Strategic Culture and Small States: From Norm Breakers to Norm Takers to Norm Shapers Jan Niklas Rolf Abstract When Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania followed suit in 2004, commentators warned that the former’s non-aligned status and the latter’s pro-American stance would act as a brake on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Looking at the years since their accession, this chapter shows that Austria, Finland and Sweden covertly redefined their neutrality and that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania cautiously realigned their loyalty. But the new member states not only downloaded European strategic preferences; they also uploaded domestically identified threats and strategies to the EU level, influencing the CSDP’s agenda and course of action. This indicates that strategic culture – both on a domestic and European level – is rather fluid and that – at least in the field of security and defence policy – there does not have to be a trade-off between widening and deepening. Keywords strategic culture, small states, European integration, ESDP/CSDP, NATO, security, defence 1 When Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, commentators feared that the countries’ neutrality would obstruct the newly created Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). “Further enlargement”, Christopher Hill and William Wallace (1996, p. 9) warned, “would only widen the diversity of national assumptions and interests to be reconciled, within a process which has not yet learned how to begin to redefine the interests and assumptions of its present members.” Notwithstanding, in 2004, ten more countries acceded to the EU, among them the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that have traditionally strong ties to the United States (US). Scholars such as Karen Smith (2004, p. 204) worried that “divisions within the EU over relations with the US will deepen after enlargement”, hampering the just established Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).1 The voiced concerns bear witness to the widely held belief that a country’s strategic culture, that is, deeply ingrained views about the country’s role in matters of security and defence, exhibits a high degree of resilience and that, as a result, a wider EU will be a shallower one. The fact that all named countries are small in terms of population, that all but Sweden and Finland are small in terms of territory and that all but Austria are peripheral member states only adds to the scepticism about the adaptability of these countries: Given their relative weakness, Austria, Sweden and Finland reasoned that not taking sides with warring powers was vital to their security, while Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania determined that aligning with the greatest of these powers is the best strategy to ensure their survival. As the strategic cultures of small states tend to have an existential character, these states can be expected to firmly hold on to them. This chapter examines whether the concerns that were expressed during the enlargement rounds of 1995 and 2004 have proven true. To this end, the concept of strategic culture is introduced in the first section. The second section, titled “norm breaking”, shows that the strategic cultures of the accession countries were in fact largely incompatible with the CFSP and CSDP. In the third section, titled “norm taking”, it is argued that the new member states downloaded European strategic preferences by covertly redefining their neutrality and cautiously realigning their loyalty. In the fourth section, titled “norm shaping”, it is suggested that the new member states also uploaded domestically identified threats and strategies by influencing the CSDP’s agenda and course of action. This leads to the conclusion that strategic culture – both on a domestic and European level – is rather fluid and that – at least in the field of security and defence policy – there does not have to be a trade-off between widening and deepening. 2 The concept of strategic culture Strategic culture, a concept first used by Jack Snyder (1977) in his study of Soviet nuclear strategy, has been defined as “an integrated system of symbols […] which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs” (Johnston 1995, p. 46). Another widely cited definition stems from Kerry Longhurst (2004, p. 17): “A strategic culture is a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding the use of force held by a collective and arising gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process.” Building on these two and other definitions, Craig Greathouse (2008, p. 9) eventually came to define strategic culture “as identity derived norms, ideas and patterns of behavior which are based on long lasting and pervasive strategic preferences about the role of military force which shape the institutional options available for achieving security and defense goals.”2 Even though there does not exist a jointly accepted definition of strategic culture, scholars tend to agree that strategic culture is relatively resistant to change. This, after all, follows from the two terms strategy and culture that imply a certain endurance: Unlike tactics, a short-term method of operation, strategy refers to a long-term plan of action (Baylis and Wirtz 2007, p. 5). Culture, referring to “persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas” (Gray 1999, p. 131), seems to be long-lasting, too. That strategic culture is fairly robust, however, does not mean that it is set in stone: A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences. (Longhurst 2004, p. 17) Theo Farrell (2001), Jeffrey Lantis (2002), Christoph Meyer (2005) and Colin Gray (2007) agree that strategic cultures can alter in light of critical events. However, as these cultures are deeply rooted in history, it needs a profound external shock for change to occur. Japan’s shattering defeat in World War II and America’s traumatic experience of 9/11 are two frequently cited illustrations of such significant external shocks that led to a reversal of the countries’ strategic cultures (Katzenstein 1996, Hyde-Price 2004).3 Against this, I will argue that change does not require an all-out war or a full-blown attack. As I will demonstrate in section three, the “fundamental” (Longhurst 2004, p. 17) change in the strategic culture of 3 Austria, Sweden and Finland, as well as the “piecemeal” (ibid) change in the strategic culture of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was largely conditioned by the rather small-scale conflicts in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo) and Black Sea region (Georgia and Ukraine), respectively, that none of the countries was a direct party of. At first, though, I will have to outline the strategic cultures of these countries. Norm breaking The strategic culture of Austria, Sweden and Finland The bedrock of Austrian, Swedish and Finnish strategic culture has been the countries’ neutrality that prevented them from joining the EU during the Cold War. Since the formative moments of their common strategic culture differ quite fundamentally, I will treat the three cases separately. Whereas the early stages of the Cold War saw the division of Germany into a capitalist West and a communist East, Austria was left intact on the condition that it would adopt a posture of “permanent neutrality”. In 1955, non-alignment was approved by the Austrian parliament and enshrined in the constitution. Austria’s neutral status allowed the country to become an international meeting ground and its capital, Vienna, to become home to the headquarters of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), as well as the third major office site of the United Nations (UN). Austria’s foreign minister and later federal president Kurt Waldheim even came to serve as UN Secretary-General. In light of this, it does not surprise that neutrality became a key pillar of Austria’s national identity (Bruckmüller 1998, p. 84). In 1990, 82 percent of Austrians preferred forgoing EU membership rather than neutrality if the two proved incompatible, and in 1995, the year of Austria’s accession, 78 percent were still proud of non- alignment (ibid, pp. 84-85). Sweden’s non-alignment dates back even further. In 1814, Swedish king Karl XIV Johan adopted neutrality in order to safeguard Sweden’s territorial integrity after the country had already lost its empire. Its neutrality also came to save the country from involvement in World War I and II, making Sweden the only EU member state to have enjoyed undisturbed peace since the Napoleonic Wars. During the Cold War, Sweden was yet another neutral country to 4 install a national, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Dag Hammarskjöld, as UN Secretary-General. While Austria used its neutral status to attract a number of international organisations into the country, Sweden utilised its non-aligned position to pursue an active foreign policy based on cosmopolitan values. Taking a clear moral stand on global issues such as human rights, development assistance and arms control allowed the small state to become a “moral great- power” (Nilsson 1991). Accordingly, neutrality had the vast support of the Swedish people. In the early 1990s, 71 percent reported to be in favour of Sweden’s non-alignment (Devine 2011, p. 349). If Austria is committed to neutrality by constitution, and Sweden by conviction, Finland is devoted to it by caution. Its non-alignment was borne out of the bitter experience of two military defeats by the Soviet Union and the subsequent desire to prevent Finland from yet another Soviet invasion.