'Winning Hearts and Minds' The Unlearned Lesson of Counterinsurgency' prof. T.R. Mockaitis* Introduction terinsurgency campaigns, in particu- government's failure to protect its pe- lar the successful British campaign in ople and may compel cooperation uring the past year many ob- Malaya and their own experience in with the insurgents and discourage servers have commented on Vietnam. cooperation with the authorities. Dthe failure of the U.S. led coalition to win the hearts and minds Definitions Insurgents may be ideologically moti- of the Iraqi people. Disturbing photos Discussion of insurgency and coun- vated, but their goals are decidedly of prisoner abuse and footage of an terinsurgency must begin with a de- politica!. Malayan and Vietnamese in- American soldier shooting an Iraqi ci- finition of terms because of the tend- surgents shared a communist ideolo- vilian who lay on the ground contri- ency to lump very different conti iets gy, but they sought to gain politica! buted to this perception. Reports of under broad categories like 'low-in- control of their respective countries. misdirected bombs and the shooting tensity conflict,' 'operations other Some Iraqi insurgents embrace Isla- of the Italian escorting a freed hosta- than war,' and 'stability and support mic extremism while others have a ge to safety have made matters worse. operations.'1 Insurgency is an organi- less militant worldview; all seek to zed effort to gain control of state from overthrow a U.S. appointed governing Bad as such images are, however, the within, using a combination of propa- council widely considered illegitima- characterization of American counter- ganda/subversion, guerrilla warfare, te and end the foreign occupation. insurgency as deliberately and unne- and terror. Guerrilla warfare refers cessarily heavy handed is not entirely specifically to operations by insur- Insurgency versus terrorism accurate. U.S. soldiers understand the gents against conventional military A clear distinction must be made be- importance of winning hearts and formations. tween insurgency and terrorism. In- minds. Unfortunately, they have little surgents will use terror, both to inti- training for or experience of how to 'Terror' is violence aimed at the ge- midate opponents and to keep their do so. The real problem is an institu- neral population and intended to spre- own supporters in line, but they do so tional failure to learn from past coun- ad fear. Such fear demonstrates the in a highly selective and very limited manner. Shortly before the Irgun bombed the King David Hotel in Je- The author is professor of History al DePaul University and 2004 Eisenhower Professor at the KMA. Professor Mockaitis co-edited Grand Strategy and the War on Terrarium (London: Frank rusalem (1946), they warned the Bri- Cass, 2003) with Paul Rich. He is the author of British Counterinsurgency: 19I9-I9M) (London: tish to evacuate the building. Insur- Macmillan, 1990), Brithh Counttrinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era (Manchester: U. of Man- gents need to win support of the chester Press, 1995), and Peacekeeping and Intrastate Conflict: the Sword or the Olive Branch? general population and so wish to (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999). The Future of Peace Operation.t: Old Challenge.ifor a New Century, avoid unnecessary violence that co-edited with Erwin Schmidl is forthcoming. Professor Mockaitis team teaches terrorism and counter-terrorism courses internationally with might alienate ordinary people. other experts through the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Post-Graduate School. He has lectured at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Canadiun Forces Contemporary terrorist organizations Staff College and presented papers at the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (Canada), the Royal like Al Qaeda and its affiliates divide Military Academy Sandhurst (UK), and at conferences eo-sponsored with the Military Science Department of the Austrian ministry of Defense. the world into the righteous, who sup- l made this same case for precise deflnition fifteen years ago. Thomas R. Mockaitis, Kritish Coun- port them, and the unrighteous, who terinsurxency: 1919-1960 (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 1. deserved to be killed. They seek to 252 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 174 6-2005 „ A Marine shouts instructions to soldiers of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps during a firefight while on a joint patrol in Nasir Waal Salaam, Iraq 2004 (Photo u.s. Marine Corps, K.R. Reed; collection IMG/KL) rnake a dramatic impression with as tion movement with specific and tbr and even harder to implement. Govern- much death and destruction as possi- the most part reasonable goals but has ments like individuals find self- We, These terrorists may have short degenerated into a mere terrorist or- examination and reform difficult to term political goals, such as over- ganization tbr whom violence has be- undergo. The temptation to dismiss throwing the Saudi government, but come an end in itself. insurgency as mere terrorism or cri- subordinate these immediate