conducted two air strikes in which at least eight AGE were killed, IM Special Forces conducted two night raids in the north of Kunduz City, in Gortepa and Zarkharid in which six AGE were arrested and IM/ANSF conducted extensive search operations in Chahar Dara, Nahri Sufi area which were largely unopposed. AGE who seemingly learnt from previous exchanges have fought only limited engagement battles, pulling back to lure IM into IED ambushes. In one such ambush, an IM vehicle was significantly damaged. The 3 m crater suggests that at least 100 lbs of explosive was used and that the IED had been laid over a considerable period of time and was remotely detonated. IM/ANP continue to plan for the long awaited Fall offensive to target Aliabad Page 2 of 14 SIOC – Afghanistan: UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENTIAL and Imam Sahib Districts initially based on the approved ALP Tashkill. However, amidst these plans there are other concerns being raised about the capacity of the ANP to ‘manage’ the Arbaki who will form the ALP. It has been suggested that while the NDS had penetrated these groups and had the assets and capacity to monitor their activities, the ANP was not similarly structured or resourced. The insecurity in Baghlan particularly along the main highways continues to present challenges to the security forces. One IED was discovered along the Pul-e-Khumri to Mazar highway, and a temporary CP was established along the Baghlan to Kunduz highway by AGE. However, the most significant incident involved a series of attacks conducted against ANP CPs over a period of six hours in Surkh Kotel, Gurgurak, Puli Khatol, Tajikha Street and Chashma-i-Sher areas of Pul-i-Khumri. Since the BBIED attack against IM during the previous week there have been increased threat warnings of suicide attacks in Pul- e-Khumri City with likely targets being IM/ANSF/GoA. In Takhar IM Special Forces operations were used successfully over the previous period to ease the AGE pressure on ANSF and pro government militia particularly in the northern districts. While the Governor of Kunduz was assassinated within Taloqan City, it is widely felt that the attack was planed and executed by Kunduz based TB with little or no support from elements in Takhar.