W&M ScholarWorks Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 1973 Power and Politics in the Korean War: A Study in negotiatory naiveté James Hugh Toner College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd Part of the History Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Toner, James Hugh, "Power and Politics in the Korean War: A Study in negotiatory naiveté" (1973). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539624818. https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-bq37-kb25 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. POWER AND POLITICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: / A STUDY IN NEGOTIATORY NAIVETE A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Government The College of William and Mary in Virginia In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts t>y James Hugh Toner 1973 ProQuest Number: 10625274 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest, ProQuest 10625274 Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQ uest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346 APPROVAL SHEET This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Au Approved, July 1973 Alan J. WaiTd, Ph.D. Chonghan KjM, Ph.D. t^ -2 \A J^mes M. Roherty, ^h.D. 5 8 5 2 6 5 TABLE OP CONTENTS Page PREFACE..................................................... iv ABSTRACT..................................................... vii INTRODUCTION................................................. 2 CHAPTER I THE UN GOES TO WAR: THE POLICY PARRAGOES OP LIMITED CONFLICT............................................ 11 II THE KAESONG NEGOTIATIONS............................ 60 III THE TALKS AT PANMUNJOM.............................. 96 IV CONCLUSION......................... 132 GLOSSARY..................................................... Ik5 APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY...................................... ll*6 APPENDIX B: M A P S ............................................ l£l BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................. 199 VITA......................................................... 169 iii PREFACE While I was preparing my thesis I was asked, "What has your* research to do with political science?" The question was an acute one, rooted in the knowledge that my thesis is without charts, graphs, tables and statistical analyses. Should the thesis, therefore, he "relegated" to the category of history— as opposed to political science? In responding to the question, I disclose my preference for the traditional approach to the study of politics. Despite the many accomplishments and the potential of the behavioralists, their approach to politics is severely limited and there are many questions, they freely admit, which they are unable to explore. It is where the behavioralists end their research that the tradition­ alists must begin theirs. Whereas the behavioralists are limited by their insistence upon exactitude and regularity, the traditionalists are limited by their inability to insist upon those desiderata. Poli­ tical science is best served, therefore, by its students who understand the prejudices of their favored approach and look to their colleagues of different persuasions for their compleieitary wisdom and advice. A persistent danger exists in the arguments of those who wish to define out of the discipline of political science those whose methods of research may not be in vogue. Whether he uses mathematics or philosophy there ought to be room within the discipline of politics for any student or scholar who seeks to understand political man. At one point in the education of every student should come the knowledge that college catalog division of subjects is a matter of academic con­ venience and that the unity of knowledge resists such arbitrary com­ partment alization. In short, then, who is to say whether history is the rightful property for study of political scientists or politics is the bailiwick of historians? This thesis is a reflection of my belief that a political science devoid of philosophical speculation and historical analysis is a bankrupt enterprise. Perhaps the best example of this in inter­ national politics is in the writing of Thucydides who said that the events he described in the Peloponnesian War "... have been before and shall be ever as long as human nature is the same.""*' Because the work of philosophers and historians cannot be reduced to formulas or equations is no reason to dismiss their work as only peripheral to political science or to fail to honor them by the conferral of the title of "political scientist." * * * For his patience, encouragement and constant assistance, I must thank Professor Alan J. Ward. Both as teacher and as thesis advisor, Professor Ward has been willing to help me in every way possible in my year at William and Mary. Professor Chonghan Kim and Professor James M. Roherty critically read the manuscript and provided a number of helpful suggestions. I am grateful also for their availability to me ■^■Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Vol. I, the Thomas Hobbes Translation, ed. by David Grene (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959)> P* 20l|. (Bk. Ill, 82; see also, IV, 18 inter alia.) v and their genuine interest in my thesis throughout the year. I owe an indirect and inestimable debt of gratitude to Profes­ sor Peter V. Sampo, former associate professor of politics at St. Anselm's College, Manchester, New Hampshire, whose love of learning first attracted me to the study of politics. I must also acknowledge the help and ready encouragement of my wife Rebecca. Learning is an activity without end. Students of all disci­ plines might well adopt as their motto, as I have, the maxim of the French historian Fustel de Coulanges, "Qiiaero"— "I seek to learn." To those who have helped me learn to this point I am sincerely grateful. JHT vi ABSTRACT The thesis is an historical analysis of the diplomatic and military policies of the United Rations and the United States during the Korean War. The thesis demonstrates that the mis judgments in United Rations1 policy have their origin not in a conspiracy against or by the United States, but rather in the failure of UR leaders to appreciate the symbiosis between military power and diplomatic purpose. The failure to integrate power and purpose was most dramatically mani­ fested in the fluctuating objectives of UR policy and the progressive deterioration of UR military might. The thesis inquires into the nature and causes of the frustra­ tion and irresolution which characterized the two-year period (195>1- 1953) of the Korean War truce talks. The argument is adduced that, to a significant degree, the impasse at the conferences was a product of the UR leaders' diplomatic misperceptions of the cultural, political and military orientations and objectives of their bargaining adver­ saries. The thesis concerns itself with the notion that the respective bargaining rivals represented divergent— and at first, irreconcilable— purposes; that only after prolonged disputes did it become clear to the UR leaders What the progress of truce talks between belligerents depends for its direction upon the application of military power which is coincident with and complementary to simultaneous negotiatory ini­ tiatives. The thesis characterizes the policies under examination as a study in negotiatory naivetel vii POWER ARK POLITICS IR THE KOKEAH WAR: A STULY IR REGOTIATORY RAIVETE^ INTRODUCTION . In a legitimate order, a conference represents a struggle to find formulas to achieve agreement; in a revolutionary order, it is a strug­ gle to capture the symbols which move humanity.- — Henry Kissinger Although the complexities and controversies of the Korean War pale by comparison with those of the Vietnam War, there is a plethora of information about the three-year conflict in Korea. In the twenty years that have elapsed since the signing of the armistice at Panmunjom, scholars and soldiers have produced a wealth of commentary concerning the issues that emerged during the war. Among the controversies are MacArthur's relief by Truman, the brainwashing- of UN POWTs, the degree of success of the UN collective security effort, the alleged use by the UN of germ warfare against the North Koreans and a host of other debat­ able topics. A representative divergence of opinion about the success of the UN military effort is that between Senator Joseph McCarthy and General Matthew Ridgway. The former regarded the effort in Korea as a p "tremendous defeat" while the latter thought that in Korea "the crest of the Communist wave was broken" by the UN Army.-^ ICited in David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961+), p. 310. 2Pacts on File,