This article was downloaded by: [HCL Harvard College] On: 16 February 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 908307701] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Middle Eastern Literatures Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713404747 Speech and Nature: al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn, 2.175-207, Part 4 James E. Montgomery Online publication date: 17 December 2009 To cite this Article Montgomery, James E.(2009) 'Speech and Nature: al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn, 2.175-207, Part 4', Middle Eastern Literatures, 12: 3, 213 — 232 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14752620903302178 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14752620903302178 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Middle Eastern Literatures, Vol. 12, No. 3, December 2009 Speech and Nature: al-Jah iz, Kitab al-Bayan wa-l-tabyın, 2.175–207, Part˙ ˙ 41 JAMES E. MONTGOMERY Some thinkers seem to feel no intellectual discomfort in interpreting such concepts as responsibility, culpability, etc. in conformity with strict determin- ism. I must own that while the notion of uncaused choice, which is nevertheless not something out of the blue, is one of which I know no adequate analysis, its opposite, a choice fully attributable to antecedent causes mental or physical, and yet regarded as entailing responsibility and therefore subject to moral praise or blame, seems to me even less intelligible. This difference, which has so deeply divided opinion, is the crux of the matter.2 Interpretation, 2—Determinism If, attempting to answer what al-Jahiz might want his speech–nature insight to do, within ˙ ˙ his Mu‘tazilı system, we turn from the realm of God back to that of man, we encounter another set of questions. What are we to make of the apparent determinism of the speech–nature insight, especially in light of the purported Mu‘tazilı insistence on ‘free will’? Does this not smack of predestination? How can a man exercise ‘free will’ in what he says if what he says is determined by his innate disposition, itself determined in him by God? Gimaret has controversially argued that the precursors of al-Jubba’ı taught varieties (maximalist and minimalist) of a doctrine of determinism according to which God assumes complete responsibility for all human acts. Should al-Jahiz, then, be ˙ ˙ established as the philosophical precursor of the Basran Mu‘tazila? Was his version of the Downloaded By: [HCL Harvard College] At: 15:00 16 February 2010 speech–nature insight of profound importance for how Abu‘Al ı, AbuH ashim and their followers approached the issue of human autonomy? Is his concept of tab‘ a precursor of ˙ ilja’, compulsion? Or does he pave the way for the Ash‘ariyyah’s flirtation with the possibility that God ‘willed other than what eternally He wills’?3 And anyway, does this determinism not render suspect my insistence on the pedagogical significance of the insight in the development of the man of reasoning intellect? For if one does not have an appropriate nature or innate disposition, how can one learn to speak otherwise than one does (naturally) already? Can one alter one’s nature? Gimaret formulated this reading in his The´ories de l’acte humaine en the´ologie musulmane (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1980), 3–60 (especially pp. 34, 36, 49, and 57–60). In ‘The Autonomy’ (see Part 3, p. 124, n. 60 for full reference James E. Montgomery, Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge, Trinity Lane, CB2 1TJ, UK. E-mail: [email protected] ISSN 1475-262X print/ISSN 1475-2638 online/09/030213-20 Ó 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14752620903302178 214 J. E. Montgomery details), Frank has proposed some serious and significant challenges to this conclusion. Much depends on whether we take ‘Abd al-Jabbar (in late 10th- century and early 11th-century Rayy) to be slavishly representative of Abu ‘Alı and AbuH ashim (in late 9th-century and early 10th-century Basra) (as many scholars such as Gimaret and Frank do), whether ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s formulation of their doctrines is accurate, unimproved and unelaborated (in other words, how optimistic we are at being able to denude the theses of their dialectical and argumentative formulations, to say nothing of the fact that the Mughnı is a massive product of imla’) and whether we can discern in al-Jahiz’s notions of ˙ ˙ tab‘, khuluq and wus‘ the