13 CHINDA SUTEMI, 1857-1929 Ambassador in Peace and War [london, 1916-201 IAN NISH Chinda Sutemi istorians have a penchant for examining the origins of war. That is very H proper because it is important to learn the art of preventing wars. But the aftermaths of war are equally worthy of study because it is there that things go wrong for the future and the decisions have often to be taken at breakneck speed in fast-moving situations. This requires adaptability, flexibility and vision on the part of decision-makers. This was nowhere more needed than in the case of Japan and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 which brought an end to the 'first world war'. In spite of the description, it had been primarily a European war; andJapan had kept herself on its fringes. She had grown prosperous as a result of it. Without doubt she had made a contribution to allied victory, mainly as a result of her naval actions. But she had not suffered many casualties which for many nations was to be the criterion by which their contribution to the war effort was judged. This left the Japanese with a seat at the top table at the Paris Peace Conference where the peace was negotiated - one of the members of the Council of Five Great Powers but outside the Council of Four in which many of the critical decisions were vested. Japan had advanced on to the world stage and had much to do to adjust to her new role. 1 Chinda Sutemi, as Ambassador to Britain from 1916 to 1920, was one of those who had to attend the Paris conference and address these new international problems. He had a role in the preparation of Japan's peace terms, took his share in steering through the negotiations and conducted important business during the first two years after the armistice.f Born in Mutsu, Aomori-ken, Chinda graduated at an American university and joined the Foreign Ministry in 1885. After a variety of consular posts, he became minister to Russia briefly in November 1900. He then returned to the ministry as vice-minister under Komura jutaro in 1903 and served throughout the stressful CHINDA SUTEMI, 1857-1929 127 days of the Russo-Japanese War. Because of Komura's frequent illnesses and his absences at Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Beijing, Chinda was effectively in charge at critical junctures. He had close relations with the British ambassador who reported confidentially to London in 1908: 'Chinda is considered by some to be a man of exceptional ability. The Baron speaks excellent English but is very reticent." In June 1908, he went to his first ambassadorial post, succeeding Inouye Katsunosuke in Berlin. He then moved to Washington from November 1911 where he had a long stint of five years. He enjoyed cordial relations with the British Ambassador there, Sir Cecil Spring Rice.4 CHINDA IN LONDON Chinda was appointed to the London embassy in the middle of the First World War and arrived at his post at a critical juncture on 1 August 1916. It was a strange coincidence that he should succeed Inouye whom he had earlier replaced in Berlin in 1908. It was rumoured that he had turned down the post of foreign minister in 1915, a sign that he was approaching the pinnacle of his career. He came to London at a depressing time for the Allies before the United States joined them in April 1917. China, which was even more a matter of concern for Japan, entered the war in August of that year. While Britain was preoccupied by the changing fortunes of the fighting, Japan was looking ahead to the bargaining which would take place at the peace-table. In October 1916, the Okuma cabinet resigned, making way for the cabinet led by General Terauchi Masatake. The foreign minister appointed was Motono Ichir6, the former ambassador to Russia, who had played a large part in formulating the Russo-Japanese Alliance which had just been concluded in July. Motono came to the post dissatisfied with the lack of clarity over Japanese policy towards the war. Basically, Japan was at war against the Central Powers of Germany and Austro-Hungary, and should cooperate with the Entente to the fullest degree. But the situation, Motono wrote, was full of uncertainties: Peace terms should include Japan's retention of Tsingtao and occupied islands in the Pacificand acqulsition of rights possessed by Germany in Shantung province... But, if victory does not go either to the Allianceor the Entente, it is likely that Germany will reject Japan's claims... If the war ends in victory for the German Alliance,it will be even more difficult to get approval for Japan's claims... Even if the Entente are victorious, they will probably expect the country that made the least sacrificein the war [i.e.Japan] to be modest in its demands... Hence we should give the Entente countries as much help as possible in materiel, finance etc.5 Clearly, from Japan's perspective, all contingencies were being explored. But Motono was seeking clarification and proposing a radical shift of emphasis away from a policy which would not send troops to the Western Front and hitherto had declined to send war-ships beyond Singapore. The Japanese cabinet agreed that, now that the war was finely balanced, it was desirable that Japan should more explicitly throw in her lot with Britain and her Entente partners in the hope of securing the prizes on which she had set her sights. Such was the policy which Chinda had to apply in the months ahead. Almost as soon as he reached London, the naval situation in the Atlantic took a turn for the worse because of German submarine attacks. Britain reiterated to Chinda her.