NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 73 | Number 1 Article 4 11-1-1994 Sullivan's Paradox: The meE rgence of Judicial Standards of Journalism Brian C. Murchison John Soloski Randall P. Bezanson Gilbert Cranberg Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Brian C. Murchison, John Soloski, Randall P. Bezanson & Gilbert Cranberg, Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 7 (1994). Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol73/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SULLIVAN'S PARADOX: THE EMERGENCE OF JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF JOURNALISM* BRIAN C. MURCHISON, JOHN SOLOSKI, RANDALL P. BEZANSON, GILBERT CRANBERG, ROSELLE L. WISSLER** In this Article, Brian C. Murchison, John Soloski, Ran- dall P. Bezanson, Gilbert Cranberg, and Roselle L. Wissler examine the development of libel law in America since the United States Supreme Court's watershed decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and suggest that Sullivan affords members of the press less protection than many have hitherto believed. According to the authors, Sullivan's actual malice stan- dard of care invites judges to create norms of acceptablejour- nalistic conduct for all three stages of news gathering,namely, research, writing, and editing. These norms are reflected in judicial decisions, which members of the press and their law- yers use as maps to navigate around libel liabiliiy. The authors examine a large number of these judicial de- cisions and note the types of journalisticconduct at issue in libel cases. They highlight the types of conduct courts view positively and suggest strategies for defending libel lawsuits. The authors also examine the modes of decision making that courts employ in libel decisions and suggest that judges may * This Article represents the third component of the Iowa Research Project, a twelve-year project that investigated, first, the operation of the libel tort, and second, the use of alternative dispute resolution in libel litigation. For the earlier work of the Project, see RANDALL P. BEZANSON FT AL., LiBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY (1987); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Resolving Libel Disputes Out of Court: The Libel Dispute Resolution Program,in REFORMING LIBEL LAW (John Soloski & Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992). ** Brian C. Murchison is Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. John Soloski is Professor, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, Univer- sity of Iowa. Randall P. Bezanson is Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. Gilbert Cranberg is George H. Gallup Professor, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Iowa. Roselle L. Wissler is Director of Research, Iowa Libel Research Project, College of Law, University of Iowa. The authors wish to thank the Knight Foundation and the Ethics in Journalism Foun- dation for providing grants in support of this study. In addition, the authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Matthew Pollack, Robert Galbreath, Rob- ert Howie, Paul Kirgis, Amy Balfour, Moira Roberts, Bonnie Sue Brennen, Kim Karloff, Ki-Yul Uhm, Gerald Davey, Bruce Nestor, Suzanne Elwell, and Jane McConnell, James Cahoy, Michael Ferch and John Tsimikas. NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 take a more restrictive approach in cases concerning research than in cases concerning writing and editing. The problem with these judicial decisions, according to the authors, is that they leave judges considerable leeway to decide cases the way they want to decide them. This problem presents a serious threat to press freedom. Thus, the authors urge law reformers to abandon Sullivan's actual malice stan- dard and adopt alternative forms of First Amendment protection. Introduction .................................................... 10 I. ASSESSING PRESS BEHAVIOR IN LIBEL CASES .......... 16 A. Origins of Standards Creation in Libel Decisions ... 16 1. The Common-Law Process ..................... 16 2. Substantive Policy Making ...................... 22 3. Conclusion ...................................... 24 B. JournalisticBehaviors in the Adjudication Process .. 25 1. The Study: Objectives and Methods ............ 25 2. Range of Behaviors Discussed by Courts ....... 27 3. Impact of Behaviors on Case Outcomes ........ 30 a. Use of an Unreliable Source ............... 31 b. Failure to Contact an Obvious Source ...... 33 c. Use of a Confidential Source ............. 35 d. Failure to Follow Accepted Publishing Standards ................................... 38 e. Repeating False Information ................ 