Solving Parfit’s Puzzles In Part IV of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit explores moral questions regarding future generations. His thought-provoking analysis raises several problems for our most intuitive beliefs about future generations. Of the many puzzles Parfit raises, I will focus on two: The Non-Identity Problem and the Repugnant Conclusion. Both these puzzles are alarming. As I intend to demonstrate, Parfit’s puzzles can be solved by appealing to non-consequentialist principles1. In the sections to follow, I will explicate the arguments Parfit uses to establish his puzzles. I will then provide arguments against some of Parfit’s conclusions and reply to the counterarguments of which I am aware. I Drawing from a mere biological fact regarding human reproduction, Parfit introduces one of the most puzzling issues in contemporary moral thinking: the Non-Identity Problem. Anyone with a basic understanding of biology would agree that the human organism grows from a particular ovum fertilized by a particular spermatozoon. Because there are perhaps millions of possible sperm and egg combinations, Parfit believes The Time-Dependence Claim: If any particular person had not been conceived when he was in fact conceived, it is in fact true that he would never have existed.2 In making this claim, Parfit is strengthening the The Parent-Dependence Claim: If any particular person had not been conceived by the man and woman he was in fact conceived by, it is in fact true that he would never have existed. To illustrate the basis of the Non-Identity Problem, we can turn to the popular science fiction film Back to the Future.3 The film properly employs the Time-Dependence Claim in the plot line of the story. By traveling to the past, the protagonist alters the causal chain of events that resulted in his two parents falling in love and consequently conceiving him and his siblings. When the protagonist looks at a photo of him and his siblings, he notices that his siblings have disappeared and that he too is slowly fading from the photograph. This is because he has altered the course of history so that his parents either: (1) never conceive children, (2) conceive children at different times, or (3) marry different people. To assure his future existence and that of his siblings, the protagonist must make sure his parents fall in love at the appropriate time so that there is a causal chain of events that lead to his conception. Because of the facts about the nature of human reproduction, the identities of future people are causally connected to the actions of people currently living. Similarly, the number of people who will exist also depends on the choices people living in the present make. The Non- Identity Problem, then, deals with scenarios involving the following structure: 1 In this paper I will not provide any independent reasons for accepting non-consequentialism. Even if non- consequentialist principles are granted, Parfit does not believe that these principles can solve the Non-Identity Problem or the Repugnant Conclusion. My intention is to prove otherwise. 2 Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 351. 3 This example is subject to numerous worries about the metaphysics of time travel. My only intention is to provide an illustration of the Time-Dependence Claim. I ask the reader to ignore the metaphysical incoherencies with the Back to the Future franchise. When choosing between action A and action B, we must consider that our choosing A will not result in the same number and identities of future people as would choosing B. Choosing A would result in population X while choosing B would result in population Y. Populations X and Y could have different numbers of people as well as different identities. Parfit distinguishes between Same People choices and Different People choices. If action A and action B both result in population X then this would be an instance of a Same People choice. Most of our moral thinking deals with Same People choices. Different People choices occur when action A would result in population X and action B would result in population Y. When considering Different People choices, we could further inquire if the same number of people would live in both outcomes. If the answer is yes there is a Same Number choice and if the answer is no there is a Different Number choice. Parfit is concerned with the moral status of future people. What weight, if any, do future people’s interests have? Is it possible for people living in the present to harm or benefit someone in the future? The answers vary depending on what kind of choices we are faced with. Prior to reflecting on the subject, most of us would believe that on a daily basis we only deal with Same People choices. As a very simple example, consider Ice Cream: John has the choice between vanilla ice cream and chocolate ice cream. John chooses vanilla. In doing so, John’s action eventually results in population X. Had history been the same with the exception that John chose chocolate, John’s action would also have resulted in population X. Therefore, John’s choice has no effect on the identities of future people – it is a Same People choice. John’s choice in Ice Cream does not result in anyone other than John being harmed or benefited. We can say that John’s act is morally neutral. But now consider Landmine: John plants a landmine in a remote area. A hundred years later, the remote area is developed and settled. One day Mary steps on the landmine and is killed. Had John not planted the landmine, history would have taken the same course up until the moment Mary steps on the landmine. Mary would have been born regardless of John’s choice to plant the landmine. John’s choice to plant the landmine is also a Same People choice. Most people would agree that in planting the landmine, John has done something morally wrong. As Parfit reasons, we believe that harming someone is bad regardless of their spatial location. Harming someone who lives next door is equally as bad as harming someone on the other side of the world.4 Similarly, we should not disregard the harm John’s action causes because of its temporal remoteness. John’s action is morally wrong because it is bad for someone –namely, Mary. Parfit’s main concern is not with Same People choices but with Different People choices. The Non-Identity Problem arises when dealing with Different People choices. To illustrate the problem simply, Parfit asks us to consider The 14-Year Old Girl: This girl chooses to have a child. Because she is so young, she gives her child a bad start in life. Though this will have bad effects throughout this child’s life, his life will, predictably, be worth living. If this girl had waited for several years, she would have had a different child, to whom she would have given a better start in life.5 4 I am here assuming that there are no special obligations to spatially proximal people. 5 Parfit 358. The questions at hand are: (1) has this girl done something wrong? Our answer may depend on how we answer a broader question: (2) does causing someone to exist benefit this person? Parfit believes the answer to (2) is yes, but holds that answering no is a defensible position. Parfit argues that regardless of our views on (2), the girl’s decision is not wrong because it is bad for her child (it could turn out to be wrong for a different reason). This is because, if we believe that causing someone to exist with a life worth living benefits this person, then we must conclude that the 14-year old girl does not act wrongly by birthing her child. On the other hand, suppose that we do not believe causing to exist benefits, Parfit writes “we should ask, ‘If someone lives a life that is worth living, is this worse for this person than if he had never existed?’ Our answer must be No.”6 On both views, the 14-year old girl’s decision leaves no one worse off. Despite this conclusion, Parfit does not want us to conclude that the 14-year old girl does not act wrongly. Doing so would have serious implications when approaching decisions that affect multiple future people. To best understand Parfit’s argument, it is important to note that Parfit is approaching the issue from a consequentialist framework. In part I of Reasons and Persons, Parfit revises our ordinary account of harming and benefiting. He believes the proper account of harming and benefitting is (C6) An act benefits someone if its consequence is that someone is benefited more. An act harms someone if its consequence is that someone is harmed more. The act that benefits people most is the act whose consequence is that people are benefited most.7 According to C6, “I benefit someone even when my act is a remote part of the cause of the receiving of this benefit. All that needs to be true is that, if I had acted otherwise, this person would not have received this benefit. Similar claims apply to ‘harm’.”8 According to James Woodward, C6 implies: N: An action A performed by X cannot wrong person P and cannot be objectionable because of bad effects it has on P if P is not worse off as a result of A than he would be under any alternative action which could be performed by X.