View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by ResearchArchive at Victoria University of Wellington The Science of Stories Human History and the Narrative Philosophy of Science by Robert Alexander Hurley A thesis presented to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Victoria University of Wellington 2012 Abstract There is a pronounced tendency within contemporary philosophy of history to think of historical knowledge as something apart from the kind of knowledge generated in the sciences. This has given rise to a myriad of epistemological issues. For if historical knowledge is not related to the scientific, then what is it? By what logic does it proceed? How are historical conclusions justified? Although almost the entirety of contemporary philosophy of history has been dedicated to such questions, there has been little real and agreed upon progress. Rather than fire yet another salvo in this rhetorical war, however, this thesis wishes instead to examine what lies beneath the basic presumption of separatism which animates it. Part One examines several paradigmatic examples of twentieth century philosophy of history in order to identify the grounds by which their authors considered history fundamentally different in kind from the sciences. It is concluded that, in each case, the case for separatism fows from the pervasive assumption that any body of knowledge which might rightly be called a science can be recognised by its search for general laws of nature. As history does not seem to share this aim, it is therefore considered to be knowledge of a fundamentally different kind. This thesis terms this the "nomothetic assumption.” Part Two argues that such nomothetic assumptions are not an accurate representation of either scientific theory or practice and therefore that any assumption of separatism based upon them is unsound. To do this, examples of acknowledged scientific problems from the biological and geological sciences which do not involve the use of general laws are examined, with the aim of discovering how these historical disciplines are able to do the work of explanation in their absence. They do so, it is concluded, through a mechanism of epistemic (as opposed to literary) narrative. Having thus identified how historical sciences proceed without making direct use of laws, Part Two then generalises this model of scientific narrative and shows how it can be used to model existing practices in human history. This conclusion has far-reaching consequences, for it brings a single definition, method, and logic of confirmation to all studies of the past – whether traditionally acknowledged as scientific or historical. Thus all historical enquiries proceed by a common logic and by a common method. This effectively and definitively places human history among the sciences, without the need for the kind of radical transformation past attempts to do this have required. (409 words) 3 Acknowledgements First and foremost, I am most grateful for the assistance of my supervisor Professor Miles Fairburn, whose unwavering assistance and positivity over these long years is greatly appreciated. To say nothing of the fact that some of the most challenging intellectual exchanges of my life so far have begun with Professor Fairburn placing a pen and blank piece of paper in front of me and asking, “could you please explain to me how...” I would also like to thank my second supervisor, Doctor Alexander Maxwell. The fear of Alexander's Disapproving Grammar Finger sometimes kept me awake late into the night. I dreaded the seas of red ink my drafts would invariably come back covered in. “He's not mad,” I would tell myself, “only disappointed.” Not being a natural writer by any stretch of the imagination, this thesis almost certainly contains much prose that is somewhat less than optimal. Without the input of Doctor Maxwell, however, it would have been so much worse. I am also grateful for the assistance of Doctor Benjamin Jeffares, who assisted me throughout his post-doctoral tenure at Victoria University. When I first met Doctor Jeffares, I knew what I wanted historical explanation to be, but was unsure of how I might get there. It was Ben who pointed me towards the work of David Hull, and thus was responsible for the almost audible click that could be heard as the jumble of ideas and plans in my head snapped into place. Ben also deserves praise for allowing me to borrow half of his personal library, and for waiting so patiently for it to be returned. His input is especially valuable in that it was entirely in an unofficial capacity, and was given freely without hope of reward. I would also like to thank Professor Donald MacRaild who, during his brief time at Victoria