Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2004 "You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone": On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers – [Raising Questions about Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law] Bernard Harcourt Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons Recommended Citation Bernard Harcourt, "You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone": On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers – [Raising Questions about Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503 (2004). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/646 This Foreword is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 0091-4169/0419403-0503 THEJOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 94, No. 3 Copyright 0 2004 by NorthwesternUniversity, School of Law Pnred i U.S.A. SUPREME COURT REVIEW FOREWORD: "YOU ARE ENTERING A GAY AND LESBIAN FREE ZONE"': ON THE RADICAL DISSENTS OF JUSTICE SCALIA AND OTHER (POST-) QUEERS. [RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT LAWRENCE, SEX WARS, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW] BERNARD E. HARCOURT* The most renowned substantive criminal law decision of the October 2002 Term, Lawrence v. Texas,2 will go down in history as a critical turning point in criminal law debates over the proper scope of the penal sanction. For the first time in the history of American criminal law, the United States Supreme Court has declared that a supermajoritarian moral belief does not necessarily provide a rational basis for criminalizing conventionally deviant conduct. The Court's ruling is the coup de grdce to legal. moralism * Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Special thanks to Mary Anne Case, Joshua Cohen, Elizabeth Emens, Janet Halley, Martha Nussbaum, Toni Massaro, Richard Posner, Mia Ruyter, James Spindler, Geoffrey Stone, and Cass Sunstein for comments, criticism, and guidance; and to Ranjit Hakim, Kate Levine, and Aaron Simowitz for exceptional research assistance. 1 1991 editorial by Johnny Noxema and Rex Boy in the Toronto zine BIMBOX, quoted in Dennis Cooper, Queercore, in THE MATERIAL QUEER: A LEsBIGAY CULTURAL STUDIES READER 292 (Donald Morton ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE MATERIAL QUEER]. 2 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (upholding a substantive due process challenge to Texas's criminal statute banning homosexual "deviate sexual intercourse," TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003), where "deviate sexual intercourse" is defined as oral sex, anal sex, or penetration with an object of the genitals or the anus of another person. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(1) (2003)). 3 I use these terms-"supermajoritarian" and "conventionally deviant conduct"-in a positivist sense. According to a survey poll based on telephone interviews with 1000 adult Texans conducted between August 7 and August 21, 2003, by the Scripps Howard polling BERNARD E. HARCOURT [Vol. 94 administered after a prolonged, brutish, tedious, and debilitating struggle against liberal legalism in its various criminal law representations. Henceforth--or at least until further notice-majoritarian morality no longer automatically trumps liberal argument (whether consequentialist or deontological) in defining the reasonable and permissible contours of the penal code. Justice Byron White's infamous declaration in Bowers v. Hardwick that the criminal law is constantly, and may properly be, "based on notions of morality" 5 no longer stands. Instead, Justice John Paul Stevens's contrary statement from his dissent in Bowers is elevated, in block quote, to supreme law of the land: "the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral6 is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.", With much pomp and circumstance, the majority in Lawrence inters legal moralism and crowns liberal legalism.7 As a matter of federal due process, courts reviewing penal legislation must now deploy some other principle to distinguish between permissible and impermissible majoritarian moral opprobrium. agency, on behalf of the Star-Telegram and other media organizations, seventy percent of Texan respondents believed that homosexual behavior was morally wrong, compared to seventeen percent who felt that it was not morally improper. See Dave Montgomery, Most Texans Say Gay Marriages are Wrong, STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 5, 2003, available at http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/news/nation/6698373.htm. In addition, a similar poll conducted in Texas in 1999 showed a breakdown of sixty-eight percent morally opposed versus eighteen percent not morally opposed. See id. Moreover, male homosexual anal intercourse-the specific conduct charged in Lawrence-traditionally has been viewed as conventionally deviant in Texas and under common law. In 1868, most state penal codes, including the Texas criminal code, criminalized the "crime against nature" and "followed the English decisions defining the crime as involving penetration by a male penis inside the rectum of an animal, a woman or girl, or another man or a boy." Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute at 9, Lawrence (No. 02-102). 4 The leading variation in the criminal law is, naturally, the harm principle. For a discussion tracing the rise and triumph of the harm principle in criminal law, see generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999) (tracing the rise of the harm principle and suggesting that the triumph of the harm principle over legal moralism paradoxically has eviscerated the limiting principle of harm). See also BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER (2001). ' 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 6 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 7 The pomp and circumstance resonates loudly in the majority's pronouncement following the block quote from Justice Stevens's Bowers dissent. With all the formality appropriate to the coronation of a new monarch following a coup d'itat, the court declares: "Justice Stevens' analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled." Id. at 2484. 2004] FOREWORD. SEX WARS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 505 What that other principle will consist of is not clear. Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinion for the majority in Lawrence offers a dizzying array of possibilities, ranging from the watered-down harm principle of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, to evolving standards of morality as reflected in the history of state legislative enactments (and repeal) of sodomy provisions, to the critical commentary of reputedly conservative American academic judges such as Charles Fried and Richard Posner, to international law decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, to the 1957 British Wolfenden Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, to the Romer v. Evans equal protection anti-animosity principle, to state judicial resistance to the Bowers ruling, to conceptions of privacy, notions of dignity, or what Cass Sunstein refers to as "an American version of desuetude." 8 The result is a rhetorical smorgasbord of legal authority, a judicial m~lange of bibliographic references. As Mary Anne Case observes, the Lawrence opinion points to a "this" and "that" of ambiguous referents-it is, in Case's words, an opinion that "starts its readers off with this and in the end may deliver that instead." 9 Justice Kennedy's pastiche in Lawrence is, at a legal theoretical level, incoherent, and under normal circumstances-in many other cases-would be internally contradictory. As a jurisprudential matter, utilitarian welfare maximizing or harm calculations are anathema to a deontological human rights paradigm, which in turn is in tension with jurisdictional bean- counting. These different rules of decision have little in common except, of course, when they converge on the same result, which is apparently the case here-or at least, it is the case for decriminalizing homosexual sodomy. The theoretical incoherence and rhetorical overkill of Justice Kennedy's opinion lends credence to Justice Antonin Scalia's incendiary dissent in Lawrence, specifically to the idea that the majority's holding is no technical knock-out victory for liberal legalism, but rather a politically or culturally partisan decision. To Justice Scalia, the majority in Lawrence simply took sides in our contemporary culture wars over the sexual and moral fabric of American society. The Lawrence ruling, Justice Scalia declares, is a partisan outcome that aligns the court with the pro-gay faction in large part because of a law profession that is biased in favor of gay men and lesbian women. "It is 8 Cass Sunstein argues on grounds of judicial prudence for a narrow reading of Lawrence that stresses this last possibility-the idea that "a criminal ban on sodomy is hopelessly out of accord with contemporary convictions." See Cass Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? OfAutonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage,2004 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 9 See Mary Anne Case, On 'This' and 'That in Lawrence v. Texas, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2004). BERNARD E. HARCOURT [Vol. 94 clear from this [decision] that the Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of. assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed," Justice Scalia writes.'0 "Today's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda..