SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA, 1975 - 1988: A STRUCTURAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE by L.J.D. Devraun Thesis submittedUniversity in fulfilment of Cape of the requirements Town for the degree of Masters of Arts in International Relations in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town Cape Town Republic of South Africa September 1996 ~o:·•;:r.~c-.7".""-.x-·-..,··:;r.·,·,....-·-··c-:-;;-:e:r,.-::=-~ t~ Tht·: f?1·: ·r ... ,... ~{,· ri' ri·. · ·r,.-,.•:-, }.,_."~ !\··2-n ni"·nn ~ ~th~:;;;_·;~!_,:~:) .i::i~:i~·:\>.,.:,f:~>'.:;,~~.~---'_:1 _.·?;:~:~ ~ I or lfl r--·"· C,1,.•/ ';-;,h !,, ·---U ,_.,, .-.,.,.,.,r. ~ ·)~..);".:,.::.· :._-.·-~..,.,..- ;;,,";~,-~·;·t.• :,$>1'~·~-·."f·:--· •n.~w.... ·; ,,'•'•: The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non- commercial research purposes only. Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. University of Cape Town SOUTH AFRICA IN ANGOLA 1975 -1988 Copyright (1996) by L.J.D. Devraun D.D.D. to my Russian forbearers ABSTRACT: There are an enormous number of competing interpretations of South Africa's apartheid era policies both in the region and towards Angola. With South Africa's role in the Angolan civil war as its case study, this paper evaluates the relative utility of certain selected approaches to international relations theory. This paper evaluates the relative utility of system level versus unit level theories to explain the nature of South African involvement in the Angolan conflict. These two categories are represented by nee-realist structural theory and, secondly, by a variety of unit level theories typically concerned with South Africa's domestic environment. This dissertation demonstrates, through the actual events, the utility of these two distinct theoretical approaches. Given the above approach and objectives, the methodology consists firstly of a critical conceptual review and analysis of each paradigm as a useful explanation of South African foreign relations. It consists secondly, of a more "empirical" ass~ssment of their value in accounting for or illuminating significant aspects of the internal and external sources of motivation for South Africa's military intervention. The empirical evidence is examined according to four stages: firstly; a review of the related literature, secondly; South Africa's initial intervention and the presence of US aid in 1975, thirdly; the widening of the conflict post 1978 under P. W. Botha, and fourthly; the departure of all the major foreign influences and final resolution of the Angolan conflict. This exercise extends until 1988 which, in December of that year, witnessed the cessation of all external intervention. The conclusion recommends further research in the form of empirical case studies which consider both the application of international relations theory as well as the military dimension of the conflict. ' Ahstract+v;;·································· TABLE OF CONTENTS: ABSTRACT ..................................................... vii LIST OF EXHIBITS .............................................. xv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................... xvii ACRONYMS ...................... -.............................. xix APPENDICES ................................................... xv 1. CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY ..................................................· ................. 1 1 .1 General Comments . 1 1.2 Identification of Problem and Methodology ....................... 3 1.3 Levels-of-Analysis .......................................... 4 1.4 Sectors ................................................... 5 1.5 Overview of the Chapter by Chapter Outline ...................... 8 1.5.1 Chapter Two: Review of the Related Literature ............. 9 1.5.1.1 The First Body of Literature ..................... 9 1 .5.1.2 The Second Body of Literature .................. 9 1.5.2 Chapter Three ...................................... 9 1.5.3 Chapter Four ...................................... 11 1.5.4 Chapter Five ...................................... 13 1.5.5 Chapter Six ....................................... 15 1.6 Endnotes for Chapter One ................................... 16 2. CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE ......................... ·........................................ 20 \ 2.1 General Comments ........................................ 20 ~2.2 Review of Classical Realism ................................. 20 42.3 The Central Importance of Kenneth Waltz ....................... 22 i 2.4 Review of the Modern Nee-Realist Literature .................... 22 2.4.1 Kenneth Waltz's Theory of Politics .................... 