Fettes, Carol (2018) Testing the sufficiency of virtue ethics as theistic theory through a reading of the book of Amos. PhD thesis. https://theses.gla.ac.uk/9097/ Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Enlighten: Theses https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] Testing the sufficiency of virtue ethics as theistic theory through a reading of the book of Amos Carol Fettes Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD School of Critical Studies College of Arts University of Glasgow January 2018 2 Abstract The ancient theory of virtue ethics has been rejuvenated in recent years, and many believe that this ‘new’ approach to ethical theory might not only revitalise the sometimes stale and often intractable nature of contemporary moral debate, but also serve as a viable alternative to traditional normative theories. This thesis aimed firstly to test this claim, and secondly, to construct a modified version which would not only be useful for the theist, but could also serve as a heuristic device for reading the text of the Old Testament. The method employed to conduct this investigation was to identify and critique the essential features of a virtue-based theory, and then suggest theological interpretations of each based on the text of the OT. These interpretations would be subsequently tested through a canonical reading of the Book of Amos. It was found that an Aristotelian form of virtue ethics admitted the closest parallels with the biblical text, and provided the best framework for the construction of a theistic version. But it was also found that virtue ethics, in all its contemporary forms, was unable to justify an account of right action, and so explain the source of normativity. We concluded that, while a theistic version of virtue ethical theory could indeed provide a useful heuristic device for reading the biblical text, virtue ethics alone could not provide a viable alternative to traditional normative theories. However, it was suggested that this shortcoming could be rectified through a partnership with a modified natural law theory. 3 Table of Contents Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... 10 Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ 11 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 13 1. Locating the current project in the theoretical landscape ..................................... 14 2. Methodology ............................................................................................................... 17 2.1. A point of clarification ................................................................................... 17 2.2. A declaration of presuppositions .................................................................. 18 3. The structure of the thesis ......................................................................................... 19 Chapter One What is virtue ethics? ................................................................................. 22 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 22 2. Conditions of adequacy and the search for a definition ......................................... 25 3. Some attractions of virtue ethics as a theory ........................................................... 28 4. Some weaknesses of virtue ethics as a theory .......................................................... 29 5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 30 Chapter Two The Concept of Good in a Teleological Ethic .......................................... 32 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 32 2. The meaning and uses of ‘good’ ............................................................................... 33 2.1. The ‘good’ and the ‘good for’ or absolute and relative goodness.............. 34 2.2. Good – natural or non-natural? ................................................................... 34 2.3. Concluding thoughts ...................................................................................... 35 3. Value in the modern period ...................................................................................... 36 4 4. Value in ancient theory .............................................................................................. 38 4.1. Eudaimonism as a theory of the good .......................................................... 38 5. Eudaimonism in ancient ethics: the theoretical options ......................................... 40 5.1. On the eudaimonia of the Stoics: the sufficiency of virtue ......................... 41 5.1.1. Concluding thoughts .......................................................................... 43 5.2. Aristotle on eudaimonia ................................................................................. 44 5.2.1. The nature of eudaimonia .................................................................. 46 5.2.2. Eudaimonia and external goods ........................................................ 49 5.2.3. Aristotle and the kalon....................................................................... 53 6. Eudaimonia in the OT? .............................................................................................. 56 6.1. Virtue as Torah obedience? Answering the deontological objection ........ 59 6.2. Revisiting Aristotle’s eudaimonia ................................................................. 62 6.3. A future aspect to eudaimonia ...................................................................... 63 6.4. Concluding thoughts ...................................................................................... 65 7. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 65 Chapter Three The virtue of Justice ................................................................................ 67 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 68 1.1. Justice: Changing conceptions ..................................................................... 68 1.2. The virtue of justice in ancient theory ......................................................... 69 2. Aristotle’s theory of justice ....................................................................................... 71 2.1. CVE theory and Aristotle’s justice: some problems .................................. 73 2.1.1. Problem 1: Inherent injustice? ......................................................... 73 2.1.2. Problem 2: Virtue and the state ........................................................ 75 2.1.3. Problem 3: Self-other tension ........................................................... 76 2.1.4. Problem 4: The problem of motive ................................................... 78 5 2.1.5. From justice to friendship: a proposed resolution .......................... 80 2.2. Concluding thoughts ..................................................................................... 82 3. David Hume ................................................................................................................ 83 3.1. Hume’s distinction ........................................................................................ 85 3.1.1. Can Hume’s distinction stand? ......................................................... 87 3.2 The virtue of justice and an ethics of care ................................................... 88 3.3. Concluding thoughts ...................................................................................... 90 4. The virtue of justice and theism ............................................................................... 91 4.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 91 4.2. Justice in the OT ........................................................................................... 92 4.2.1. Root špṭ ................................................................................................ 93 4.2.2. Root ṣdq ............................................................................................... 94 4.3. OT justice and VE theory: a potential resolution ...................................... 96 5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 99 Chapter Four Moral exemplarism as the imitatio Dei .................................................. 101 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................