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Not Beyond Language: Wittgenstein and Lindbeck on the Problem of Speaking about God Khay Tham Nehemiah Lim Doctor of Philosophy The University of Edinburgh 2019 Declaration I, Khay Tham Nehemiah Lim, declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own. Signature: ________________________ Date: ___________________ iii To Jenise whose faith in me has been unswerving and whose encouragement has helped me stay the course. My debt of gratitude to her is beyond language. iv Abstract The problem of speaking about God arises from the claim that God is utterly transcendent and is ‘wholly other’ from human or this-worldly existence. Another challenge is the profound sense of mystery that surrounds God’s being. In traditional theology, the response opted by some is to keep silent. This would seem to have been the position of the early Wittgenstein who famously declares, ‘What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.’ In this study, I take a different position by contending that it is still possible to speak about God—that he is not beyond language. My argument, however, is that although we may speak about God, our language cannot be pressed to yield precise definitions or complete explanations of the divine. So, while language about God can and does open up previously shrouded pathways leading us to know (more) about God, the sheer incommensurability between divine transcendence and its possible expression should leave us with ambiguities and gaps in our understanding. My argument is wedged between two extreme understandings of religious language. On the one hand, there is the tendency to regard religious statements as having no factual content, or at best, as expressing moral or ethical intentions to follow a certain way of life. The consequence of this is that speech about God is rendered empty or even inauthentic, giving rise to scepticism. In contrast to this approach, however, is the tendency to assume that words are perfectly fitted to give believers precise explanations and render God (or, indeed, reality as a whole) completely intelligible. The consequence of the latter tendency is absolutism or idolatry. In support of my case, I will explore the philosophy of Wittgenstein and appropriate his insights to shed light on the nature of language and its use. Many of his notions, such as ‘meaning-as-use’, ‘language-games’, ‘form(s)-of-life’, and the ‘private-language-argument’ will be discussed. What will be stressed is Wittgenstein’s overall view that language is not merely a system of signs for stating facts or making truth-claims—even about God—but that the speaking of language is grounded in the setting of everyday life. Meaning, in a large class of cases, is bound up with ‘use’: what a word or statement actually means depends on how it is used in relation to the conventions, practices and needs of a given community. I will also seek to learn from George Lindbeck, a theologian whose postliberal theology was inspired by Wittgenstein and who has sought to maintain a balance between two not dissimilar poles of conceiving the use of religious language, namely, the ‘cognitive- propositional’ and the ‘experiential-expressive’ theories of religion. The conception of language I am concerned to advance here, however, does not deny the possibility of truth, and it does not imply that ‘anything goes’. The question of truth will be included in the discussion. Other than attempting to navigate a via media between scepticism and absolutism, my approach can also veer us toward a better appreciation of the proper role of language in speaking about God, and to an understanding of religion that is much more than that of being fixated with inquiring into or explaining about ‘how things are in the world’, as though religion were a science. v Lay Summary Even with widespread unbelief and indifference towards religious concerns in contemporary society, God continues to be habitually spoken of. God is addressed in prayers, reflected upon in religious discourses, and featured in scriptures, creeds, sermons, and liturgies. In all this diversity, the presupposition is that it is possible to say some things about the divine reality by means of language. A polarisation of views regarding the religious use of language has divided modern theology. On one pole, there is a tendency to treat religious statements as having no factual content, or at best, as expressing moral or ethical intentions to follow a certain way of life. The consequence of this is that speech about God is rendered empty or even inauthentic, giving rise to scepticism. On the other pole, there is the tendency to assume that words are perfectly fitted to give believers precise explanations and render God (or, indeed, reality as a whole) completely intelligible. The consequence of the latter tendency is absolutism or idolatry. The argument of my thesis is the simple but important one that though religious words and statements can give us factual content about God, they can only do so with a certain level of ambiguity or incompleteness. This follows from God’s radical otherness—that is, his being radically different from us and our language—and the presumed notion of divine mystery. The account of language I am concerned to advance here, however, does not deny the possibility of truth, and it does not imply that ‘anything goes’. The strategy I have adopted to argue my case is to appropriate insights principally from the philosopher of language, Ludwig Wittgenstein and in a secondary way, from the ecumenist theologian George Lindbeck, to shed light on language and its proper use. What will be stressed is Wittgenstein’s overall view that language is not merely a system of signs for stating facts or making truth-claims—even about God—but that the speaking of language is grounded in the setting of everyday life. Meaning, in a large class of cases, is bound up with ‘use’; that is to say, the meaning of a word or statement is dependent on how that word or statement is actually applied in relation to the conventions, practices and needs of a given community. As for Lindbeck, we will consider his use of language as an analogue for his understanding of religion and doctrine. Drawing on Wittgenstein, Lindbeck’s project offers an account of theological meaning that is best reached by navigating between two alternative approaches which he designates the ‘cognitive-propositional’ and the ‘experiential- expressive’. Lindbeck’s preferred theory is called the ‘cultural-linguistic’. Other than attempting to navigate a via media between scepticism and absolutism, my own thesis will also take us toward a better appreciation of the proper role of language in speaking about God, leading to an understanding of religion according to which religion does not revolve around the pursuit of so-called objective facts and exhaustive conceptions about God. When religious believing is so perceived, doctrinal differences across religions and within a religion will become less intransigent and more reconcilable. vi Acknowledgements In undertaking this research, I have been much helped and supported by many people. It is now my pleasure to record my gratitude. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, the Revd Professor David Fergusson for his comprehensive academic support and guidance. His penetrating critique at every stage of my research had been invaluable in furthering my thinking about what is presented in this study. I would also like to thank the Revd Dr Harriet Harris, my second supervisor, for her guidance and support. Thanks are also due to Ms Karoline McLean, the Postgraduate Studies & Research administrator for assistance rendered. I am deeply indebted to Professor Emeritus David Brown and Professor Emerita Ann L Loades, both at the University of St Andrews. As my former teachers at the University of Durham, they provided the recommendations for me to be accepted for this research project. In addition, David offered useful feedback on my work over several conversations, while Ann extended warm hospitality and encouragement. Grateful thanks are due to the Revd & Mrs Jeremy-Joe Tan and their children (Joshua and Anna Joy), Andy and Mabel Lie (Newcastle-upon-Tyne), Jim and Rhona Dunn (Morpeth), Eric Woodburn (Helensburgh) and the Revd & Mrs Jae-Hun Park (Edinburgh Japanese Church) for friendship, hospitality and meals. Jeremy-Joe (a fellow doctoral student from Singapore) and Tricia not only provided a ‘home’ for me in Edinburgh during the final stages of my writing-up, they gave me much support and encouragement. In spite of his busy schedule, Andy whose enthusiasm greatly inspired me, proofread most of this thesis and saved me from numerous embarrassing errors. I hasten to add that the flaws remain my own.