Alexis Turner Indiana University 03.28.2013 Presented at the annual conference for the Western Political Science Association Draft. Please do not cite or distribute without permission The Logic of Desire In ancient Greek thought, which had not yet formally theorized a mathematical concept of zero, the idea of nothing or lack nonetheless held a prominent place, perhaps most fully articulated through eros: desire. Or, as we more gently tend to translate it in English, love. This is an unfortunate softening, for the Greeks understood all too well that to play with love is to play with fire. Such pyrotechnics do not require the abandonment of reason, contrary to most common readings – just as we can admire jaguars, canyons, Siren songs, and other beautiful things without being witless enough to throw ourselves headlong into them, so we can flirt with desire without being consumed. This paper explores the possibility that refusing nothing – refusing to live with desire – is the fundamental error that sits at the heart of The Republic. If I am not entirely mistaken, the Socratic notion of desire is a deeply logical one deployed as a response to, and critical of, question-begging elements inherent in positive declarations derived from a reasoning process based wholly essentialist either/or oppositions. If so, the problem shifts from one of authoritative, unidirectional truth to one of diplomacy, tactics, and strategy. Truth has not disappeared, but it becomes enmeshed in relations between people and depends on the exercise of judgment, restraint, and friendship. Starting with nothing brings us back to politics. Is the modern world really so disenchanted as we are continually being told? The claim resonates, and yet trends in modern photography indicate that things are practically fetishized, each object lovingly isolated and focused on in macro-miniature, each of its colors and curves fondled by the camera. Facebook and Tumblr abound with photographs of every meal, and young men spend unfathomable amounts of time each morning lovingly caressing wax into moustaches so magnificent, one wonders how they do not topple forward beneath the weight. At the same time, the current awestruck refrain that humans are made of stardust suggests that science has replaced religion as a source of the magical, where we partake of distant galaxies and this engenders the deepest reverence, even as Paul Lockhart tells us “…there is nothing as dreamy and poetic, nothing as radical, subversive, and psychedelic, as mathematics. It is every bit as mind | 2 blowing as cosmology or physics… and allows more freedom of expression than poetry, art, or music… Mathematics is the purest of the arts…”1 How does one square this with the claims of political theorists that modern life is disenchanted? What strikes me as notable about each of these scenarios is not that we lack for sources of enchantment – indeed, as someone with a background in science, design, and technology, as well as art and now politics and theory, I am hard pressed to swear allegiance to only one of these fields on account of the intrinsic beauty of each, and the way in which they somehow all manage to tell us the same things in different languages, even as they bring forward for contemplation the endless ingenuity of human beings. But I am struck deeply by the observation that the sources of enchantment above and which seem to proliferate today share something disturbing in common – namely, that none of them involve an enchantment with people. If it is political theorists who have been consistently lamenting the demise of enchantment while no one else has, perhaps the problem is not that we are not enough enchanted by things,2 but that our spheres of beauty have become ugly in their artificially imposed exile from one another. In other words, we no longer have ways to speak to each other. It is not the world that has become disenchanted, it is politics from which we seek our escape. But to flee politics is a deeply ironic move, for it is that very disavowal, tantamount to disavowing the pleasure of being with others, that renders it less beautiful. Politics is not something to leave behind any more than other people are. It is something in which to be lost. My concern with the abandonment of politics for isolated escapist and professional spheres is two-fold. The first concerns the effects that such increasingly narrow specialization has on judgment through both a loss of ability to interpret widely 1 Paul Lockhart, A Mathematicians Lament: How School Cheats Us Out of Our Most Fascinating and Imaginative Art Form, New York: Bellevue Literary Press, 2009. 2 With apologies to Jane Bennett, whose work I actually find incredibly enchanting. In spite of this, I disagree with her assessment that it is things that require a reinjection of magic in the modern world. I think things have nearly all of our current attention. Nonetheless, her work, as all new materialist work, does not forbid enchantment with conversation, itself a material waveform that impinges upon our equally material ears. Calling for attention to “thingness” risks obscuring this fact of her own work, due to entrenched ways of thinking of things as visible and tangible. | 3 as well as a growing dogmatic attachment to narrowly conceived truths. As with most contemporary accounts of judgment, this grows in no small part from my encounters with the work of Hannah Arendt and her observations concerning the impairment of judgment when confronted with these two factors. I take it that a democratic polity requires the basic ability to communicate intelligibly with others, an imaginative stance or range of experiences that allow one to interpret generously, and a sense of political judgment that permits one to assess the varied scenarios that one is politically confronted with each day and determine appropriate actions in response. While it is not clear to me that this requires a depth of knowledge with each domain, or even whether such knowledge is desirable, reason suggests that it minimally requires an ability to listen to and grasp what other people say even if they speak from outside of our own sphere of experience, as well as the imaginative ability to bridge across existing concepts, expand them, or apply them to novel scenarios.3 Linda Zerilli points out the double move that Arendt considers judgment to entail. It involves equally the ascertainment of truth as well a decision concerning the appropriate action. On this view, Arendt was largely critical of the Platonic split between knowing and doing as obliterating freedom and plurality, insofar as judgment requires the ability to enact decisions as much as make them.4 I would like to complicate this process by drawing out what I take to be a much more complex practice of Platonic judgment. This rendering is not nearly so far from Arendt’s account as she held, but, rather than foregrounding the imaginative element of the process as Zerilli does following Arendt, I foreground the Kantian-Arendtian observation that the spectator is imbricated in the actor’s decision/judgment to act, 5 an observation which I take to be present in the work of Plato. On the account as I draw it, the split cannot be made at all, as the actions one engages in alter the truth that the world reveals, thus altering doxa and future 3 On the imaginative move that entails bridging across seemingly disparate concepts, see Bonnie Honig on catachresis. On the role of imagination in judgment, see Linda Zerilli, “We Feel Our Freedom,” Political Theory 33 (April 2005): 158-188. 4 Linda Zerilli, "Truth and Politics.” Theory & Event 9, no. 4 (2006). 5 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, edited by Ronald Beiner, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1989), p. 62. | 4 judgments. I argue that the form of interactions emerges from the interplay of reason and desire, but this unfolding form itself informs actors’ response to events on both levels of judgment. By altering both their interpretations of what is occurring as well as the proper course of action to take, even as it potentially alters their desires and goals, the form of the interaction becomes an inextricable part of the assemblage of judgment. In making this argument I am informed by both the work of Karen Barad and Jane Bennett, however, I believe that such an assemblage of judgment can be extricated from the Socratic dialogues on their own.6 That contemporary theory has been heavily influenced by attention to judgment, desire, and aesthetics from the work of theorists including Arendt, Foucault, and Derrida, themselves heavily influenced by Socrates, makes it no surprise that one should ultimately lose the thread of which theory begat which interpretation. It is my contention that this sort of causal confusion is inherent in the act of judgment, as each part of the apparatus is mutually entangled with, and constitutive of, the others. Rather than a clear causal chain which places primacy in the originator of action and proceeds in a finite, straight line, we end up with an infinitely regressive circle. This circle holds the possibility (but not guarantee) for non-domination, insofar as each party is equally involved in its shape. While this entanglement makes the act of judging more complex, taking it up offers appealing possibilities for broadening the scope of what is considered reasonable and who is considered a welcome interlocutor, thus overcoming some of the more common criticisms of traditional liberal theory that accuse it of being overly constraining and smuggling pre-determined outcomes into the debate through the particular structure of what counts as discourse.7 It also offers a more precise explanation of how the process works and what, exactly, has been so insufficient about narrower renditions of public reason like those of Rawls or Habermas.