Taliban history of war and peace in Afghanistan Felix Kuehn Felix Kuehn is the co-editor of My Life with the Taliban, the poetry written by Taliban members; and co-editor of The Taliban autobiography of the former Taliban envoy to Pakistan, Mullah Reader (Hurst, forthcoming). Kuehn holds a degree from the School Abdul Salam Zaeef (Hurst, 2010); co-author of An enemy we created: of Oriental and African Studies in London and will defend his PhD The myth of the Taliban/Al-Qaeda merger, 1970–2010 (Hurst, 2012); thesis submitted to King’s College London Department of War co-editor of Poetry of the Taliban (Hurst 2012), a volume of Studies later in 2018. ABSTRACT What does conflict in Afghanistan look like to the The movement sees itself as inclusive – not aligned Taliban and how can greater knowledge of how the with any group nor based on ethnicity or a political movement functions inform better peace policy? programme but following Islam alone. The Taliban’s resurgence in the 2000s mirrored their initial rise to Misconceptions of the Taliban have complicated power, facilitated by widespread public discontent efforts to end the war in Afghanistan. A key example with the new government. They see themselves and is the extent to which the movement represents the the US as the real stakeholders in the conflict and so grievances of a significant section of Afghan society. likewise in any reconciliation process. The Taliban are not unified. From inception the movement The Taliban are perhaps less exceptional in Afghanistan has included distinct groups with different views on national than many people would prefer to believe, as they and international policy. But the core message of the express a much broader discontent that is anchored in central leadership has resonated widely: Afghanistan needs local conflict. The Taliban’s narrative of the conflict in to return to law and order, and the Taliban are here to Afghanistan is not an alternative history, but rather a dispense security and justice based on Islam. The Taliban’s missing piece of the larger puzzle of how to administer military conquest of Afghanistan has reflected their core the country peacefully. belief that holding a monopoly of power is a precondition for the formation of a viable Afghan state. Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 35 Former Taliban fighters line up to hand over their rifles to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during a reintegration ceremony at the provincial governor’s compound May 28, 2012 in Ghor, Afghanistan. © DOD Photo / Alamy Stock Photo The history of the Taliban remains a phenomenon. many others – believed that ‘control was in the hands of Not because it is impossible to explain who they are, the corrupt and wicked ones’. For much of the Taliban why they started or why they were so successful. leadership, the men who would follow Mullah Omar, it But because politically motivated alternative narratives was clear that the civil war had been fuelled by outside have proven even more durable than the group itself. interference, and that the victory of the jihad had been There are fundamental misconceptions about what the spoiled by the selfishness of the mujahidin commanders Taliban were and are, and what they were not and are not, who were fighting each other in a struggle for power. which complicate efforts to end the war. While the Taliban leadership is made up of distinct groups and individuals, But the crisis was more than just a few mujahidin the movement from in the 1990s through to today remains commanders and their foreign supporters; the Taliban an expression of the sentiment of a significant section of saw that the Afghan people had lost their way. They had Afghan society. There are many Taliban versions of the been hiding their religion, which had allowed the chaos past. For all the distortion and propaganda these contain, and anarchy to take hold as the loosely affiliated networks much is to be learnt from the Taliban’s understanding of local mujahidin disintegrated and the commanders of the Afghan crisis. turned on communities. A Taliban op-ed from mid-1995, some seven months after the movement had started, is Beginnings illustrative: ‘We all witnessed what happened when there was no shari’a law in the country. The last few years are The Religion of Allah is being stepped on, the people a good example of the disaster a society faces without a are openly displaying evil, the People of [Islam] are strict code or law.’ hiding their Religion, and the evil ones have taken control of the whole area; they steal the people’s There are differing views on matters of national and money, they attack their honour on the main street, international policy within the Taliban, and to think of they kill people and put them against the rocks on the movement as one group is misleading. Even in their the side of the road, and the cars pass by and see the earliest incarnation there were distinct Taliban groups. dead body on the side of the road, and no one dares Nevertheless, the core Taliban message resonated widely to bury him […]. – that Afghanistan needed to return to law and order and that they had come to provide security and justice on the Mullah Omar was addressing the first group of religious basis of Islam. students in Panjwayi, describing the situation all around Kandahar in 1994. After the Afghan mujahidin For the Taliban, their early success was not built on their had successfully driven out the Soviet forces and the superior military might but was an expression of the government it had left behind in Kabul, Afghanistan widespread discontent and desperation about the steadily descended into war with itself. Mullah Omar – and deteriorating situation. As Mullah Omar explained in 36 // Accord // ISSUE 27 1995: ‘We asked the religious scholars for their advice Islam would provide the framework on which others should and received a shari’a-based decree from them. In be operating. From this perspective, the central goal of an the light of this decree from our religious scholars, we Islamic government based on shari’a could not seriously started our armed resistance to the corrupt regime in be disputed since this had been what all Afghan mujahidin Kabul. We started this movement for the protection of the had fought and died for in the jihad against Soviet forces. faith and the implementation of the shari’a law and the As Mullah Omar stated in the summer of 1995, which must safeguarding of our sovereignty.’ have been confusing to the outside world at the time: ‘the Islamic movement of the Taliban was trying its best and After their momentous success in taking Kandahar making all sorts of possible efforts to prevent any potential province, the Taliban’s growing momentum soon convinced conflict in the country.’ Much of what the Taliban actually them to turn their sights nationwide. While they only did, however, was reactive. They were making things up established an official government after the fall of Kabul as they went. The overall goals they propagated – peace, in 1996, by spring 1995 they had already transformed justice, security and Islam – resonated widely. But they themselves from a loosely structured network of separate were also loosely defined and the details were often groups. They organised as the mujahidin groups of the discussed as issues arose. 1980s had, developing their capabilities to raise finance, fight and negotiate. Within four months of starting they In September 1996, the Taliban took Kabul. Mullah Omar had not only managed to expand their reach to within a few announced that ‘After this, a pure Islamic government kilometres of Kabul, but had also established committees will rule over Afghanistan.’ The Taliban would go on to and departments that, however poorly they performed form a government – which meant for the most part in practice, were meant to fulfil government functions reopening previous ministries and encouraging people of international diplomacy, healthcare and economic to return to their workplace. But at the time of Mullah development – alongside the movement’s core goals of Omar’s statement, the Taliban did not rule Afghanistan. providing security and justice. The ministers that were appointed then were ‘acting’: theirs was a transitional government, and Afghanistan’s National conquest: ‘peace, justice, future was to be decided once the war had ended. security and Islam’ Meanwhile, the Taliban would focus on their main mission The Taliban’s primary objectives were informed by what of preventing a return to chaos and harvesting the fruits they considered to be the precondition for the formation of the hard-won jihad. of a viable Afghan state, ie holding the monopoly of power. While they expanded their territory and ranks mostly Kabul, long the motor of innovation and modernity in through incorporation and negotiation, the Taliban’s Afghanistan, seemed for much of the Taliban to be the understanding was that as long as the option to fight epicentre of what had gone wrong. After all, it had been in existed then there would be fighting, or Afghanistan as the capital that unhealthy ideologies such as Communism a whole would fracture. As Mullah Ghaus, the Taliban’s and Muslim-Brotherhood-inspired Islamism had seeped first acting minister of foreign affairs, would explain, ‘the into society. To this end the Amr bil Ma’rouf, better known Taliban are facing opponents […] who want to increase as the Ministry for Vice and Virtue, was created soon their military advantage through war. There are too many after Kabul fell – having previously been established only arms in Afghanistan; the war would not end until they were as a department.