Kremlin Watch Report 13.06.2018 2018 Ranking of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations Kremlin Watch Team Kremlin Watch is a strategic program which aims to expose and confront instruments of Russian This report has been consulted with 16 governmental influence and disinformation operations focused and non-governmental experts from 12 European against Western democracies. countries. 2018 Ranking of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations 1 2018 Ranking of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations 1. Introduction This report is a follow-up to the Overview of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin's subversion operations conducted by the European Values Think-Tank and published in May 20171. It summarises the attitudes, policies, and strategic responses of the EU28 to Russia's disinformation campaigns and other hostile influence operations. The special focus in this updated issue is on the main developments and changes, positive or negative, which took place during the months after the original report was published. Specifically, the developments have been updated up to June 1st, 2018. The second half of 2017 and first half of 2018 have been far from uneventful. The Kremlin's hostile activities are becoming ever bolder each month. Europeans have witnessed more attempts to meddle in domestic affairs and elections, increased activity of automated bots and trolls on social media, and even a physical attack on their own soil in the case of the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the public and political debate has also progressed. The mentioned events stirred wider discussions about the responsibility of social media platforms and the urgent need for media literacy amongst European citizen. The findings of the Report are based on a qualitative analysis of national strategy documents, reports, and official statements from all 28 member states that reveal the priorities of their individual foreign, security and defence policies. Specifically, this Report aims to summarize how individual EU member states are reacting to the growing threat of Russian subversion in three separate domains: 1) the government and political establishment, 2) the counterintelligence community, and 3) the non- governmental (civic) sector. The Report thus provides a comprehensive comparative overview of the current state of play in Europe, identifying common strengths and weaknesses between countries. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that typological studies are inherently reductive and thus cannot fully account for the particularities and complexity of individual cases (in this instance, the EU28 country profiles). Nonetheless, the identification of regional and group patterns, common challenges and proven best practices is a valuable exercise for gaining a deeper understanding of both the threat in question and the most effective palliative policies. The authors hope the Report fulfils these objectives and, furthermore, that it stimulates political will for decisive and internationally-coordinated action against Russian disinformation and other means of subversive influence. Any errors or omissions are our own. 1 http://www.europeanvalues.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Overview-of-countermeasures-by-the-EU28-to-the- Kremlin%E2%80%99s-subversion-operations-1.pdf 2 2018 Ranking of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations 2. Method Country profiles detailing the of state of play in each EU member state were compiled using policy reviews, media analyses, and independent expert data. We reviewed official strategy documents and summary reports of each member state, together with recent statements made by their political representatives and security/intelligence officials. Our analysis centred on content pertaining to the influence of foreign powers, cyber-security, disinformation campaigns, counterintelligence activities, and media literacy programs. We searched for all available data on policy proposals and countermeasures (both planned and implemented), as well as evidence of their effectiveness, using open-source, online, and academic sources. We also utilised the expertise gained through our cooperation with numerous institutions and organisations in the countries under review, in order to identify the most effective national projects and local response initiatives. If we have missed any relevant initiative, we will gladly update the Report as feedback arrives. The chief methodological contribution is the development of a rating system based on three qualitative measures: 1) political acknowledgment of the threat by state representatives, 2) government strategy and applied countermeasures, and 3) counterintelligence responses. The tables below define and operationalise the scale for each of the three measures. Based on each country’s total score (the sum of all three measures), we generated an overall symbolic ranking and grouped the EU28 into six categories based on their recognition of and response to the Russian threat. This categorisation is the basis of the Report’s conclusions and also structures our final recommendations based on individual states’ experience and capabilities. These recommendations follow the experiences and best practices of the EU countries that are most advanced in countering disinformation and hostile influence. 3 2018 Ranking of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations Analytical framework: Operationalization of the rating scale Political acknowledgment of the threat RATING DESCRIPTION SYMPTOM CRITERIA 0 COLLABORATION WITH Governing politicians play a Clear signs of cooperation of HOSTILE FOREIGN cooperative role with Kremlin governing politicians with hostile INFLUENCE foreign influence. foreign influence & any attempt for a state response to the Treat is stopped. 1 THREAT DENIAL Critical mass of the governing No relevant state response to the politicians denies or Threat is allowed by the government. systematically underplays existence of the Threat 2 THREAT PARTIALLY Individual politicians in the Ad hoc minor non-coordinated ADMITTED government admit existence of initiatives by individual state experts the Threat. Critical mass of are allowed, but complex policy is not governing politicians is reluctant pro- actively pursued by the to the threat government. 3 GOVERNMENT ADMITS Critical mass of the governing Specific government ministers seek THE THREAT politicians admits existence of to develop a policy response, the Threat and allows individual individual counter-measures are government bodies to start already implemented in practise, under-radar ad-hoc responses others are being planned. Agreement on the political direction. 4 GOVERNMENT ASKS FOR Steps for setting up national The government directly tasks its POLICY COUNTER- defence system to counter security institutions to create a MEASURES hostile foreign influence complex policy to counter the Threat, operations are being developed. not only ad hoc non-coordinated initiatives. 5 ALL-GOVERNMENT An all-government approach Specific initiatives are already put in POLICY adopted, policy is established practise, and no significant political COUNTERMEASURES IN and implemented. setbacks are present while policies PLACE are implemented. 4 2018 Ranking of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations Government counter-activities RATING DESCRIPTION SYMPTOM CRITERIA 0 COLLABORATI The government helps The government takes specific measures limiting the ON Russian influence to resilience of the country towards Russian influence or spread, either from enabling the fulfilment of the goals of the Kremlin, i.e. conviction or for limiting the freedom of the press, collaboration with opportunistic reasons. extremist parties, etc. 1 IGNORANCE The government is not There are no signs of any acknowledgement of the concerned with disinformation and influence operations coming from disinformation and Russia or elsewhere. influence operations; it does not consider them a threat and takes no steps to counter them. 2 PARTIAL There are a few single One or only a few departments of the state administration INITIATIVES IN initiatives and steps show concern with disinformation and influence operations SOME AREAS being taken to counter and takes steps to counter them. They are focused on disinformation and specific problems, for example cyber-security or media influence operations. literacy. The lack of resources or support prevents these The effectivity of these initiatives from being fully efficient. The country has a measures is representative in at least one of the international bodies questionable. countering disinformation operations. There is no sophisticated and coordinated policy in place. 3 SOPHISTICAT There are a few single One or only a few departments of the state administration ED initiatives and steps show concern disinformation and influence operations and INITIATIVES IN being taken to counter takes steps to counter them. They are focused on specific SOME AREAS disinformation and problems, for example cyber-security or media literacy. influence operations. They have enough resources and support and clearly show They are widely positive results. The country has a representative in at least supported and show one of the international bodies countering disinformation efficiency. operations. 4 INITIATIVES There are initiatives All the relevant departments of the