23 2.4.2 Systems Level vs Unit Level .......................... 23 2.4.3 Three Features of Waltzian Structure ................... 24 2.4.3.1 Ordering Principles ........................... 25 2.4.3.2 Character of the Units ........................ 25 2.4.3.3 Distribution of Capabilities ........ ·............. 26 2.4.4 Critical Weaknesses of Waltz's Theory .................. 27 2.4.4.1 Waltz's Evolution ............................. 29 2.4.5 A Modified Theory of Waltz ........................... 30 2.4.5.1 Gilpin's Notion of Hegemonic War ............... 31 2.4.6 Structural Realism .................................. 31 2.4.6.1 New Theoretical Horizons ..................... 32 2.5 Review of Unit Level Literature ............................... 33 2.5.1 A View from the Left ................................. 33 2.5.1.1 Robert Davies .......... , .................... 33 2.5.1.1.1 SA's Escalating Destabilization .......... 34 2.5.1.1.2 SA's Sudden De-escalation . 36 2.5.1.2 Joseph Hanlon ........................ 36 ~ 2.5.2 The Militarization of SA Politics ........................ 37 2.5.2.1 Relationship Between SADF and Leadership ...... 38 -;':> 2.5.2.2 Cultural Notions of Security and Survival .......... 38 -:>2.5.2.3 Security Establishment ......................· .. 39 2.5.2.3 Bureaucratic Rivalry .......................... 39 2.5.2.5 Personalities and Bureaucracies ................ 40 VJ- 2.5.3 Internal Decision-Making of the SA State ................ 41 2.5.3.1 Three Factors of Strategic Policy Formulation ...... 42 -> 2.5.3.2 Internal and External Security Concerns .......... 42 2.5.3 ..3 Leadership Personalities ...................... 43 2.5.4 SA's Civil-Military Relations .................. ·......... 44 2.5.4.1 Boer Tradition of A Citizen Army ................ 44 2.5.4.2 Bureaucratic Rivalry .......................... 45 2.5.4.3 Leadership Personalities ...................... 46 2. 7 Endnotes for Chapter Two ................................... 47 3. CHAPTER Ill: THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA'S INITIAL INTERVENTION IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT (1975-1977) .............· .................................................... 54 3.1 The Global Context: ........................................ 54 3.2 Prelude to Civil War, 1961 - 1975 ............................. 55 3.3 The Nationalist Factions .................................... 56 3.3.1 MPLA ........... -................................. 57 3.3.2 UNITA ........................................... 58 3.3.3 FNLA ............................................ 59 3.4 Factional Fighting, Early to Mid 1975 .......................... 60 3.4.1 Portuguese Colonial Policies .......................... 60 3.4.2 Factional Character of Conflict ......................... 60 3.4.3 The Fight for Control of Luanda ........................ 61 3.4.4 Alvor Agreement in Disarray .......................... 62 3.4.5 Nakuru Agreement .................................. 62 3.4.6 Transitional Government Evacuated .................... 63 3.5 Period Immediately Preceding Independence ................... 64 3.5.1 Withdrawal° of Portuguese ............................ 64 3.5.2 FNLA's March on Luanda ............................ 65 3.5.3 SA Direct Military Intervention ......................... 66 ~ 3.6 American Involvement ...................................... 66 3.6.1 Ford Approves $14 Million ............................ 67 3.6.2 Congressional Opposition ............................ 68 · 3.6.2.1 Resignation of Assistant Secretary .............. 69 3.6.3 Clark Amendment ................................... 70 3.6.3.1 Congress Prefers Diplomacy ................... 71 3.6.3.2 Two Lines of Argument ........................ 71 3.6.3.3 Timing of Clark Amendment .................... 72 3.6.3.4 Clark Amendment Gives Green Light ............. 72 3.6.4 Direct Naval and Aerial Involvement .................... 73 3. 7 South Africa's Initial Involvement .............................. 73 3.7.1 Which Faction Would SA Support ...................... 74 3.7.2 When Did SA Actually Intervene ....................... 74 3.7.3 Protection of Ruacana Falls ........................... 75 ~ 3.7.4 Strategic Reasons for Intervention ...................... 76 3.7.5 OAU Indecision .................................... 77 3.7.6 Soviet and Cuban Involvement ........................ 78 3.7.7 Military Gains by MPLA, Early 1976 ..................... 79 3.7.8 Repercussions of SA Intervention ...................... 80 3.7.8.1 Liability of SA as an Ally ....................... 80 3.8 Soviet Involvement .......................... '............... 81 3.8.1 Superpower Collision ................................ 81 3.8.2 Soviet Arms Shipments .............................