Disinformation Campaign in Overdrive: Iran’s VEVAK in High-Gear by Professor Rabbi Daniel M. Zucker Global Politician.com, September 3, 2007. In two prior articles,1 we looked at the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS = Farsi: VEVAK=Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar). The following essay is a third installment in what looks to be a growing research project. Reference to the earlier papers is suggested for those new to the subject. Founded in 19842 and ranked by experts as one of the world’s largest and most active intelligence agencies in the Middle East and possessing a global reach,3 VEVAK’s activities and structure are shrouded in mystery, but its presence has been felt keenly with over 450 acts of terrorism carried out in less than a quarter of a century. With an almost unlimited budget, and a command structure reporting direct to the Supreme Leader (Farsi: faqih) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the secretive agency is one of the key pillars of the theocratic regime.4 Led from 1999 until mid-2005 by the notorious hanging judge Hojjatol-Islam Ali Younesi,5 it is now headed by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s appointee, Hojjatol-Islam Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ezhei, 51, formerly Prosecutor and Judge of the Special Tribunal for Clergy, and formerly Special Prosecutor in the MOIS, as well as a founding official and member of the staff selection board for MOIS6 Although a government ministry, because of its secret budget and lack of accountability to either the cabinet or the Majlis (parliament), VEVAK remains above the law, being accountable only to the Supreme Leader. Under such conditions it is easy to see how it has become a major vehicle for political repression.7 VEVAK agents traditionally have been tested vigorously before receiving security clearance and being trusted to take part in sensitive operations that could implicate the highest levels of the government if leaked to the public. Members, handpicked from other security agencies throughout Iran, are first required to torture and execute dissidents so as to test their loyalty to the regime and the Supreme Leader. Only the most loyal are inducted into the ranks of VEVAK.8 One of the primary methods used by VEVAK is the dissemination of disinformation, a trick learned from the KGB playbook. Indeed, the largest directorate within the Ministry of Intelligence and Security is the Department of Disinformation (Farsi: Nefaq) which is charged with the task of creating psychological warfare and misinformation about enemies of the regime. Former VEVAK chief Hojjatol-Islam Ali Younesi admitted publicly on Iran State Television in October 2004 that the agency employed several thousand individuals just to staff that section. Some of those working in that department are former resistance members that were either seduced (with money, etc.) or coerced into assisting the regime. The regime gives high priority to this department and pays its agents handsomely. In recent months, at the direction of Ahmadinejad, VEVAK has revived and expanded its directorate of Foreign Affairs to recruit foreigners to work with the intelligence agency.9 Although much of the increased budget for this directorate is earmarked for recruitment of those that will serve as jihadists in Iraq and/or Afghanistan,10 VEVAK also recruits spies11 as well as agents to serve in its disinformation campaign. The recruitment methodology is basically the same for jihadists, spies and disinformation agents even if the three are different types of activities requiring different characteristics and skills. Recruiting agents begin the process, spotting and identifying candidates. After the initial contact, a positive response results in the following process being initiated: • Once recruited, the regime’s local embassies take over in contacting such individuals; • Then the prospective recruits are informally interviewed by undercover MOIS agents in those countries and under such pretexts as seminars, visits, getting to know the Islamic Republic, etc., before they are sent to Iran; . • Once in Iran, the MOIS and Qods Force take it forward from that point. If the individual is willing to cooperate, the agents sign a contract with him and dispatch him to designated camps which are located in the suburbs of Tehran and the holy city of Qom for additional trainings.12 If one surfs the net looking at sites that discuss Iran, one may encounter ads for cheap flights, special tours, and subsidized seminars in Iran; but beware, there is no such thing as a free lunch when it comes to Iran! As pointed out in the earlier articles, VEVAK agents have been trained to use the old KGB 80/20 formula: tell the truth 80% of the time and spread lies 20%; attack the regime 80% of the time and the resistance 20%. It’s amazing how