U.S. Policy Toward the Caribbean in the 1980s -- Paper presented by Roland I. Perusse, Director, Inter American InstitUte of Puerto Rico, at the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association, St.Kitts—Nevis, May 30 to June 2, 1984 The change in U.S. Presidents on January 20, 1981, from Jimmy Carter, the humanitarian, to Ronald Reagan, the realist, brought about sharp changes in U.S. foreign policy around the world, but especially in the Caribbean region. The Jimmy Carter years were a search for accomondation with the Soviet Union and marxism. In the Caribbean, Carter sought to normalize relations with Cuba and to establish friendly relations with the aew Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Carter pressed for respect of human rights around the world. In the Caribbean, he criticized. violations in Cuba, Haiti and the *Dominican Republic. He opened the gates of the United States to 100,000 refugees from Cuba and to several thousand % other "boat people' from Haiti. Realist Ronald Reagan views the world in terms of a confrontation between the "evil empire" of communism and western concepts of democracy. With respect to the Caribbean, he recognizes the need to attack basic social, economic and political problems, but feels that the Soviet Union Cuba and Nicaragua are seeking to exploit the situation for the benefit of the world communist movement. Thus, marxist ideology and aggression are seen as posing the immediate threat to progress, stability and secur- ity in the region and to U.S. national interests in the Caribbean basin Western scholars, especially social scientists, have traditionally perceived Central America and the Caribbean to be two distinct regions. Central America has been seen as embracing Guatemala, El Salvador, Hon- duras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The Caribbean is seen as the islands in the sea, plus four continental enclaves closely tied to these islands (Belize, Guyana, Surinam and French Guiana). The Reagan Administration has a different perception of the.area. - Central America and the Caribbean are seen as comprising a single, geo- strategic unit, and the term, Caribbean Basin, is used to describe a region composed of both these parts. Under President Reagan, U.S. policy in the Caribbean has had two major thrusts, one economic and the other military. I shall discuss each of these in turn. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) The economic component of President Reagan's Caribbean policy is the Caribbean Basin Initiative. It is designed to revitalize the econ- omies of the Caribbean and Central America by three means: (1) trade preferences for the products of Caribbean Basin countries in the U.S. market; (2) special incentives for private investment in the region; and (3) a limited amount of emergency financial existence to govern- ments in dire need. The aim is to involve the U.S. private sector and to encourage free enterprise in the Caribbean. Nations under com- munist control are excluded from participation. 1 The countries participating in the Caribbean Basin Initiative are Anguilla, Antigua/Barbuda,the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, the Turks and Caicos and the British Virgin Islands. - 2 The Caribbean Basin Initiative did not become operative until the first of this year, so it is a bit early to assess its work. As a concept, however, it appears to have validity in addressing a fundamental and long-standing complaint in the region -- lack of a basic, long-range plan and policy for that part of the world. It also responds to long-standing pleas for "trade, not aid," in other words, access to the U.S. market. 2 By lowering or removing U.S. tariff barriers to a wide range of products from these countries, the United States affords them the opportunity to work themselves out of their economic dilemma. By providing tax incentives to U.S. corporations investing in the region, the United States and the Carib- bean nations involved insure the flow of capital essential, for econ- omic recovery and expansion. But the CBI picture at present is far from rosy. The initial appropriation of $350,000,000 is infinitestimal in terms of the econ- omic needs of the region. And of this amount, a third was assigned to El Salvador, because of the urgent crisis there, leaving only $200,000,000 for the remaining 26 nations in the Plan, less than $8,000,000 per country, just enough, perhaps, to build a small bridge in each of them. Also, because of pressure from U.S. interest groups (both labor and management) who want protection from foreign competition, ex- ceptions had to be made to duty-free entry of a number of significant 2Development needs in the Caribbean have not changed much in the past 14 years. See the author's A Strategy for Caribbean Economic Integra- tion (San Juan, Puerto Rico, North-South Press, 1971) pp. 57=69. exports from the region, for example, textiles and apparel, canned tuna, petroleum and certain leather goods, including footwear. There have also been strong protests from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, who feel that the U.S. Government is extend- ing the benefits they enjoy as U.S. territories (free access to the U.S. market and tax exemption) to their competitors in the Caribbean. Peace through Strength The second major thrust of U.S. policy in the Caribbean has been military. The rationale for a strong military posture in the region is that economic and social progress is possible only in a climate of stability and security; that the export of revolution and the pro- motion of so-called wars of national liberation by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua, among others, have served to destabilize the re- gion and to drain off its human and financial resources. Thus, the communist menace must be countered and democracy in the region must be defended in the mutual interest of both the Caribbean nations and the United States. There have been two principal manifestations of this policy. The first was the prompt and positive response of the United States last fall to the plea . of the Organization of East Caribbean States for joint intervention to restore order in Grenada and to prevent that island nation from falling under the total domination of Cuba and the Soviet Union. The second principal manifestation of the policy of peace through strength has been a military build-up and maneuvers in Honduras, covert • aid to anti-government forces in Nicaragua, and military assistance to El Salvador in its efforts to stem a rebellion incited and supplid by Cuba and Nicaragua. The Grenada operation was eminently successful. Peace was restored to the island. The Soviets, Cubans and other foreign marxist elements were expelled, and an interim civilian government was established. Plans are being made for free and democratic elec- tions before the end of the year. A potential base of Soviet—Cuban operations in the Eastern Caribbean has been eliminated. The Grenada intervention also had a sobering effect on Fidel Castro. He made the point that the marxist government in Nicaragua could not count on Cuban military support in case of large—scale hostilities in that country. The operation took away the refueling base planned for the support of Cuban troops in Africa. There is now talk of the withdrawal of the 20,000 Cubans in Angola. Military pressure on Nicaragua is also showing favorabJi The marxist government ruling that country is now talking in terms of fulfilling the promises made by the Sandinistas to the Organization of American States five years ago -- free elections, a free press, a pluralistic society, and respect for private property and human rights. We are told that the number of Cuban advisers has been reduced, that the headquarters of the El Salvador rebels in ManageP. will be removed from Nicaraguan territory, and that the marxists rulers of Nicaragua are now prepared to listen to the recommendations of the Contadora Group. Evaluation U.S. policy toward the Caribbean is working. There is new re- spect for the United States in the region. A long—range plan for economic developement is in operation, with a good chance of success. The people are no longer intimidated by marxism. Faith in the demo- cratic process has been restored. My principal criticism of present U.S. policy toward the Carib- bean is the virtual non—existence of what might be termed a socio- cultural—educational component. A strong economy and strong defenses are essential to prosperity in the Caribbean. There is no doubt of that. But for prosperity to be lasting, the democratic nations must win the war of ideas in the region. Marxism is basically an idea, or set of ideas. It can not be destroyed by dollars or cannon. It can only be superceded by a better idea. Likewise, democracy is an idea. In the long run, it can not be sustained by dollars and cannon alone. To survive, it must be respected and practiced. While President Reagon may be correct in eschewing social reform as the central element in U.S. Latin American policy, as it was under Presidents Kennedy and Carter, he may have swung to the othei- extreme by virtually ignoring the human element. For example, though he may be correct in refusing to cut off aid to El Salvador despite human rights violations there, because the ultimate result might be the takeover of government by marxists, whose record on civil rights is even worse, how does one justify continuing aid to Haiti in the face of gross civil rights violations there.