a report of the csis japan chair The South Manchuria Railway Company as an Intelligence Organization 1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 Author E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org Akihiko Maruya February 2012 CHARTING our future Blank a report of the csis japan chair The South Manchuria Railway Company as an Intelligence Organization Author Akihiko Maruya February 2012 CHARTING our future About CSIS—50th Anniversary Year For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed practical solutions to the world’s greatest challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars continue to provide strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and de- velop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Since 1962, CSIS has been dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. After 50 years, CSIS has become one of the world’s pre- eminent international policy institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in 2000. CSIS was founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Cover photo: The South Manchuria Railway Company Head Office in Dairen; postcard probably issued in 1920s or 1930s. Owned by the author. © 2012 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org 2 contents Preface iv 1. Historical Background of SMR’s Intelligence Gathering and Operational Activities 1 2. Organizational Structure of SMR’s Intelligence Gathering and Operational Activities 2 3. Specific xamplesE of SMR’s Intelligence Gathering and Operational Activities 5 4. Assessments of SMR’s Intelligence Gathering and Operational Activities 7 5. Comparison with the Kwantung Army’s Intelligence Gathering and Operational Activities 8 6. Lessons from SMR’s Intelligence Gathering and Operational Activities from the Point of View of the Present 10 Appendix: SMR’s Special Recruiting and Educational System 11 About the Author 12 | iii preface The intelligence activities of the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR) “Research Depart- ment” (Chōsabu) are well known in Japan. However, according to recent studies based on com- ments by retired SMR officials—the memoirs of senior SMR representatives such as Viscount Shinpei Goto (first SMR president) or Yosuke Matsuoka(14th SMR president); recent research on some of the specific intelligence gathering and operational activities of the SMR Mukden Branch Office; and research on the Muslim Movement, which was conducted collaboratively between SMR and the Japanese Imperial Army—it appears that SMR as a whole operated as an intelligence organization from its establishment until the end of World War II. Interestingly, there are positive and negative views and analyses of these recent studies, making it difficult to evaluate the quality or effectiveness of SMR as an intelligence organization. Furthermore, as one retired SMR official predicted in the 1980s, “If Japanese officials would like to establish a full dressed intelligence orga- nization in the future, they will confront the same difficulties that we faced at the SMR.”1 There is currently a debate in Japan over how to strengthen the effectiveness of intelligence gath- ering and organizations, and one can point to many lessons from the history of SMR. This is a summary of a research paper produced in Japanese that describes various elements of SMR’s intelligence gathering and operational activities including historical background, organizational concepts and structures, and the recruitment, training, and promotion system. The paper also compares SMR’s intelligence gathering activities to those of the Kwantung Army and concludes with an overall assessment of SMR including lessons learned with an eye toward the future organi- zation of Japanese intelligence gathering. This study in no way intends to justify Japanese colonial rule of Northeast China, and the views expressed are solely those of the author. The author wishes to thank Michael Green, Nicholas Szechenyi, Eri Hirano, Hideaki Shiraishi, William Colson, and the staff of the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Stud- ies (CSIS) for their support. 1. Kiyotomo Ishido, Susumu Noma, Kazuo Nonomura, Shoichi Kobayashi, Jūgonen Sensō to Mantetsu Chōsabu [15 Years’ War and the South Manchuria Railway Research Department] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1986), pp. 242–244. iv | historical background of smr’s intelligence gathering and 1 operational activities The South Manchurian Railway (SMR) conducted various intelligence gathering and operational activities equivalent to the following intelligence functions of the present day: ■ Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) ■ Human Intelligence (HUMINT) ■ Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) ■ Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) ■ Analysis (based on the aforementioned methods) ■ Counter Intelligence (CI) ■ Propaganda ■ Political Activities The intelligence gathering and operational activities of SMR were initiated just after it was established in 1906 and continued until the end of World War II in 1945. (SMR was established by imperial order in 1906, and operations commenced in 1907). Large-scale data gathering (OSINT) was also initiated at the request of the Japanese Imperial Army and became a symbol of the qual- ity, quantity, and specialized analysis of SMR research activities. Unfortunately, there was no clear methodology for intelligence gathering and the operational activities of SMR. Viscount Shinpei Goto, the first president of SMR, seemed to create an organizational structure for acquiring basic data, managing the land owner system, or conducting economic intelligence gathering to imple- ment colonial rule in Manchuria. Yosuke Matsuoka, the 14th president of SMR, had an important role in expanding SMR’s intelligence activities by cooperating with the Kwantung Army during his tenure as president from 1911 to 1916. Matsuoka expanded SMR’s intelligence gathering network during his tenure, but the purpose was ambiguous. As some alumni of SMR have pointed out, the organization was never able to clarify the purpose of its intelligence gathering and operational activities. | 1 organizational structure of smr’s intelligence gathering and 2 operational activities Both SMR’s head office and its field offices conducted intelligence gathering and operational activi- ties just after SMR was founded, and this chapter documents those activities. The following is a rough organizational structure for SMR’s intelligence gathering and operational activities at the head office, field offices, and foreign offices. Head Office (Dairen) ■ Research Department [Chōsabu]: OSINT ■ Intelligence Section: HUMINT ■ Data Section/Library: HUMINT Branch Office (Tokyo) ■ Investigation Office [Chōsashitsu]: Head office of SMR. South Manchuria Railway Company, OSINT Answering Questions on Manchuria 1937 (Tokyo: Herald Press, 1937), p. 3. Owned by author. ■ East Asia Economic Research Bureau (Tōa Keizai Chōsa Kyoku) Field Offices [Kosho] (in Manchoukuo, China) ■ Kosho (Harbin, Mukden, Tsitsihar, etc.): HUMINT ■ Regional Bureau: OSINT ■ Field Officehanghai: S HUMINT ■ Resident Officials (Temporary Intelligence Officials) Overseas Offices ■ Ne w York ■ Paris 2 | It is difficult to grasp the scale of person- nel in SMR’s intelligence related organizations. The number of personnel at SMR in its prime totaled nearly 400,000, equivalent to the total number of employees of the former Japanese National Railway (JNR). (The current total number of employees in the seven Japan Rail- way, or JR, groups combined is only 133,000.) The number of SMR personnel assigned to the Research Department [Chōsabu] also expanded exponentially as shown in the chart Tsitsihar “Kosho” office of SMR. Postcard postmarked Septem- below. The SMR Research Department staff at ber 8, 1935. Owned by author. its peak of 2,345 exceeded that of the present- day Japan Defense Intelligence Headquarters (JDIH) and other intelligence organizations Total Personnel in SMR Research Department as shown in the second chart below. The third Point of time Number of Personnel chart shows the size of some organizational 1 units within SMR, and it appears that on 1917 343 2 average specific intelligence units were staffed 1935 1,209 with 100 officials. It is also important to note 1939 1,731 that SMR instituted various recruiting sys- 1940 2,3453 tems including temporary intelligence officials 1943 9134 or resident officials and exchanged staff with 1944 1,1015 Manchoukuo, the Imperial Army, the Na- 1. The total number of SMR personnel in 1912 was 20,475. tional Planning Authority [Kikakuin], and the The Research Department was 1.67 percent of the total.