MOBASHER 4/18/2016 3:11 PM UNDERSTANDING ETHNIC-ELECTORAL DYNAMICS: HOW ETHNIC POLITICS AFFECT ELECTORAL LAWS AND ELECTION OUTCOMES IN AFGHANISTAN *Mohammad Bashir Mobasher After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan began transitioning toward democracy. The democratization, which began with the Bonn Agreement, was very promising for all ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The Bonn Agreement provided that Afghanistan must establish “broad based, gender sensitive, multi- ethnic and fully representative government.”1 As a part of this agreement, Afghanistan adopted a new Constitution in 2004, which established elections as the foundation for representative government and guaranteed that the elections be inclusive, fair, and representative of all groups and regions. Despite this progress in the laws, Afghanistan has not been able to reduce ethnic tensions. In fact, this article shows that ethnic tensions tend to intensify during elections, a result that belies the vision of the Bonn Agreement. After presenting a statistical and qualitative analysis of voting practices across three presidential elections and 26 provinces, this article makes several observations about the role of ethnicity in Afghan presidential elections. These observations are: (1) people of an ethnic community are more likely to vote for a candidate of their own ethnic group; (2) voters from one ethnic group are likely to vote for a candidate from another ethnic group only when they do not have a candidate of their own; (3) cross ethnic voting is more likely to occur in blocs and in exchange for patronage to the elites of voting groups; and (4) candidates and ethno-political elites tend to prioritize their electoral campaigns by ethnic mobilization, manipulation of laws and political bargains rather than by policy development in order to generate votes. This article contributes to the ongoing legal and political discourse on reforming the Constitution and the electoral laws, revealing the danger of neglecting the role of ethnicity in Afghan politics. * Ph.D. Candidate, University of Washington, School of Law. 1. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re- Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Dec. 5, 2000), http://www.un.org/ News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm [hereinafter “Bonn Agreement”]. 355 MOBASHER 4/18/2016 3:11 PM 356 GONZAGA LAW REVIEW Vol. 51:2 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 357 I. IS ETHNICITY LOSING ITS INFLUENCES ON ELECTION OUTCOMES? CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS AND SCHOLARSHIPS .............................. 359 A. Electoral Laws, Electoral Strategies, and Cross-Ethnic Coalitions ............................................................... 362 1. Electoral Strategies of Candidates, Elites, and Voters ........... 364 a) Candidates ....................................................................... 364 b) Elites ............................................................................... 365 c) Voters .............................................................................. 367 2. The Pattern of Cross-Ethnic Voting in Afghanistan .............. 369 II. THE EMPIRICS OF ETHNIC-ELECTORAL DYNAMICS ............................. 370 A. Ethnic Demographics in Afghanistan .......................................... 371 B. Role of Ethnicity on Election Outcomes: Nationwide .................. 373 1. The Presidential Election of 2004 .......................................... 374 2. The Presidential Election of 2009 .......................................... 377 3. The Presidential Election of 2014 .......................................... 383 C. Province-Wide Analysis of Ethnic-Electoral Relations ............... 387 1. Electoral Politics in the 2004 and 2009 Presidential Elections ............................................................. 388 a) Hamid Karzai, The Unparalleled Pashtun Candidate in the 2004 and 2009 Elections ....................................... 388 b) Qanooni and Abdullah, The Tajik Runner Ups............... 394 c) The Third Placed Hazaras: Mohaqiq and Dr. Bashardost ................................................................. 398 d) Abdul Rashid Dostum: The Uzbek Powerbroker ............ 400 2. The Presidential Election of 2014 .......................................... 402 a) Dr. Abdullah: The Apparent Frontrunner ....................... 402 b) Dr. Ashraf Ghani: The Emerging Elite ........................... 405 III. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS TO ETHNIC-ELECTORAL DYNAMICS ... 409 A. Insecurity and Turnout Rate ........................................................ 