objecti- minality can prove irresistible. Few ves to the larger struggle between If insurgency seeks to overthrow an insurgencies begin and none advance good and e vil. existing government, then counter- without at least the tacit support of a insurgency by definition consists of significant segment of the population 'hey exercise little restraint and no steps taken by that government to disillusioned with its own gover- discriminations. While insurgents will thwart the insurgents. Despite what its nment. Counterinsurgency depends target soldiers, police officers, and name suggests counterinsurgency on regaining support from the dis- government officials, contemporary strategy need not be purely reactive. It affected, winning the hearts and terrorists will kill ordinary men, must, however, be comprehensive. A minds of the people. wornen, and children. Some organiza- threatened state must defend its peop- hons occupy a grey area between in- le and institutions, address the root surgency and terrorism. The Basque causes of unrest that lead ordinary British Counterinsurgency 'nsurgent group ETA began as a libera- people to support the insurgents, and conduct offensive military operations Britain has enjoyed a greater degree rne Dutch Colonial Army was generally et- against the insurgent forces and orga- of success in counterinsurgency than fective in Indonesia during the nineteenth nization. most other nations.2 This success de- century. Although General Maxim Weygand rived from extensive experience successfully pacitled Morocco during the "Herwar period. the French tared poorly in Counterinsurgency strategy is easy to dealing with unrest throughout an em- hdochina and Algeria. describe but very difficult to devise pire spanning a quarter of the globe. JRG 174 6-2005 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 253 An Iraqi child walks alongside a National Guardsman as hè patrols through the neighborhoods of Iskandriyah, Iraq, 2005 (Photo U.S. Navy, B. Aho; collection IMG/KL) upon to come to the aid of the civil power. In rendering such aid the sol- dier is not different than anyone else. He remains under the direction of the civil authority throughout an emer- gency and must be able to legally jus- tify any use of force as the minimum necessary to quell unrest. A series of military pamphlets repe- atedly reminded the soldier that use his goal was not the eradication of an enemy but the restoration of order. Any use of force must be the mini- mum necessary to achieve an im- mediate result and could not be em- ployed to create a wider impression.4 Winning hearts and minds Limitations on the use of force encou- raged a different approach to counter- insurgency. Denied the ability to rely on firepower and overwhelming force, tbr which they usually lacked the resources in any event, the British sought to address the causes of unrest that provoked political violence in the first place. This approach came to be called winning hearts and minds. In the words of the late Sir Robert Thompson, who helped design the From the Northwest Frontier of India The British based their counterinsur- to the streets of Aden, British soldiers gency strategy on a few broad prin- Hor the et'fïcacy of the British approach in cooperated with local police and colo- ciples: minimum fbrce; winning hearts humanitarian intervention see, Thomas R- nial officials to quell disturbances and minds; civil-military cooperation; Mockaitis, Peace Operations and Intrastale Conflict: the Sword or the Olive Branch' ranging from riot to insurrection. and tactical flexibility. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999). Through a painful process of trial and The pamphlets produced by His/Her Ma- error involving not a few defeats, they Minimum force jesty's Stationary Office bore such titles as developed a strategy that has proved Minimum force is not merely a coun- Duties in Aide to the Civil Power and Note.i terinsurgency principle but a funda- on Imperiul Policing. The British incorpora- effective not only in traditional coun- ted the same guidance into their Counter- terinsurgency but in peace-enforce- mental tenet of English common law. Revolutionary War/are and Wider Peace- 3 ment operations as well. Any British subject may be called keeping manuals. 254 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 174 6-2005 Air Force Staff Sgt. Kyle Luker talks with boys at a school during a dismounted patrol near Balad Air Base, Iraq, 2005 (Photo U.S. Air Force, M. Buytas; collection IMG/KL) successful strategy in Malaya, 'govern- nient has to be seen as working.'5 Contrary to popular belief, rnuch unrest sterns not from political oppression but from what today would be called 'quality of life issues'. ment to use minimum force neces- fare requires that junior offïcers and people experience poverty, decli- sitated hearts-and-minds approach, NCOS be allowed considerable latitude standard of living, or even re- which in turn provided the intelligen- in the conduct of operations. The Bri- lative deprivation in a prosperous ce that allowed force to be used in a tish have always allowed and indeed society, they will be more amenable limited and selective way.