Naïve Panentheism Karl Pfeifer 1. In-troduction What is panentheism? The term »Panentheismus« was coined by Karl Krause in 1828,1 reflecting the Greek expression πᾶν ἐν Θεός (pân en Theós), which lit- erally means »all in God«. It is often said that panentheism stands midway between theism and pantheism, melding the transcendence of God from the- ism with the immanence of God from pantheism. Whereas theism regards God as standing independent of the world, pantheism regards God and the world as coextensive or identical, and panentheism regards God as containing the world; the world is in God, hence God is more than the world (transcendence), but God is also present in the world (immanence). The word »in« is central here and needs to be clarified. It has been claimed that various panentheist positions entail different meanings of »in« and Tom Oord has been credited with putting together an illustrative list.2 Supposedly, the world is »in« God because: 1. that is its literal location 2. God energizes the world 3. God experiences or »prehends« the world (process theology) 4. God ensouls the world 5. God plays with the world (Indic Vedantic traditions) 6. God »enfields« the world (J. Bracken) 7. God gives space to the world (J. Moltmann … zimzum tradition …) 8. God encompasses or contains the world (substantive or locative notion) 9. God binds up the world by giving the divine self to the world 1 Krause 1828: 256. Although Clayton 2010: 183 alleges that Friedrich Schelling prefig- ured Krause’s 1829 [sic] coinage of the term »Panentheismus« with his use of the phrase »Pan+en+theismus« in his Essay on Freedom in 1809, that phrase (with or without the pluses) does not appear in the original German text, nor does »Pan+en+theism« (with or without the pluses) appear in any of the English translations; cf. Göcke 2013a: n. 5. A possible even earlier use by Krause awaits verification: in his foreword to Vorlesungen über das System der Philosophie, Krause tells us (pp. v-vi) that his System der Wissenschaft is unaltered (»unverän- dert dasselbe«) from his teaching lectures of 1803-04 in Jena and that his Entwurf des Systemes der Philosophie of 1804 bears witness thereto. For the first study of Krause’s panentheism in English, see Göcke 2018. 2 Clayton 2004: 253. © Karl Pfeifer, 2020 | doi:10.30965/9783957437303_008 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Karl Pfeifer - 9783957437303 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 01:54:46AM via free access 124 Karl Pfeifer 10. God provides the ground of emergences in, or the emergence of, the world […] 11. God befriends the world […] 12. All things are contained »in Christ« (from the Pauline en Christo) 13. God graces the world […] I am not convinced. Except for 1 and 8, the »becausal« relata per se seem to have nothing to do with the meaning of »in« at issue, and it is not obvious that in most of these cases a plausible connection to in-ness cannot be given in terms of a longer explanation involving a locative use. Here is how I would rate the list: – Satisfactory becausal relations (i.e. ones that actually involve a recognizably straightforward meaning of »in«): 1, 8 – Unsatisfactory becausal relations: 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13 – Maybes: 4, 6, 12 Let us first consider the Unsatisfactories: 2. God energizes the world. By itself, this does not require the world to be in God; an analogy: an electronic device may be energized by an external power source (e.g. electrical outlet) or an internal power source (e.g. battery); only rarely would an electronic device be contained within its power source, if at all. 3. God experiences or »prehends« the world. Experiences and prehensions are not confined to internals (cf. proprioception) but may be of externals (cf. perception). 5. God plays with the world. Prima facie this suggests that God and the world are ontologically distinct, inasmuch as playthings are typically external to play- ers. In the Heliopolitan creation myth, Atum does »play with himself« but that does not support a world-in-God interpretation or outcome. 7. God gives space to the world. »Giving space to« or »making space for« can be construed as forming an internal space or an external space. However, since the central concept of the tzimtzum tradition is contraction (»tzimtzum« means »contraction«) for the purpose of making the space in which creation of the world can take place, prima facie giving space to the world does not seem to put the world into God. 9. God binds up the world by giving the divine self to the world. One can bind up something that is either internal or external to oneself, but giving one- self to the world suggests the world is external. 