prehistory of the ‘axioms and principles’ that Frank ˙ argues Gimaret has not established or explored for the psychological determinism of the Basrans. Thus, it is not at all clear to me that for al- Jahiz, ‘ontological or causal entailment (al-’ıˆgˇaˆb) is excluded from the function ˙ ˙ of motivations’ (Frank, ‘The Autonomy’, 347) or that ‘motivations are not causes in a formal sense, i.e., they are not determinant or ‘‘necessitating causes’’ (‘ilal muˆjibah)’.4 Gimaret (The´ories, 31–32) construes tab‘ basically as a ˙ precursor of ilja’ :onilja’ ; see the studies of D. Gimaret, ‘La notion d’impulsion irre´sistible (ilgˇa’ ) dans l’e´thique mu‘tazilite,’ Journal Asiatique (1971): 25–62; Gimaret, The´ories, 56–60; M. Schwartz, ‘Some Notes on the Notion of Ilja’ (Constraint) in Mu‘tazilite Kalam ,’ Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972): 413–427; Frank, ‘The Autonomy,’ 340–343. Generally, and to anticipate somewhat, Gimaret, along with most other scholars, fails to notice in his account of al- Jahiz’s theory of human autonomy the fact that a man’s nature can be improved ˙ ˙ and he misses the radical elitism of his vision of taklıf. In order to begin to formulate a response to these questions, we must investigate three fundamental notions of the Jahizian psychology and their filiations with some of the ˙ ˙ theories of earlier scientist-theologians: (1) khuluq, (2) tab‘ and (3) wus‘.5 ˙ 1. Khuluq One’s khuluq can be either good—Bayan , 2.78.11–12, wa-husn al-khuluq khayr qarın ˙ (Hisham b. Hassan, a tradent of al-Hasan al-Basrı, renowned for his memory);6 Downloaded By: [HCL Harvard College] At: 15:00 16 February 2010 ˙ ˙ ˙ Bukhala’ , 135.5, bi-karami-hi wa-husn khuluqi-hi (of Muways b. ‘Imran)—or bad— ˙ Bayan , 2.115.8, al-Ahnaf b. Qays declares that adwa al-da’ al-lisan al-badhı’ wa-al-khuluq ˙ al-radı’; Bayan , 2.188.13, wa-man sa’a khuluqu-hu qalla sadıqu-hu (¼ anonymous, in x83 ˙ of the translation); Bayan , 2.199.12, la wara‘ li-sayyi’ al-khuluq (¼ al-Ahnaf b. Qays, in ˙ x149); KH (Jidd), 67.7 (wa-khuluqu-hu al-shararah wa-al-tasarru‘); it can be expansive— ˙ ˙ Bukhala‘ , 135.10, kana Abu al-Hudhayl aslam al-nas sadran wa-awsa‘a-hum khuluqan wa- ˙ as’hala-hum suhulatan ; or lofty: Bayan , 2.196.11, dhı al-khuluq al-‘al ı (¼ Sahl b. Harun, in x127 of the translation)—or mild, an unerring way to attain praiseworthiness (hamd bi- ˙ la marzi’ah): Bayan , 2.115.7, al-khuluq al-sajıh wa-l-kaff ‘an al-qabıh (al-Ahnaf b. Qays). ˙ ˙ ˙ Al-Khayyat uses sarırah as a cognate, of Ibn al-Rawandı’s contradictory statements: ˙ wa-hadh a yadullu-ka ‘alah ayrati-hi wa-su’ sarırati-hi,7 while for Ibn Qutaybah and Ibn ˙ al-Washsha’ it guarantees muruwwah: wa-in kana la-ka khuluq fa-la-ka muruwwah (a prophetic hadıth);8 muruwwatu-hu khuluqu-hu (‘Umar b. al-Khattab).9 I have used ˙ ˙˙ ‘innate’ to try to indicate that, consonant with its etymology, one’s disposition or character is created by God. In the Qur’an (Q. 68.4), Prophet Muhammad is reassured ˙ al-Jah iz, Kitab al-Bayan wa-l-tabyın, 2.175–207, Part 4 215 _ _ by God that he is possessed of ‘a mighty character’ (wa-inna-ka la-‘ala khuluqin ‘azımin); ˙ whereas in Surat al-Shu‘ara’ (26.137), the ‘A¯ d justify their unmindfulness of God’s blessings by reminding Hud that they are following the ‘character of the forebears’ (in hadh a illa khuluqu al-awwalına). In a notable explication of the first of these ayah s, ‘A¯ ’ishah equates the khuluq of Prophet Muhammad with the Qur’an: kana khuluqu-hu al- ˙ qur’an , his character was the Qur’an, an intriguing equation of speech and behaviour.10 In a poem by Ka‘b b. Zuhayr to his brother Bujayr, quoted by Ibn Hisham (Ibn Ishaq), ˙ khuluq is tantamount to sunnah, a set of behavioural exemplars, a code of conduct,11 while Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ in his Risalah fı al-sahabah assures the Caliph that God has purified him ˙ ˙ of the undesirable innate traits (khala’iq ) he has been enumerating.12 According to al- Shafi‘ı, the khuluq of Prophet Muhammad is exemplary, for ‘he is the most virtuous ˙ of His creation in terms of soul and of them all combines the most numerous 5praiseworthy4 characteristics’.13 (The school of) al-Kindı, Fıhudud al-ashya’ wa- ˙ rusumi-h a refers to the human virtues as khuluq: note also the contrast in this definition between nature and convention or imposition, wad‘.14 It is surely as a result of these and similar usages that the early˙ translators used the plural, akhlaq , to render the Greek ethe.