This is the accepted manuscript version of the following article: Jussi Backman, “Modernity in Antiquity: Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy in Heidegger and Arendt,” Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 24:2 (2020): 5–29, available in final form at https://doi.org/10.5840/symposium202024210. Modernity in Antiquity: Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy in Heidegger and Arendt Jussi Backman (University of Jyväskylä) This article looks at the role of Hellenistic thought in the historical narratives of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt. To a certain extent, both see—with G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Droysen, and Eduard Zeller—Hellenistic and Roman philosophy as a “modernity in antiquity,” but with important differences. Heidegger is generally dismissive of Hellenistic thought and comes to see it as a decisive historical turning point at which a protomodern element of subjective willing and domination is injected into the classical heritage of Plato and Aristotle. Arendt, likewise, credits Stoic philosophy with the discovery of the will as an active faculty constituting a realm of subjective freedom and autonomy. While she considers Hellenistic philosophy as essentially apolitical and world-alienated—in contrast to the inherently political and practical Roman culture—it nonetheless holds for her an important but unexploited ethical and political potential. L’article examine le rôle de la pensée hellénistique dans les récits historiques de Martin Heidegger et Hannah Arendt. Dans une certaine mesure, tous les deux voient, avec G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Droysen et Eduard Zeller, la philosophie hellénistique et romaine comme une « modernité dans l’antiquité », mais avec des différences importantes. Généralement, Heidegger dédaigne la philosophie hellénistique et finit par la considérer comme un tournant historique décisif qui introduit un élément protomoderne de volonté et de domination subjective dans l’héritage de Platon et Aristote. De même, Arendt attribue à la 1 philosophie stoïque la découverte de la volonté en tant que faculté active constituant un domaine de liberté et d’autonomie subjectives. Même si elle considère la philosophie hellénistique comme fondamentalement apolitique et aliénée du monde—à l’inverse du caractère fondamentalement politique et pratique de la culture romaine—cette pensée détient néanmoins pour elle un potentiel éthico-politique important et sous- exploité. 1. The Invention of Hellenism as Protomodernity: Droysen, Hegel, Zeller In a preface to the 1843 edition of his Geschichte des Hellenismus, Johann Gustav Droysen notes that the period between the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE and the Battle of Actium in 31 BCE—a political and cultural epoch for which he introduces the term “Hellenism”—was generally regarded as “a great gap, as a dead spot in the history of humanity, as a loathsome deposit of all kinds of degeneracy, putrefaction, lifelessness.”1 In the eyes of the classicists of Droysen’s day, the three centuries separating the classical era of the Greek polis from the classical era of Latin literature were, at best, an intermediary age of imitation, conservation, and dissemination of classical culture. In contrast to this notion of Hellenism as a “medieval period of antiquity,” Droysen portrays it as a “vital link in the chain of human development”—as the “modern age of antiquity” (moderne Zeit des Altertums), an age of disenchantment and loss of cultural innocence, but also one of great political and intellectual progress.2 I thank the guest editors Frederik Bakker, Antonio Cimino, and Elena Nicoli for the opportunity to contribute, and Ville Suuronen and the anonymous referees for wonderfully helpful comments. Financial support was provided by my Academy of Finland research project, Creation, Genius, Innovation: Towards a Conceptual Genealogy of Western Creativity (2018–23; decision number 317276). 1 Johann Gustav Droysen, “Vorwort zur Geschichte des Hellenismus II” [1843], in Kleine Schriften zur alten Geschichte, Vol. 1 (Leipzig: Veit & Co., 1893), 300. Cf. Jürgen Busche, “Hellenismus,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. 3, (ed.) J. Ritter (Basle: Schwabe & Co., 1974), 1050–53. 2 Droysen, “Vorwort,” 299–300, 307–308, 313. 2 The perception of Hellenism as an intermediate period of stagnation has also long applied to its philosophy.3 The Neoplatonism of the late imperial age bolstered the canonic supremacy of Plato and Aristotle. Of the main Hellenistic schools of thought, Epicureanism, with its materialist ontology and hedonistic ethics, was outright rejected by pagan and Christian Neoplatonism. The philosophical ideals of the ancient skeptics were equally incompatible with the emerging alliance between philosophy and theology, in the service of which individual skeptical arguments found at most an instrumental role.4 Stoic ethics and ontology were more favourably received by Christian thinkers, but mainly because Stoic terms such as logos and pneuma had developed into a kind of intellectual lingua franca of the Roman world.5 By contrast, Renaissance humanists, for whom the works of Cicero, Epictetus, Seneca, and Sextus Empiricus again became standard reading, espoused a renewed lively interest in all aspects of Hellenistic thought, and the late medieval and early modern crisis of Aristotelianism and rational theology contributed to a revival and reappropriation of skepticism in the sixteenth century.6 Immanuel Kant, whose “Copernican Revolution” in many ways made modern skepticism redundant as a living philosophical movement, still shows a lively engagement with Hellenistic ethics.7 3 For a concise overview of the reception of Hellenistic philosophy in the later tradition, see A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 232–48. 4 See Charles Bolyard, “Medieval Skepticism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), (ed.) E. N. Zalta, [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/skepticism-medieval/], accessed June 25, 2019. 5 See Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, Vol. 2: Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1985). 6 See J. Miller and B. Inwood, eds., Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 17–43. 7 See Daniel Doyle and José M. Torralba, “Kant and Stoic Ethics,” in The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition, (ed.) J. Sellars (London: Routledge, 2016), 270–83. 3 It was G. W. F. Hegel, however, who, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, cemented the notion that Stoicism, Epicureanism, and skepticism constitute a separate and independent episode in ancient thought in which the individual “unhappy consciousness” seeks intellectual release from the alienating and oppressive external world of universal Roman imperialism.8 In Hellenistic philosophy, the initial harmony of consciousness with the world, its “being at home” characteristic of earlier Greek philosophy,9 is ruptured; “wisdom” (sophia) no longer means insight into the ideal structures of the world but becomes synonymous with the harmony of the individual with herself and her autonomy from the vicissitudes of the external world. Thus, Hegel, too, sees philosophical Hellenism as a kind of “modernity of antiquity”—as a dialectical move towards the self-reflective and autonomous modern subjectivity. Hegel’s view was echoed by Eduard Zeller in his extensive and highly influential history of Greek philosophy (1844–52), which portrays Hellenistic thought as a “withdrawal of the human being onto herself, her internal disposition, her own willing and thinking, the deepening of self-consciousness,” due to the loss of political freedom and amounting to “a restriction and isolation, and the loss of lively interest in the external world.”10 It is the Hegelian- Zellerian reading that has, above all, shaped our contemporary understanding of Greek philosophy from Aristotle to Plotinus.11 8 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Werke, Vol. 19: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), 401–403, tr. by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson as Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Plato and the Platonists (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 371–73. 9 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Werke, Vol. 18: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993), 171–79, tr. by E. S. Haldane as Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 1: Greek Philosophy to Plato (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 149–55. 10 Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Vol. 3.1: Die nacharistotelische Philosophie [1852], 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Fues, 1865), 18–19, tr. by O. J. Reichel as The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892), 25; trans. mod. 11 For Heidegger’s remarks on Hegel’s and Zeller’s renderings of Greek philosophy, see Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 22: Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie [1926], (ed.) F.-K. Blust (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 4 In what follows, I will not attempt to evaluate the historical adequacy of this reading, but will rather study some of its repercussions within Continental thought. I will first show that the role allotted to Hellenistic philosophy in what is perhaps the most