Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School 1969 New Spain and the War for America, 1779-1783. Melvin Bruce Glascock Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses Recommended Citation Glascock, Melvin Bruce, "New Spain and the War for America, 1779-1783." (1969). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 1590. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/1590 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 70-237 GLASCOCK, Melvin Bruce, 1918- NEW SPAIN AND THE WAR FOR AMERICA, 1779-1783. The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1969 History, modern University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. New Spain and the War for America. 1779-1783 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of History by Melvin Bruce Glascock B.S., Memphis State University, i960 M.A., Louisiana State University, 1964 May 1969 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. John Preston Moore, Who directed this dissertation. He also wishes to acknowledge debts of gratitude to Senor Ignacio Rubio Mand, Director of the Archivo General de la Nacion, and to Dr. Jane L. DeGrummond, Dr. Robert C. West, Dr. John L. Loos, Dr. Burl Noggle, and Janice Glascock. M.B.G. April x9d9 ii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONTENTS Part Page Abbreviations ..................................... iv Abstract ......................................... v I. SPAIN PLANS REVENGE: PROM THE PEACE OF PARIS IN 1763 TO BELLIGERENCY IN 1779 .... 1 II. SPAIN ENTERS THE WAR FOR A M E R I C A .......... 5^ III. THE WAR GATHERS M O M E N T U M .................. 99 IV. 1781: THE YEAR OF V I C T O R Y ................ l6l V. THE FINANCIAL STRAIN OF WAR ......... 213 VI. CONCLUSION ................................ 263 Bibliography ..................................... 287 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABBREVIATIONS Explanation of Abbreviations Used in Reference to Source Material: AGNM Archivo General de la Naci6n, Mexico City AHN Archivo Hist6ricoNacional, Madrid CV Correspondencia de Virreyes Fol. Polio RC Reales C6dulas Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT The participation of Spain in the Seven Years' War resulted in the humiliating defeat of its armed forces in America, and the French cession of Louisiana brought Spain face to face with the expanding English colonies of North America along an extended and defense­ less frontier. Fearing future English aggression against his American empire, Carlos III reorganized his colonial defenses. The burden of maintaining Spain's growing armed forces in North America weighed heavily on New Spain, the richest of the viceroyalties. Although the public revenues of the kingdom more than doubled in the years 1763-1779/ tlie increase in the subsidies (situados) paid by Mexico City to the colonies financially dependent upon it tripled. Guatemala, Cuba, Louisiana, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico were scenes of increased military and naval activity, and since none of these colonies was v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. self-sufficient, the growth of their defense establishments was reflected in heavier disbursements by New Spain. The Spanish government regarded another war between . England and Spain as inevitable, and after hostilities between England and her North American colonies began in 1775/ Spain, urged on by trance, moved slowly toward sup­ port of the rebels and to war with England. Limited and covert aid to the Americans began in 1776 through the port of New Orleans, and the port officials of Spanish America were secretly instructed to admit American privateers. Spain's declaration of war against England in 1779 coincided with the death of Antonio Marla Bucareli, Vice­ roy of New Spain. His successor, Martin de Mayorga, unexpectedly faced the task of meeting the unprecedented demands made upon the viceroyalty for money, gunpowder, and food. The discharge of his responsibility was made more difficult by almost constant quarrels with Josi de Gilvez, Minister of the Indies, and with officials in Cuba. The principal objectives of the Spanish forces in America were to expel the English from the Mississippi River, to conquer Florida, and to destroy the English log- cutting establishments on the Bay of Honduras. After vi Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Bernardo de G&lvez, the Governor of Louisiana, had captured the British posts on the Mississippi River and had taken Mobile and Pensacola, plans were made to recover Jamaica and to take the Bahamas. All of these objectives were not realized, for Jamaica was not invaded, and the Spanish operation against the Baymen had only limited and tempo­ rary success. All the Spanish operations were financed and supplied from New Spain, as was the expedition of the French admiral de Grasse from the West Indies to Chesapeake Bay in 1 7 8 1 . In this service of supply Havana functioned as the base for Spanish naval power and as a distribution center for money and supplies. During the period of hostilities, the value of New Spain's disbursements to Spain, to other Spanish colonies, and to allies of Spain, was equivalent to one-half of all the revenue collected by the viceregal.establishment. Although the viceroyalty was hard-pressed to meet the obligation imposed on it, the transportation of money, food, and supplies from Mexico to Cuba and to other points proved to be as difficult as their collection. Poor communication and a serious shipping shortage impeded the vii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. movement of cargoes and caused the loss of perishable material. This dissertation, written largely from unpub­ lished material in the Archivo General de la Nacidn in Mexico City and the Archivo Hist6rico Nacional in Madrid, Spain, traces the nature and extent of New Spain's contri­ bution to the prosecution of the American war. The conclu­ sions reached are that, despite poor communications, the shipping shortage and dissension among officials in Madrid, Havana, Guatemala, and Mexico City, New Spain was virtually the sole support of Spanish arms in America, and that during the war the viceroyalty made a contribution to the mother country and her allies unmatched in the history of colonial Spanish America. viii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I SPAIN PLANS REVENGE: FROM THE PEACE OF PARIS IN 1763 TO BELLIGERENCY IN 1779 On February 10, 1763, the Treaty of Paris ended the war between Great Britain, Portugal, France, and Spain. By its terms Spain lost the island of Minorca and the two Floridas, although she regained Havana and Manila, 'both of which had been lost to the British in 1762. France had ceded Louisiana to Spain on compensation for the loss of the Floridas, 1 but the effect on Spain of her participation in the Seven Years 1 War could not be •'•England had apparently hoped to gain control of access to the Mississippi through possession of West Flor­ ida, but her negotiators at the peace conference were ignorant of the details of the physical geography of the Gulf Coast of North America. The Duke of Choiseul, anx­ ious to retain control of the river mouth for France *s ally, had convinced the English that Lake Pontchartrain was the most desirable entry to the river, and by so doing had retained the Island of Orleans for Spain. Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 193*0, PP* 23-24. 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. measured solely in terms of colonial territory gained or lost. The armed forces of Carlos III in the Indies had suffered a humiliating defeat, all the more humiliating since it had been unexpected. As late as July 22, 1762, the King had written to his confidant in Naples, Bernardo Tanucci, that "the English will have their heads broken in the Indies. "2 Yet at the time he wrote Havana was under attack, its naval squadron had been sunk or scuttled in the harbor, and its land defenses had been invested by an English army. Spain's mistake had been to go to war before she was prepared, for her ministers had been deceived by the misrepresentations of her commanders in the Indies. The soldiers of the Havana garrison had been ill-trained and badly equipped, their officers had been incompetent,