10. God provides the ground of emergences in, or the emergence of, the world […]. God could presumably provide this whether the world is in him or not. Karl Pfeifer - 9783957437303 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 01:54:46AM via free access Naïve Panentheism 125 11. God befriends the world; 13. God graces the world. Again these do not preclude the world’s being external rather than internal to God. Now for the Maybes: 4. God ensouls the world. If the »en« of »ensoul« works like the »en« of »envelop«, then there is a semantic linkage to »in« that implies the world’s being in God. However, if we go with the Oxford English Dictionary’s secondary definition of »ensoul« as »to infuse a soul into« then ensouling could be either internal or external. 6. God »enfields« the world. Because this claim is associated with Joseph Bracken, the notion of enfielding here is one that derives from psychological field theory,3 an offshoot of Gestalt psychology. In psychological field theory interactions between individuals and environments are central, and the total- ity of a person’s experiences and needs and all the environmental factors that influence the person’s behavior at any time is called a »life space« or »psy- chological field«. Psychological field theory also uses topological notions in describing the various interconnections within the totality. Hence, psychologi- cal field theory deploys spatial metaphors that might provide an appropriate sense of in-ness. However, it is not clear whether Bracken’s take on fields con- siders God to be coextensive with a field that is all-enfielding or whether the field is confined to the world.4 12. All things are contained »in Christ« (from the Pauline en Christo). This one strikes me as an outlier, not so much wrong as irrelevant, perhaps using »in« in a doxastic sense of participating-in-a-community-of-ideas or of having- faith-in; or a social sense of being-together-in-fellowship (cf. the salutation »Yours in Christ«). To momentarily change gears, rather than implying any- thing spatial or locative, 12 seems more on the order of what a party faithful might tell a comrade: »Everything is contained in Marx.« To be sure, there are some biblical passages that are more amenable to a spatial or locative con- strual than this, although it is noteworthy that the »things« typically referred to are the believers in Christ and not the inventory of the world at large. (But that may be enough for a clever spin doctor to get started.) Benedikt Göcke has instructively generalized the problems he sees with what I have listed as Unsatisfactories and Maybes with his observation that »almost any interpretation of ›in‹ that understands the relation between God 3 Britannica 2016. 4 Bracken 2000: 7f. says, for example, »in line with this proposal one can postulate that the universe or cosmic process is at any given moment an all-encompassing ›structured society‹ or structured field of activity for all the actual entities emergent within it.« […] »God shares, in other words, a common field of activity with finite actual entities.« Karl Pfeifer - 9783957437303 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 01:54:46AM via free access 126 Karl Pfeifer and everything else as an internal and intimate relation between God and ev- erything else can also be thought of as an external and intimate relation, and vice versa.«5 As is evident from my own assessments, I don’t disagree with that. My problem, however, is with regarding a number of Oord’s so-called mean- ings of »in« as being meanings of »in« in the first place, rather than simply being not relevantly qualified tenets of some variant of panentheism. »God graces the world« for example says absolutely nothing about in-ness or lack thereof, absolutely nothing about characterizing an internal or external rela- tion. As a tenet of a variant of panentheism, it does not explain the in-ness of that variant; rather, what needs to be explained is how that tenet can be under- stood in terms of the in-ness of that variant of panentheism. I don’t believe a demarcation of panentheism that abandons the central loc- ative or spatial characterization suggested by the etymology and the familiar diagrams (more on which below) or makes proprietary claims about any other properties of God not articulated in such terms is feasible. A clever theist could always appropriate such properties in some manner or other, and panentheists of different denominations could always find ways to disagree amongst them- selves about such properties. A constant across many popular contemporary portrayals of panentheism just is a spatial-locative characterization with accompanying diagrams. One may be naïve in holding that this constant directly provides us with a view of panentheism comme il faut, but that is where I will start and, after some scru- tiny, grooming, and fattening thereof, abide.6 2.