40 f. Not Including Pertinent Information ........ 42 g. Failure of the Media to Correct or Retract. 44 h. Failure of the Media to Act on False Information ................................. 46 i. Failure to Investigate Information Adequately ................................. 48 j. Ill Will as Evidence of Actual Malice ....... 49 C. Conclusion .......................................... 51 II. CREATING JOURNALISTIC STANDARDS .................. 51 A. Modes of Standards Creation ....................... 52 1. Discussion of Press Behavior as Egregious, with the Court Providing both Factual and Legal Analysis, Producing a Restrictive Norm ........ 52 2. Fact-Oriented Discussion of Behavior, Implying that Certain Behavior is Highly Questionable, Thus Producing an Implied Restrictive Norm... 53 1994] LIBEL 3. Law-oriented Discussion in Which Behavior is Approved, Producing a Permissive Norm ....... 54 B. Discussion of Press Behavior as Egregious.......... 56 1. Discussions of Press Research .................. 57 2. Discussions of Writing .......................... 60 3. Discussions of Editing .......................... 64 C. Fact-Oriented Discussion of Press Behavior ......... 67 1. Discussions of Press Research .................. 68 2. Discussions of Writing .......................... 70 3. Discussions of Editing .......................... 71 D. Law-Oriented Discussion of Press Behavior......... 73 1. Discussions of Press Research .................. 74 2. Discussions of Writing .......................... 79 3. Discussions of Editing .......................... 81 E. Judicial Choice of Emphasis of One Behavioral Category Over Another ............................. 83 1. Writing Emphasized Over Research ............ 84 2. Research Emphasized Over Writing ............ 86 3. Research Emphasized Over Editing ............ 88 4. Editing Emphasized Over Research ............ 90 III. CONCLUSIONS ........................................... 91 A. Libel Law and the Spirit of Sullivan ................ 92 B. The Dynamic of Standards Creation: in Part Familiar,in Part Novel .............................. 95 C. Research Cases and Restrictive Norms .............. 96 D. The Open Range of Judicial Discretion ............. 98 IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR JOURNALISM AND LAW ............. 99 A. Implications for Journalism ......................... 99 1. Is the Role of Courts Discussed in this Study Acceptable to the Journalism Profession? . 99 2. Is the Role of Counsel in the News Process Acceptable to the Journalism Profession? . 99 3. How Reasonable is the Profession's Fear of Changing the Status Quo? ..... 100 B. Implications for the Law ............................ 101 1. Return to the Common-Law Tort, with a Twist (or Two) ........................................ 102 2. Press Immunity in Public Plaintiff Damages Suits, and Provision for Declaratory Judgment . 104 3. Comprehensive Statutory Reconfiguration of the Libel Tort ....................................... 106 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 4. Bar Against Plaintiff's Use of "Compositional Behaviors" as Evidence of Actual Malice ....... 107 V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE Sullivan Paradox ....... 108 A ppendix ...................................................... 110 Table 1. Journalistic Behaviors at Issue in Actual Malice C ases ................................................... 110 Table 2. Journalistic Behaviors at Issue in Actual Malice Compared with Case Outcome ......................... 112 INTRODUCTION In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' the United States Supreme Court fashioned a rule to protect the "citizen-critic of government,"' including the press, from libel judgments based on publications about the conduct of public officials. The rule required officials bringing li- bel actions to prove actual malice, defined as knowledge of falsity or 3 reckless disregard of the truth. In a" 'majestic opinion' ",4 that trans- formed the common-law tort of libel, the Court placed libel suits in the context of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide- open."'5 The Court's new rule would serve this ideal of democratic debate, allowing the press to report and editorialize without the chill of potentially debilitating libel suits. Journalism was to be free from the supervision of libel law; only a calculated lie would endanger that freedom. For many, the Sullivan decision was cause for celebration.6 In a period of complex social struggle and change,7 the case allowed the press a measure of" 'breathing space' "I to operate without the spec- ter of strict liability