Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Economics Faculty Research and Publications Economics, Department of 9-15-2007 Why is Economics Not Yet a Pluralistic Science? John B. Davis Marquette University, [email protected] Published Version. Post-Autistic Economics Review, Vol. 43 (September 2007): 42-51. Permalink. © 2007 Paecon. Used with permission. post-autistic economics review, issue no. 43 Why is economics not yet a pluralistic science? John B. Davis [University of Amsterdam and Marquette University] copyright: John Davis 2007 Introduction: the nature of pluralism Pluralism as a vision of professional interaction in research and pedagogy has acquired a growing following in economics, first and foremost among heterodox economists but also now also among mainstream economists associated with the new research approaches in the field. At the same time, debate and discussion about the nature of pluralism in economics still seems to be at an early stage with many important questions still unaddressed. One major issue concerns the relationship between pluralism seen as a prescription for economic practice and pluralism seen as a description of economic practice. Consider the following two questions. Do calls for pluralism reflect there already being real movement toward pluralism in the discipline? Or, do calls for pluralism help create a basis for pluralism in the discipline? Though many might reject the either/or nature of these questions, and wish to affirm both, the relative weight they place on each proposition makes a difference to how we understand pluralism. That is, if there is a real movement toward pluralism in economics, this would tell us specific things about how pluralism can be supported. Alternatively, if calls for pluralism are primarily instrumental in creating the basis on which pluralism may develop in the discipline, this tells us something else about how pluralism can be supported. Freeman and Kliman (2006) appear to take the latter view of the matter, namely, they see prescription in the lead, see very little actual pluralism in economics (including in heterodox economics), and hope that a clear and commanding call for pluralism will create a particular kind of pluralism they label ‘critical pluralism.’ My view is somewhat the opposite of theirs, and is at once both optimistic and pessimistic. I am optimistic in believing that there is an increasing practice of pluralism in economics (in both heterodox and, contrary to what many hold, also in mainstream economics), and that this practice is influencing the culture of economics. I am pessimistic in believing that the limitations that apply to the current practice of pluralism in economics narrow what may realistically be sought in attempts to create a stronger culture of pluralism in economics. In this paper I seek to contrast these two visions of pluralism in economics, and emphasize the central importance of strategy regarding pluralism in economics. Strategy on this subject depends in my view on sorting out the relationship between pluralism’s status as a prescription for economic practice and its use as a description of economic practice. My general view, however, irrespective of how people sort out their different understandings of this relationship, is that there has been very little thinking thus far about pluralism as a ‘strategic pluralism,’ where this involves determining what goals to pursue relative to the context in which they are pursued (see Davis and Sent, 2006). This short paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of the paper sets out Freeman and Kliman’s critical pluralist conception of pluralism. Section 3 examines the assumptions behind critical pluralism, and argues that their view of natural science, on which it rests, is inaccurate. Section 4 examines the strategy for reform of economics that Freeman and Kliman employ, and argues that this strategy is unlikely to be effective. Section 5 turns to an alternative view of pluralist reform for economics, drawing on the interconnectedness of 42 post-autistic economics review, issue no. 43 values and explanations, and characterizes this view as a strategic pluralism. Section 6 considers the prospects for pluralism in economics in the long run. Critical pluralism In their recent contribution to the Post-Autistics Economic Review, Alan Freeman and Andrew Kliman (2006) argue that economics is not a pluralistic science, and make a strong case that it ought to be if it is to be a genuine science. Their interpretation of pluralism as critical pluralism identifies a set of obligations they believe all researchers should always observe. Briefly, researchers should critically engage alternative explanations, including their presuppositions, identity the evidence for their own explanations, and identify the evidence for alternative explanations. In a word, critical pluralism is about engagement. Most economists, they argue, pursue their research without consideration of the research and arguments of others. Freeman and Kliman believe, however, that genuinely scientific research is always carried out in the spirit of serious attention to alternative research pathways. Behind their proposal lies a critique of a strategy for pluralism they attribute to heterodoxy: “we argue that heterodox economists have made the mistake of reducing pluralism to diversity,” where what they mean by this is advocating that there be a multitude of diverse approaches in economics. The problem with this strategy, they believe, is that it results in a set of “monotheoretic” practices largely closed off to one another in a supposed evolutionary “market for economic theory” (31). Proponents of each approach expect their particular approach will ultimately be seen to be true, and accordingly feel little need to engage other approaches. The International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE) is taken to be an embodiment of this conception of pluralism in that ICAPE is seen as an umbrella organization for heterodox groups that share an antipathy to neoclassicism but otherwise communicate very little with one another. Accordingly, when it comes to heterodoxy’s stance toward orthodoxy, this kind of pluralism is then confined to insisting that every ‘school,’ orthodox or heterodox, be fairly represented within economics as a legitimate school – that is, that economics be re-made in the image of ICAPE. In their view, however, this understanding of pluralism reproduces both between schools and indeed within schools the same intolerance that orthodoxy exhibits vis-à-vis heterodoxy, and thus it can never contribute to the reform of economics as a whole. As an understanding of pluralism, they argue, it goes wrong in failing to appreciate the multiplicity of views within any particular school, the opportunities for real exchange between researchers who disagree, and is contrary to the spirit of engagement they believe characterizes genuine science. Freeman and Kliman’s answer, then, to the question, why is economics not yet a pluralistic science, is simply that economics is not yet a science. “Our central thesis is that pluralism is not the condiment but the main course. Because economics is not pluralist, it is not scientific” (38; original emphasis). Their answer thus resonates with Thorstein Veblen’s and Alfred Eichner’s almost identical answers to similar questions. Veblen asked why economics was not an evolutionary science (Veblen, 1898), and Eichner asked why economics was not yet a science (Eichner, 1983). They both faulted neoclassical economics, because they believed neoclassical economics to be fundamentally nonscientific. For both, neoclassicism constitutes a metaphysical system not grounded in empirical practices and a culture of open exchange between scientists that permit the development of ideas and theories. Thus like Freeman and Kliman, they regard the main problem as a bad science culture of economics. 43 post-autistic economics review, issue no. 43 Where Veblen and Eichner, on the one hand, and Freeman and Kliman, on the other, seem to disagree, however, is with respect to the confidence we can place on evolutionary forces to create an open science culture in economics. Veblen and Eichner arguably see good epistemological and empirical practice as a positive selection device in economics and social science, whereas Freeman and Kliman argue that “the evolution of ideas in economics selects not for truth, but for political acceptance, above all by those classes in society who fund it” (Freeman and Kliman, 2006, 39). Neoclassicism, then, is selected for on Freeman and Kliman’s argument on the grounds of its political acceptability. Alternatively, pluralism in economics is not produced by evolutionary forces. At the same time, the opposite is said to be the case with respect to natural science: The selection process in the natural sciences is, possibly against the will of the natural scientists, intrinsically pluralistic. What we mean by this is that the sciences are organised in such a way that, in the course of their quest to explain natural phenomena, observed reality is tested against a wide range of possible theoretical explanations of that reality (Ibid., 42; original emphasis). In economics, where this does not apply, the ability of a theory to predict is consequently not regarded as an important criterion of acceptance or rejection, with the result that ‘logical coherence’ – too often something merely in the eyes of the beholder – is advanced in the place of empirical