successful the formula has proven to be. Occasionally an agent will up the percentage to 90/10 so as to better hide his/her real intentions, but the percentage never drops below 80/20, as that would risk detection. Now, let’s begin to examine the list of candidates that work for VEVAK. Our first subject is already known to those who read my first paper on VEVAK.13 I am referring to British-born Anne Singleton and her Iranian-born husband, Massoud Khodabandeh, currently of Leeds, England who organized and run the pro-regime/anti-resistance website Iran-Interlink.org. In the late 1980’s, Ms. Singleton worked with a pro-resistance Iranian student group in London, but was dismissed on moral grounds. Massoud Khodabandeh and his older brother Ibrahim were both members of the resistance movement group, Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK, also known as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran=PMOI) in the 1980’s when they lived in England.14 Massoud abandoned his affiliation with the PMOI in 1996. Singleton and Khodabandeh married sometime after that and subsequently were recruited by VEVAK,15 apparently after the agency had coerced the Khodabandeh brothers’ wealthy elderly mother to assist them or lose her extensive property in Tehran. Using wire-taps and monitoring her contacts abroad with her sons, VEVAK was able to flip Singleton and Masoud Khodabandeh to its service. On the invitation of her mother-in-law, Singleton made several trips to Iran16, including a visit to Tehran in the winter of 2002 where she was met at Mehrabad Airport by VEVAK agents interested in her background. She apparently volunteered to work on her brother-in-law, and then spent the month in training before returning to England and going on to found the Iran-Interlink website in the winter of 2002.17 The trips to Iran as well as to Singapore (where VEVAK generally holds briefings for its foreign agents) made the resistance suspicious of the Khodabandehs and tipped them off as to their new loyalties.18 In 2004 she was seen in Evin Prison with VEVAK agents visiting her brother-in-law, Ibrahim, who had been arrested by the Syrians and extradited to Iran. Ibrahim has since recanted his MEK affiliation and now likewise works for VEVAK’s anti-resistance campaign.19 The Khodabandehs have been very active over the years in VEVAK’s campaign to vilify the MEK. The materials disseminated on the Iran-Interlink site are all produced by VEVAK in Tehran.20 Iran-Interlink.org21 is probably the most sophisticated of the regime’s anti- resistance websites. Other sites include several that are disguised to look like resistance sites, such as www.mojahedin.ws22, www.hambastegimeli.net23, www.iran-aawa.com25, or neutral as www.perseetavenir.com26 and www.iranpeyvand.com, and those that clearly are anti-resistance, such as www.irandidban.com, www.theblackfile.com, www.pars-iran.com, www.nejatngo.org, and www.negaheno.net. Anyone associated with these websites should be considered a VEVAK agent or loyal supporter of the IRI regime. Our next subject is Mahtub (Mahtaub) Hojjati, aka Mathilde Fein, Mattie Fein, Mattie Lolavar, and Mattie Lolavar-Cohen. Ms. Hojjati is the founder and self- appointed president of a very new Iranian opposition think tank in Washington, DC, the Institute for Persian Studies, which she claims aims to replace the current regime of Iran with a democracy. At first glance, Hojjati sounds as if she has all her priorities in the right place. But when one examines her words more carefully, things begin to go awry. In a recent interview with Global Politician Associate Editor Ryan Mauro27, Ms Hojjati attacks the idea of American funding for the establishment of indigenous Iranian civic organizations and programs, and lambastes the largest, oldest, best-organized and most popular of resistance groups, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), saying it “commands no indigenous adherents in Iran.”28 When asked about the Iran Policy Committee’s suggestions29 that the MEK be removed from the US Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list30 she says: “The MEK should not be removed. The signal to the people of Iran would be devastating because they despise the MEK for its treason in the Iraq-Iran war. … Any U.S. support of MEK would dishearten many Iranians, continue to cultivate mistrust that the U.S. is far removed from the desires of the Iranian people, and would be a set-back to the U.S.”31 Ms. Hojjati’s views of the MEK seem just a little too close to those of the regime. When 50,000 Iranians can be gathered from around the world to attend a rally in support for the National Council of Resistance of Iran and the MEK in the Paris suburbs32 and 5.2 million members of the Iraqi anti- fundamentalist coalition Solidarity Congress commend the MEK33, Hojjati’s suggestion of MEK unpopularity rings very hollow.