University, picked me up off the fainting couch after an exhausting Honours year, and patiently (and repeatedly) set about convincing me I might maybe have something worthwhile to say about history and theory at the graduate level. Thanks are also due to Professor Melanie Nolan, who absolutely always took the time to aggressively fight my corner whenever she was asked. Melanie was my staunchest ally back in 2008 when I was upgrading from an MA to a PhD, and did more than anyone to make that transition happen. Professor Nolan was also kind enough to give me Research Assistant work at a time when I was having serious trouble keeping the lights on. Thank you, Melanie! On a more personal note, I would also like to acknowledge those others without whom this would have been impossible. Most importantly, Anna Young, who was always exactly what the situation demanded. Supportive when I was despondent, argumentative when I was in need of a foil, and always far more intelligent than I'll ever be. Also, my mother, Gail Hurley, whose unrelenting belief in the ability of her son was quite simply an irresistible and almost tangibly solid force. Whenever I put the phone down from calling home, I felt not merely heartened, but invincible. I would also like to thank my friends and fellow graduate students Rebecca Lenihan and Megan Simpson. You both proved it could be done. Your tales of a life after graduate school were tantalising hints of a whole other world, and welcome reminders that I wouldn't be working on this thing forever. Additional thanks to Megan for buying me dinner all those times. I would also like to thank the medical professionals who kept me on my feet and functioning during my time at Victoria. Given my persistent ill health, this was often not a trivial matter. Thank you to Doctor Kathryn Leslie, Marion Kirker, and Doctor Susie Poon. Particular thanks to Doctor Leslie. Before I met you, I really had almost given up. I would also like to thank my dear friend Martinetta Woodfield-Fijn. Not for anything in particular (although you did buy me that Piaget book when I was fat broke, thank you!) but for being a source of great support, and for turning up on those random Wednesday afternoons to force me to take a break and drive somewhere new and interesting. Thanks also to Simon Gigg, for bravely and selfessly volunteering to endlessly play video games on my desktop computer, thus preventing me from doing the same and forcing me to get on with my work. How did you ever find the courage? And lastly, my cat Dax – whose pathological need for human company combined with an actively violent resistance to being removed from my lap kept me at my computer and working when I would rather have been doing something – anything – else. In memory of my beloved cat Marjorie, who passed away on the 31st of August 2006, shortly after I began work on this thesis. 4 Table of Contents Abstract 3 Acknowledgements 4 Introduction – “Loomings” 7 Part One – The Nomothetic Assumption 10 The Structure of Part One 17 Part Two – Taking Narrative Seriously 20 The Structure of Part Two 33 Part One – “Ask Any Scientician” The Nomothetic Assumption in Twentieth Century Philosophy of History Chapter One – “Introducing the Nomothetic Assumption” 41 The Nomothetic Assumption in Action, or: The Misunderstanding of J. B. Bury 42 Idealism and Historical Autonomy 52 The Infuence of Benedetto Croce 56 Charles A. Beard 60 Carl L. Becker 64 The Covering Law Thesis, or: Laws of History versus Laws in History 67 Problems with the Covering Law Thesis 76 The Impact of the Nomothetic Assumption, or: Universality is the Problem 81 Chapter Two – “The Death of Empathy” 84 The Importance of Empathy for the Covering Law Program 85 Patrick Gardiner and the Assault on Idealism 86 Making History Look Nomothetic 96 W. H. Walsh and the Idea of Colligation 103 Colligation and the Beginnings of Narrative 108 Walsh and the Nomothetic Assumption 111 Colligation versus Classification 114 Chapter Three – “The Rise of Narrative” 121 William Dray's Model of Historical Explanation 123 Dray and the Nomothetic Assumption 129 W. B. Gallie and the Literary Interpretation of Narrative 135 The Role of Explanation in Gallie's Model of Narrative 142 Gallie and Narrative Determinism 145 Arthur Danto and the Logic of Narration 148 'Significance' as the Basis for Danto's Narrative 151 Danto and the Explanatory Power of Narrative 154 Danto's Narratives Considered as Theories and their Relationship to the Scientific 157 Thomas Kuhn's Revision of the Nature of Science 161 Louis Mink, Hayden White, and the Flight from Epistemology 166 Part Two – “Taking Narrative Seriously” Epistemic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science Chapter Four – “The Nomothetic