Cover China’s strategic thought is strongly influenced by three authors: Sun Tzu, Karl Marx, and Mao Zedong, according to Chinese sources. The methodology and philosophy of these men impact how Chinese strategists consider their battlefield context and accordingly develop their plans and procedures for the conduct of military operations. The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US government. The author works for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. FMSO is a component of the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The FMSO does strategic, guidance-driven, unclassified research and analysis of the foreign perspective of unconsidered/understudied security issues of the military operational environment. FMSO is the Army’s principal unclassified researcher, leader educator, and operational-support resource regarding the foreign perspective of the Operational Environment, and the Army’s leading advanced open source education developer, provider, and collaboration organization. TIMOTHY L. THOMAS FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE (FMSO) FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 2014 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1 PART ONE: WHAT IS STRATEGY? ................................................. 9 CHAPTER ONE: CHINA’S MILITARY STRATEGY: WHERE KARL TRUMPS CARL ...................................................................... 11 Introduction ........................................................................................ 11 The Objective-Subjective Thought Process ....................................... 13 The Evolving Nature of Strategy’s Definition ................................... 24 The Science of Military Strategy ........................................................ 27 The Theory of Military Strategy ......................................................... 32 Marx and Engels on Clausewitz ......................................................... 36 Conclusions ........................................................................................ 38 CHAPTER TWO: OF STRATAGEMS AND SHI ........................... 41 Introduction ........................................................................................ 41 Stratagems .......................................................................................... 41 Shi ....................................................................................................... 55 Conclusions ........................................................................................ 59 CHAPTER THREE: ARE SUN TZU AND MAO ZEDONG STILL RELEVANT? ........................................................................................ 61 Introduction ........................................................................................ 61 Sun Tzu ............................................................................................... 61 Art of War Symposiums ................................................................. 63 The Journal China Military Science ............................................... 66 Other Uses of the Art of War .......................................................... 69 Eastern and Western Translations of the Art of War ...................... 70 Mao Zedong ........................................................................................ 72 Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War ..................... 72 Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong ....................................... 74 The Science of Military Strategy .................................................... 75 Conclusions ........................................................................................ 78 CHAPTER FOUR: RETIRED PLA OFFICERS DISCUSS MODERN DAY STRATEGY ............................................................. 81 Introduction ........................................................................................ 81 Li Jijun ................................................................................................ 81 Peng Guangqian .................................................................................. 83 Yao Youzhi and Zhao Xide ................................................................ 84 Li Bingyan .......................................................................................... 85 Zhang Xing Ye and Zhang Zhan Li ................................................... 87 Li Jijun ................................................................................................ 87 Xue Guo’an ......................................................................................... 91 Chen Zhou ........................................................................................... 93 Conclusions ......................................................................................... 95 CHAPTER FIVE: HOW TAIWAN SPECIALISTS VIEW CHINESE MILITARY STRATEGY .................................................. 97 Introduction ......................................................................................... 97 “An Analysis of the Development and Significance of the PRC’s Military Strategy” ............................................................................... 99 “Analyzing China’s National Strategy” ............................................ 100 “A Study and Analysis of the Evolution of the PRC’s ‘Military Strategy’” .......................................................................................... 103 Conclusions ....................................................................................... 106 PART TWO: STRATEGIC CASE STUDIES: CYBER AND GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES ................................................................ 109 CHAPTER SIX: CHINA’S STRATEGIC CYBER INVASION: WHAT THEY SEE, WHY THEY DO IT ........................................ 111 Introduction ....................................................................................... 111 What China Sees, Why They Use Cyber .......................................... 111 Establishing a Strategic Advantage .................................................. 116 System Sabotage and Cyber Deterrence ........................................... 119 The Mandiant Report ........................................................................ 127 The Incoherent and Counterproductive Chinese Accusations .......... 132 Quantum Computing ......................................................................... 139 Conclusions ....................................................................................... 141 CHAPTER SEVEN: GEOTHINKING LIKE THE CHINESE: A POTENTIAL EXPLANATION OF CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGY 145 Introduction ....................................................................................... 145 Defining Geostrategy ........................................................................ 146 Chinese National Interests ................................................................ 149 China’s Strategic/Objective Environment ........................................ 161 Geo-resource Issues .......................................................................... 169 Conclusions: Assessing the Geopolitical Impact .............................. 211 PART THREE: WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF THE PLA'S STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS? HOW DO THEY COMPARE WITH U.S. STRATEGIC NEAR EQUIVALENTS? 219 CHAPTER EIGHT: COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POWER, CAMPAIGNS, AND SHI VERSUS DIME, PMESII-PT, AND SHAPING ............................................................................................ 221 Introduction ....................................................................................... 221 Background ....................................................................................... 221 The Battle of Meanings .................................................................... 222 China’s CNP, Campaign, and Shi Concepts ..................................... 226 The US’s PMESII-PT, DIME, and Shaping Concepts ..................... 237 Conclusions ...................................................................................... 239 CHAPTER NINE: THE U.S.’S “MILITARY POWER OF THE PRC” (2003-2013) VERSUS CHINA’S “NATIONAL DEFENSE WHITE PAPERS” (2000-2012): TWO DISCUSSIONS OF CHINESE STRATEGY ..................................................................... 241 Introduction ...................................................................................... 241 Up Front Analysis of the Reports ..................................................... 242 US Reports ........................................................................................ 245 China’s National Defense White Papers .......................................... 258 Conclusions ...................................................................................... 261 PART FOUR: STRATEGY AND THE CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF NEW CONCEPT WEAPONS, COMBAT POWER MODELS, AND THE CHINA DREAM .............................................................. 263 CHAPTER TEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL, NEW CONCEPT, AND CYBER WEAPONS AS ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY: PROGRAM 2110 AND OTHER ISSUES .............................................................. 265 Introduction ...................................................................................... 265 Psychological Weapons .................................................................... 267 New Concept Weapons