410 B. Electoral Irregularities ................................................................ 410 C. Localism ....................................................................................... 411 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 412 APPENDIX ........................................................................................................ 414 MOBASHER 4/18/2016 3:11 PM 2015/16 ELECTION OUTCOMES IN AFGHANISTAN 357 INTRODUCTION After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan began transitioning toward democracy. This transition began with the Bonn Agreement, which provided that Afghanistan must establish “broad based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government.”2 As a part of this agreement, Afghanistan adopted a new Constitution in 2004, under which sovereignty belongs to people and citizens exercise their sovereignty through their representatives.3 Their representatives include an elected president,4 elected legislators,5 elected mayors,6 and elected members of provincial councils, district councils, village councils,7 and municipality councils.8 Recognizing the ethnic plurality in Afghanistan, the Constitution guarantees that the elections be inclusive, fair, and representative of all groups and regions.9 This mandate is particularly important in Afghanistan, where political contests are characterized by group demands, struggles, and even violence.10 This and similar electoral rules have been expected to rearrange the field for political 2. Id. 3. Article 4 of the Constitutions provides that “[n]ational sovereignty in Afghanistan shall belong to the nation, manifested directly and through its elected representatives.” THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN [QANUN ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMAI AFGHANISTAN] Jan. 26, 2004, art. 4. 4. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, art. 61; see also ELECTION LAW [QANUN INTIKHABAT] Jun. 8, 2014 [15/5/1392], S. 1112, arts. 1, 10 (Afg.). 5. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, art. 83; see also ELECTION LAW Jun. 8, 2014, S. 1112, arts. 1, 10, 25, 26, 27. 6. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, art. 141; see also ELECTION LAW Jun. 8, 2014, S. 1112, arts. 38-39. 7. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, arts. 138, 140; see also ELECTION LAW Jun. 8, 2014, S. 1112, arts. 1, 10, 29, 32, 35. 8. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, art. 141; see also ELECTION LAW Jun. 8, 2014, S. 1112, arts. 40-42. 9. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, art. 83; see also ELECTION LAW Jun. 8, 2014, S. 1112, arts. 2, 50, 59, 61 (These Constitutional mandates were also reflected in the Election Law of Afghanistan.). 10. RASUL BAKHSH RAIS, WAR WITHOUT WINNERS: AFGHANISTAN’S UNCERTAIN TRANSITION AFTER THE COLD WAR 158-163, 230 (1994). MOBASHER 4/18/2016 3:11 PM 358 GONZAGA LAW REVIEW Vol. 51:2 contestations11 and pave the way for conflicting groups “to renegotiate power . in a non-violent manner.”12 Despite all this progress in the laws, they have not been able to reduce ethnic tensions or cross-ethnic gaps. In fact, ethnic tensions tend to intensify during the elections.13 This article shows that candidates and elites have continued to mobilize ethnic groups; furthermore, ethnic groups have tended to vote collectively and on the basis of ethnicity. After presenting an analysis of data about voting practices, this article makes the following observations about the role of ethnicity in Afghan presidential elections: (1) people of an ethnic community are more likely to vote for a candidate of their own ethnic group; (2) voters are likely to vote for a candidate from another ethnic group only when they do not have a candidate of their own; (3) cross ethnic voting is more likely to occur in blocs and in exchange for patronage to the elites of voting groups; and (4) candidates and ethno-political elites tend to prioritize their electoral campaigns by ethnic mobilization and political bargains, rather than by policy development, in order to generate votes. In this situation, the extent to which an elected individual can adequately represent the whole nation as a president is debatable. This article offers an interdisciplinary analysis, examining the legal and political aspects of ethnic-electoral dynamics. The analysis reveals that, although some electoral rules do encourage cross-ethnic coalitions in the presidential elections, ethnic voting continues to dictate the course of elections. It further reveals that ethnic politics has consistently undermined electoral laws, including constitutional principles, in all presidential elections. Part I of this article establishes the theoretical